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Preface 
 
 
 
The presentations on which this book is based, were originally given during a Jean 
Monnet Fund/Centre for Migration Law seminar on the Returns Directive 
(2008/115/EC, Directive on Common Standards and Procedures in Member States 
for Returning Illegally Staying Third Country Nationals). This seminar took place in 
Nijmegen, at the Centre for Migration Law, Radboud University, on Monday 14 
February 2011. This was only little more than a month after the date the Member 
States should have transposed the Directive in their national legislation.  
We have decided to publish a book on the results of the seminar so that those 
unable to attend may benefit from the wealth of knowledge and information which 
was shared during the seminar.  
I would like to thank all the participants in the seminar, and especially the 
speakers – Diego Acosta, Kris Pollet, Pieter Boeles, Michele Cavinato, Alexandra 
Wilton Wahren, Tamás Molnár, Chiara Favilli, Marleen Maes, Marei Pelzer and 
Severine De Potter – for coming to speak and for giving their permission to publish 
their lectures in this book. I am also grateful to participants in the seminar, Marie-
Laure Basilien-Gainche and Serge Slama who allow us to share their knowledge on 
the French implementation of the Returns Directive. Also included in the book is a 
contribution of another participant in the seminar, Vera Honusková, who writes on 
the implementation of the Returns Directive in the Czech Republic. 
 
The seminar and this publication would not have been possible without Jean 
Monnet Fund funding. 
 
 
Karin Zwaan 
Centre for Migration Law, Radboud University Nijmegen 
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Introduction 
 
 
Karin Zwaan 
 
 
On 24 December 2010, the deadline for the implementation of the Directive on 
Common Standards and Procedures in Member States for Returning Illegally 
Staying Third Country Nationals (2008/115/EC, Returns Directive, RD)1 expired. 
By December 2010 only 6 Member States had notified the European Commission 
on the measures taken for transposition.2 Twenty Member States3  received a letter 
of formal notice sent by the Commission, because they had not had notified on 27 
January 2011 measures fully transposing the Returns Directive. On 12 April 2011 
only twelve Member States notified a full transposition (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Finland, Greece, Malta, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, 
Hungary), and five notified a partial transposition (Belgium, Lithuania, Latvia, 
Sweden, Netherlands) to the Commission. 
This book is on the central themes, problem issues, and the implementation of 
the Returns Directive. The objective of the Returns Directive is, as recital 20 
explains, to establish common rules concerning return, removal, use of coercive 
measures, detention and entry bans. To this end, the Directive sets out common 
standards and procedures to be applied in Member States for returning illegally 
staying third country nationals, in accordance with fundamental rights as general 
principles of Community law as well as international law, including refugee 
protection and human rights obligations (Article 1 RD). 
 
The book is divided in two sections. The first section, containing 4 contributions 
goes into the central themes and the problem issues of the Returns Directive. The 
second part of the book focuses on the implementation of the Returns Directive in 
a selected number of Member States. Contributions on the implementation or non-
implementation in Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Sweden are included. Also there is a contribution by the Fundamental Rights 
Agency. 
In the first article of the first section, Acosta gives an overview of the Directive. 
He goes into the legal basis and the establishment of the Returns Directive and gives 
an overview of the content of the Directive. He discusses the main provisions by 
analysing their legal implications. Acosta presents some of the issues which were 
controversial during the negotiations and which are proving contentious during its 
implementation in some Member States. Also he addresses the possible limits of the 
Returns Directive.  
                                                        
1  OJ 2008, L 348/98. 
2  According to press releases on www.EUobserver.com, www.euractiv.com. 
3  Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Denmark, Greece, France, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Finland, 
Sweden. 
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The negotiations on the Returns Directive were closely followed by Pollet. He 
describes in his contribution how the Returns Directive was the result of intense 
negotiations. The first part of his contribution will provide some general reflections 
on the negotiation process from an NGO-perspective and in particular how the level 
of transparency varies in the different stages of the process.  In the second part of 
the article by Pollet, some observations will be made with regard to the final 
outcome of the negotiations from a human rights perspective. 
Boeles, in his article, goes into one of the most important instruments of the 
Returns Directive, namely the entry ban. In his contribution he presents the 
characteristics of the entry ban as it has been regulated in the Directive. He also 
makes a connection between the entry ban as entailed in the Returns Directive and 
another EU measure which has very similar features: the alert in the Schengen 
Information System (SIS).   
In the article of Cavinato,  he goes into the principles of the Returns Directive 
and the lack of procedural guarantees. He describes that due to the absence of 
specific procedural safeguards, two categories of third country nationals are in 
particular at risk of being prevented from accessing international protection or of 
being returned to persecution: those issued with an entry ban; and those who do 
not fall within the scope of application of the Directive because “apprehended or 
intercepted by the competent authorities in connection with the irregular crossing 
of the external border of a Member Stare”. 
 
The second part of the book starts with an article on the implementation of the 
Returns Directive in Sweden. Wilton-Wahren describes the Swedish legislation 
process, and the legislation process with regard to the Returns Directive. 
The implementation of the Returns Directive in Hungary is highlighted by 
Molnár.  
In the contribution of Favilli on Italy she indicates that the transposition of 
directives in Italy is carried out once yearly with a bill which is enacted by 
Parliament at the initiative of the Government. Where the implementation requires 
major changes, Favilli says, the government is required by law to enact a bill of 
implementation within a three-month time-limit if the deadline for the directive is 
about to expire or has already expired, or to respect the same deadline provided for 
in the directives. In addition to this general procedure of implementation, 
Government and Parliament can implement a Directive by using the traditional 
legislative tools, such as an act of parliament, a government bill, a regulation or a 
decree. She indicates that none of these tools were used by the Italian Government 
to implement the Returns Directive.   
Maes goes into the implementation of the Returns Directive in Belgium, with a 
focus on suspension of removal. She indicates that the Returns Directive addresses 
the issue of non-removal in a very summary way, leaving much to the discretion of 
Member States. Her contribution examines in which way the Returns Directive now 
deals with non-removal and where the differences lie with the original Commission 
proposal. Also, her contribution will describe how Belgium deals with non-removal 
and if the legislation in place is in line with the minimum provisions of the Return 
Directive. She also especially gives attention to some future perspectives. 
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For Germany, the negotiations of the Returns Directive at EU level have been 
very controversial: the proposal for the directive presented by the Commission in 
2005 was classified by the German Government as too liberal, as can be read in the 
article of Pelzer. She goes into to the implementation of the Returns Directive in 
Germany.  
Basilien-Gainche and Slama describe the situation in France. The conclude that 
the context of the examination of the French law that is supposed to transpose the 
Returns Directive has been rather peculiar. The French Interior Minister currently 
in charge, Claude Guant, multiplied declarations that stated his ambition to limit 
illegal and legal immigration; meanwhile the flow of African refugees fleeing Libya 
and landing in Italy was intensifying.  
These events shed light on the fact that the system of burden-sharing between 
Member States for the reception of asylum seekers and migrants keeps is limited 
and deficient. They instigate that further attention has to be paid to the text 
adopted by the legislative authorities and to the way it is enforced by administrative 
authorities, keeping in mind that as astonishing as it can be  the Returns Directive 
and the EU law seem to offer a protection of last resort for the migrants rights. 
Honusková introduces in her contribution the main changes which were brought to 
the Czech legislation in connection with transposition of the Returns Directive. 
The book ends with a contribution from the Fundamental Rights Agency. They 
go into their report Detention of third-country nationals in return procedures of 
November 2010. The report is the result of a project on the rights of irregular 
immigrants in voluntary and involuntary return procedures included in the 2009 
Work Programme of the Agency. The report focuses on particular provisions of the 
Return Directive; namely Article 15 on the detention of third-country nationals 
who are the subjects of return procedures. 
 
This book offers insight in all the different aspects of the Returns Directive. The 
central themes, the problem issues and the implementation. 
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7 
The Returns Directive: Possible Limits and Interpretation 
 
 
Diego Acosta Arcarazo 
1.  Introduction 
The challenge of irregular or undocumented migration1 in Europe is important not 
in terms of numbers but rather in terms of the highly politicised debate surround-
ing it.2 The term ‘irregular migrant’ refers to a variety of situations, from third-
country nationals who enter the territory of a member state without authorization 
by land, sea and air with the help of organized criminal networks of smugglers and 
traffickers, to the largest group of people that enter legally with a valid visa or under 
a visa-free regime, but ‘overstay’, to those who are unsuccessful asylum seekers who 
do not leave after a final negative decision. There is a last category which includes 
those who lose their regular status in the course of a renewal of a residence permit. 
Thus, holders of expired residence permits are de jure irregularly residing in a mem-
ber state.3 
Nevertheless, the European Union (EU) often seems not to have captured its 
various intricacies and tries instead to address the issue with measures which may be 
considered unsatisfactory, as will be seen below. The Returns Directive,4 in fact, 
aimed at solving the debate on undocumented migration by establishing a common 
                                                        
1  The author prefers the use of the term irregular or undocumented migration as opposed to il-
legal migration. Both will be used as synonyms of illegal when appropriate in the paper. 
2  According to the most reliable statistics, there were only between 1.9 and 3.8 million irregular 
migrants present in the EU in 2008, which merely represented between 0.39 and 0.77 percent 
of the total EU population. See V. Kovacheva and D. Vogel (2009), The Size of the Irregular For-
eign Resident Population in the European Union in 2002, 2005 and 2008: Aggregated Estimates, 
Working Paper No. 4, Hamburg: Institute of International Economics, Database on Irregular 
Migration 2009. 
3  A. Kraler, Regularisation: A Misguided Option or Part and Parcel of a Comprehensive Policy Response 
to Irregular Migration?, IMISCOE Working Paper No. 24, Amsterdam: IMISCOE 2009, p. 11. 
This different categories were also acknowledged by the European Commission in its Com-
munication on Policy priorities in the fight against illegal immigration of third-country na-
tionals, Brussels, 19.7.2006, COM (2006) 402 final. 
4  Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 
2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying 
third-country nationals, OJ 2008, L 348, 24.12.2008, p. 98. The Directive is applicable to all 
EU Member States except for the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark due to their special 
opt-out provisions. It also covers Iceland, Norway, Switzerland and Liechtenstein within the 
meaning of the agreements concluded between the EU and those countries as regards their as-
sociation with the Schengen Acquis. Member States were required to bring into force the nec-
essary legislation to comply with the Directive by 24 December 2010, except with regard to ar-
ticle 13(4) which deadline was extended until 24 December 2011. 
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European instrument by which irregular stay should be ended through a fair and 
transparent procedure.5 Indeed, the EU has always advocated that an effective re-
turn policy is vital in ensuring public support for other phenomena such as regular 
migration and asylum.6 It was understood that third-country nationals who did not 
have a legal status enabling them to stay in the EU, either on a temporary or per-
manent basis, should leave. A credible threat of a forced return, the Commission 
argued, would send a clear message to potential undocumented migrants that ir-
regular entry into the EU would not lead to a stable form of residence.7 A central 
question, however, remains: what is the legal status of those third-country nationals 
who cannot be expelled? The Returns Directive only partially answers the question 
as will be seen below. 
It may be argued that the Returns Directive has been the most controversial 
immigration instrument passed by the EU. The Directive was adopted by the Par-
liament and the Council by using the procedure formerly known as co-decision, 
now the ordinary legislative procedure.8 The negotiations have already attracted the 
interest of the academic community due principally to their lack of transparency.9 
Once the Directive was adopted, it received a tremendous amount of criticism from 
other International Organisations such as the United Nations10 or the Council of 
Europe, as well as from different NGOs such as Amnesty International or ECRE.11 
Even more interesting were the critiques by Latin American Regional Organizations 
and States, which constituted an unprecedented common reaction to an EU meas-
ure.12 
The Directive had to be implemented by 24 December 2010. Some articles have 
already been published on the preliminary transposition of the Directive in some 
Member States13 and an in-depth analysis of the Directive has been provided by 
                                                        
5  Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on common stan-
dards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, 
COM (2005) 391 final, p. 4. 
6  European Commission (2006), Communication on Policy Priorities in the Fight against Ille-
gal Immigration of Third-Country Nationals, COM (2006) 402 final, Brussels, 19 July 2006, 
at p. 10. 
7  European Commission (2002), Communication on a Community Return Policy on Illegal 
Residents. COM (2002) 564 final. Brussels, 14 October 2002, at p. 8. 
8  See Article 294 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. 
9  See on this D. Acosta, ‘The Good, the Bad and the Ugly in EU Migration Law: Is the Euro-
pean Parliament Becoming Bad and Ugly (The Adoption of Directive 2008/115: The Returns 
Directive)’, European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 11(1), 2009, pp. 19-39. See also for an 
analysis of its adoption by the Commission’s negotiator of the Directive: F. Lutz, The Negotia-
tions on the Return Directive, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers 2010. 
10  M. Ilies, Irregular Immigration Policy in the European Community: Action at All Stages of the Irregular 
Migration Flow (WP), Working Paper 38/2009, Real Instituto Elcano 2009, p. 13. 
11  ECRE (European Council on Refugees and Exiles) (2009), Information Note on the Directive 
2008/115/EC. CO7/1/2009/Ext/MDM. 
12  D. Acosta Arcarazo, Latin American Reactions to the Adoption of the Returns Directive, Brussels: 
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), 13 November 2009. 
13  D. Acosta, ‘Migration and Borders in the European Union: The Implementation of the Re-
turns Directive on Irregular Migrants in Spain and Italy’, in E. Zapata (ed.), Shaping the Norma-
→ 
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other authors.14 The objective of this paper is to present some of the issues which 
were controversial during the negotiations and which are proving contentious dur-
ing its implementation in some Member States. Hence, in the second Section, after 
providing an overview of the Directive, I will refer to Article 2 on the scope of the 
Directive, Article 7 on voluntary departure, Article 11 on the entry ban and, finally, 
Article 15 on detention. The aim is thus to offer some thoughts as to the possible 
interpretation and limits of these provisions. I will then look in Section 3 at the 
main challenges ahead once the implementation of the Directive is completed, es-
pecially in light of the Kadzoev ruling, notably the status of those third-country na-
tionals who cannot be returned to their country of origin but remain in a Member 
State in an undocumented situation. I will try to shed some light on this issue by 
looking at the possibilities in the Directive itself, the likeliness of a new Directive on 
the matter, the role of the Courts and the legislative options that Member States 
can pursue by using the Spanish example. I will conclude with some reflections on 
the implementation of the Directive and its role in enhancing or deteriorating ir-
regular migrants’ rights in Europe. 
2.  Scope, Voluntary Departure, Entry Ban and Detention 
The objective of the Directive is to set out ‘common standards and procedures to be 
applied in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals’ (Ar-
ticle 1). The concept of return includes the country of origin, a transit country or 
any other country to which the irregular migrant voluntarily decides to return and 
in which he or she will be accepted. The Directive deals with a number of issues re-
garding a return procedure. It establishes the obligation for Member States to issue 
a return decision (Article 6) although some exceptions apply, notably the possibility 
to grant a residence permit for compassionate, humanitarian or other reasons (Arti-
cle 6.4). I will refer to this provision below in Section 3. Irregularly staying third-
country nationals shall be granted a period for voluntary departure which ranges be-
tween 7 and 30 days, albeit some exceptions, which will be mentioned below, are 
permitted (Article 7). Article 8 to 10 deal with the removal of the third-country na-
tional whereas Article 11 provides that return decisions shall be accompanied by an 
entry ban under certain circumstances. This provision will be further explored in 
this Section. The Directive establishes a common minimum set of procedural safe-
guards in order to guarantee effective protection of the individuals concerned (Arti-
                                                        
tive Contours of the European Union: a Migration-Border Framework, Barcelona: CIDOB Founda-
tion 2010, pp. 81-95. 
14  A. Baldaccini, ‘The Return and Removal of Irregular Migrants under EU Law: An Analysis of 
the Returns Directive’, European Journal of Migration and Law, Vol. 11(1), 2009, pp. 1-17; S. 
Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, third ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press 2010, pp. 
563-575; P. Boeles, M. den Heijer, G. Lodder and K. Wouters, European Migration Law, Ant-
werp/Oxford/Portland: Intersentia 2009, pp. 411-422; K. Hailbronner (ed.), EU Immigration 
and Asylum Law. Commentary on EU Regulations and Directives, München: C.H.Beck, Hart, No-
mos 2010, pp. 1505-1552. 
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cles 12-14). Article 15 deals with detention and it has been the object of harsh con-
demnation as it provides that irregular migrants can be detained for a period of up 
to 18 months in certain situations.  In particular, a Member State could order such 
a period for reasons beyond the control of the migrant, in cases when there is a de-
lay in obtaining the necessary documentation from third-countries, as will be seen 
below. Finally, Article 18 offers Member States the possibility to adopt special 
measures in cases of emergency situations due to a large number of third-country 
nationals to be returned. 
2.1 Scope 
Article 2 deals with the scope of the Directive. It first establishes the general rule 
that the Directive applies to all third-country nationals staying irregularly (the Direc-
tive says illegally) on the territory of a Member State.15 There are however two possi-
ble exceptions to this general rule enshrined in Article 2(2). 
a. Irregular Border Crossing 
First, a Member State may decide not to apply the Directive to those third-country 
nationals who are subject to a refusal of entry in accordance with the Schengen 
borders Code, ‘or who are apprehended or intercepted by the competent authorities 
in connection with the irregular crossing by land, sea or air of the external border of 
a Member State and who have not subsequently obtained a right to stay in that 
Member State’. Some authors have already referred to the second exclusion in this 
Article, from the scope of the Directive, since the first one (refusal of entry in ac-
cordance with the Schengen borders Code) seems clear. The main element in my 
view is to see what the words ‘in connection with the irregular crossing’ mean. Bal-
dacinni argues that the wording itself suggests a narrow interpretation of the catego-
ries of irregular migrants that may be excluded from its scope.16 Peers, in turn, pro-
vides some convincing arguments for this same interpretation.17 First, the exclusion 
makes no reference to national law and hence the exception should have an 
autonomous Union law meaning.18 Second, it is clear that the drafters did not in-
tend to exclude all ‘cases of clandestine entry from the scope of the Directive’. Oth-
erwise, they could have used the same formulation of Article 12(3) to exclude all 
migrants ‘who have illegally entered the territory of a Member State and who have 
not subsequently obtained an authorisation or a right to stay’.19 Finally, Peers con-
tinues, the preamble establishes that the Directive should apply to all irregular mi-
                                                        
15  This is also mentioned in Recital 5 of the Directive: ‘This Directive should establish a hori-
zontal set of rules, applicable to all third-country nationals who do not or who no longer fulfil 
the conditions for entry, stay or residence in a Member State.’ 
16  Baldaccini 2009, at p. 3. 
17  Peers 2010, at pp. 564-565. 
18  See about the issue of a Union law meaning in the context of the Long-term Residence Direc-
tive: D. Acosta Arcarazo, The Long-Term Residence Status as a Subsidiary form of EU Citizenship. 
An Analysis of Directive 2003/109, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 2011, pp. 206-208. 
19  Article 12(3) of the Directive. 
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grants present in the EU without making any distinction. This makes Peers con-
clude that: 
 
In this light, the optional exclusion for irregular border crossing should only ap-
ply where a person was stopped at or near the border, in principle by border 
guards carrying out border surveillance as part of their border control obliga-
tions, and not when a clandestine entrant was later detected on the territory.20 
 
Hailbronner interprets the provision in a similar way by pointing out ‘that a veri-
fiable direct link to the act of irregular border crossing should be required’.21 
Hence, I believe that national courts, as well as the Court of Justice of the EU 
(CJEU) and the Commission, would interpret this provision narrowly as an excep-
tion to the general rule that the Directive applies to all migrants present in an ir-
regular situation in a Member State. This will no doubt ‘ensure a minimum of legal 
certainty’.22  
Finally, it is important to mention that third-country nationals excluded from 
the scope of the Directive in accordance with this provision do enjoy certain mini-
mum guarantees laid down in Article 4(4). 
b. Criminal Law Sanction 
A Member State may also decide not to apply the Directive to those third-country 
nationals who ‘are subject to return as a criminal law sanction or as a consequence 
of a criminal law sanction, according to national law, or who are the subject of ex-
tradition procedures’ (Article 2(2)(b)). Here there is the need to interpret what is 
meant by criminal law sanction due to the fact that some Member States consider 
irregular entry or stay as a criminal offence.  
Italy, for example, introduced, in its 2009 modification of its immigration law, a 
new Article23 by which entering or staying in Italy without permission is considered 
a crime punishable by a fine of 5,000 to 10,000 Euros. Interestingly enough, the 
Government itself has sometimes declared that the rationale for introducing such 
Article was to avoid its obligations under the Directive by declaring all irregular mi-
grants as criminals.24 Hence, an interpretation of Article 2(2)(b) as granting Member 
States full discretion not to apply the Directive when, according to national law, ir-
regular entry of stay is considered as a criminal law sanction, as Hailbronner argues, 
cannot be upheld.25 In fact, such an interpretation would render the Directive 
meaningless by depriving it of all its effectiveness. Thus, I agree with Peers’ under-
standing of this provision by which ‘the criminal law exclusion cannot apply where 
the criminal offences in question relate only to irregular migration’. Otherwise, as 
                                                        
20  Peers 2010, at p. 565. 
21  K. Hailbronner 2010, p. 1513. 
22  Ibid. 
23  See Article 10 bis Law 15 July 2009, no. 94, Disposizioni in materia di sicurezza publica. 
24  P. Bonetti  (2009) ‘La Proroga del Trattenimento e i Reati di Ingresso o Permanenza Irregolare 
nel Sistema del Diritto degli Stranieri: Profili Costituzionali e Rapporti con la Direttiva 
Comunitaria sui Rimpatri’, Diritto Immigrazione e Cittadinanza, XI (4), pp. 85-128, at p. 125. 
25  K. Hailbronner 2010, p. 1513. 
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he rightly points out, an exception to the Directive would become the rule.26 The 
CJEU will soon have the chance to deal with this issue since in March 2011 the Ital-
ian Corte Suprema di Cassazione referred a question on the matter and requested for 
it to be dealt under the urgent procedure.27  
2.2 Voluntary Departure 
A period for voluntary departure28 is established in Article 7. Member States shall 
provide when issuing a return decision for an appropriate period for voluntary de-
parture of between seven and thirty days.29 Article 7(2) allows for the extension of 
the thirty-day maximum deadline taking into account individual circumstances, 
such as the length of stay, the presence of children attending school and the exis-
tence of other family or social links. In turn Article 7(4) provides Member States 
with the possibility not to grant a period for voluntary departure or to offer a 
shorter one under certain circumstances which will be mentioned below. 
The issue of voluntary departure is central in the Directive because of two rea-
sons. The first one is that if the third-country national is granted a period for volun-
tary departure, he/she will not be detained. The second one is that Member States 
are not obliged to impose a re-entry ban when the third-country national has been 
granted a period for voluntary departure and has left during that period.30  
It may be argued that, following the recent ruling in Chakroun,31 granting irregu-
larly staying third-country nationals a period for voluntary departure constitutes the 
general rule. Any exception to that general rule has to be interpreted strictly and 
based on an exhaustive list of three grounds provided in Article 7. These grounds 
do certainly have a Union law meaning and hence these exceptions to the general 
rule have to respect general principles of Union law such as proportionality or non-
discrimination.32 The idea that voluntary departure is the general rule is also sup-
ported by Recital 10 of the preamble which states that voluntary return should be 
preferred over forced return.33 
Article 7(4) lays down and exhaustive list of three situations where Member 
States may refrain from granting a period for voluntary departure: when there is a 
risk of absconding, when an application for a legal stay has been dismissed as mani-
                                                        
26  Peers 2010, p. 565. 
27  Corte Suprema di Cassazione, I sez. pen., n. 11050, 8 March 2011. Reference for a prelimi-
nary ruling from the Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Italy) lodged on 21 March 2011 – Crimi-
nal proceedings against Demba Ngagne (Case C-140/11). 
28  According to Article 3(8), ‘“voluntary departure” means compliance with the obligation to re-
turn within the time-limit fixed for that purpose in the return decision’. 
29  Article 7(1) of Directive 2008/115. 
30  The issue of voluntary departure is so important that the Stockholm program mentions that 
Voluntary return should be preferred. See Council of the European Union, The Stockholm Pro-
gramme: An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting Citizens, 5731/10, Brussels, 3 March 
2010, p. 108.  
31  Case C-578/08, Rhimou Chakroun v. Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken [2010]. 
32  The issue of non-discrimination is mentioned in Recital 21 of the Directive. 
33  See Case C-61/11, Hassen El Dridi, 28 April 2011, not yet published in the ECR, para. 36. 
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festly unfounded or fraudulent, or when the person concerned poses a risk to public 
policy, public security or national security. Let’s briefly look at them in turn. Risk of 
absconding means, according to Article 3(7), ‘the existence of reasons in an individ-
ual case which are based on objective criteria defined by law to believe that a third-
country national who is the subject of return procedures may abscond’. Hence, the 
assessment of such a risk has to be carried out on individual and objective grounds. 
That means that those measures cannot have a general preventive nature and have 
to be exclusively based on the personal conduct of the third country national con-
cerned.34 This idea is further reinforce by Recital 6 of the Directive which estab-
lishes that ‘according to general principles of EU law, decisions taken under this Di-
rective should be adopted on a case-by-case basis and based on objective criteria, im-
plying that consideration should go beyond the mere fact of an illegal stay.’  Hence, 
the mere fact that someone is an irregular situation in a Member State cannot pre-
suppose that he or she would abscond. That is also the case if someone is from a 
particular country, as otherwise, that would breach the general principle of non-
discrimination.   
Recital 6 is also important in the interpretation of the other two exceptions to 
the general rule of granting a period for voluntary departure. Hence, Member States 
may not consistently consider a certain category of applications as always being 
manifestly unfounded without taking into consideration the particular situation of 
the person concerned.35 Likewise, the third exception has to be interpreted narrowly 
taking into account the CJEU’s previous case law on the meaning of these terms.36 
In other words, irregular residence in itself does not automatically represent a risk 
to public policy, public security or national security.37 
Member States are allowed to provide that a period for voluntary departure will 
only be granted following an application of the third country national concerned. If 
that is the case, Member States are obliged to inform the individual of the possibil-
ity of lodging such a request. The Commission will have to be alert to monitor 
compliance with this obligation.  
By and large, the provision on voluntary departure cannot be underestimated. It 
is a step forward in those Member States which did not previously contemplate this 
possibility and which now have a period for voluntary departure such as Spain.38 
                                                        
34  See on this Case 67/74, Bosignore [1975] ECR 00297, paragraph 6. 
35  See for examples ECRE’s concerns on asylum applications. ECRE (2009) Information Note 
on the Directive 2008/115/EC, op.cit., at p. 13. 
36  It is for example settled case law that ‘the concept of public policy presupposes the existence 
of a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to one of the fundamental interests of society’. See 
Case C-97/05, Mohamed Gattoussi v Stadt Rüsselsheim, [2006] ECR I-11917, paragraph 41. 
37  See on this Case C-459/99 MRAX [2002] ECR I-6591. 
38  In Spain, there was no period for voluntary departure. The 2009 modification to the Immi-
gration Law, which implements the Directive, has introduced a period of between 7 and 30 
days. Moreover, the new wording of the law explicitly forbids the imposition of a re-entry ban 
when the migrant has complied with the obligation to leave the country during the period for 
voluntary departure. See Article 58(2) Ley Orgánica 2/2009, de 11 de diciembre, de reforma 
de la Ley Orgánica 4/2000, de 11 de enero, sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en 
España y su integración social, BOE 12 diciembre de 2009. 
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Finally, the provision has direct effect as some national courts have already recog-
nised.39 
2.3 Entry Ban 
The possibility/obligation to impose an entry ban was the third controversial issue 
during the negotiations to which I would like to pay attention.40 According to some 
authors, this is indeed the ‘key rule’ in the Directive.41  Entry bans are defined in 
Article 3(6) as prohibiting entry into the territory of the Member States for a speci-
fied period. Hence, the prohibition applies to the whole territory of the EU and not 
only to the Member State issuing the return decision.42 In fact, one of its most rele-
vant features resides in its compulsory character which intends to enhance the 
credibility of a Common European immigration policy by having preventative ef-
fects,43 although the usefulness of the deterrent effect of this approach has been 
doubted.44 Accordingly, Member States shall impose an entry ban in two situations: 
When no period for voluntary departure has been granted and when the obligation 
to return has not been complied with (Article 11(1)). Member States may, however, 
consider withdrawing or suspending the ban when the third-country national has 
complied with the return decision (Article 11(3)). Moreover, they retain a general 
power to refrain from issuing a ban or to withdraw or suspend it for humanitarian 
or other reasons in individual or certain categories of cases (Article 11(3), third and 
forth indent). Finally, victims of trafficking in human beings cannot be imposed a 
re-entry ban (Article 11(3) second indent). 
Article 11.2 as well as Recital 14 in the Directive clearly establish that the length 
of the entry ban should be determined with due regard to all relevant circumstances 
of an individual case. Therefore, a third-country national cannot automatically be 
imposed a five years entry ban without taking into consideration his/her personal 
circumstances.45 Member States may impose a longer entry ban when a third-
country national is considered to be a threat to public policy, public security or pub-
lic health. As mentioned in the previous provision these concepts have a Union law 
                                                        
39  See for example in Italy: Trib. Torino, III sez pen., 20 gennaio 2011, Giud. Natale, Imp. El 
B.M. See in France: Conseil d’État, CE, avis du 21 mars 2011, MM. J. et T., n° s 345978 et 
346612. 
40  The entry ban together with the detention proviso was the most criticised Article in the Direc-
tive by the Latin American region. See Acosta Arcarazo 2009, p. 4. 
41  Boeles, Den Heijer, Lodder and Wouters 2009, p. 412. 
42  Hailbronner 2010, p. 1517. 
43  Lutz 2010, p. 55. 
44  Baldaccini in fact argues that they might have the opposite effect of reinforcing the circle of ir-
regular migration since those who are banned may only enter the EU irregularly. See Baldac-
cini 2009, p. 9. 
45  Recital 14 of the Directive reads as follows: ‘The length of the entry ban should be deter-
mined with due regard to all relevant circumstances of an individual case and should not 
normally exceed five years. In this context, particular account should be taken of the fact that 
the third-country national concerned has already been the subject of more than one return 
decision or removal order or has entered the territory of a Member State during an entry ban’. 
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meaning and as an exception to the general rule that the entry ban should not be 
longer than five years have to be interpreted strictly.  
2.4 Detention 
Detention was certainly the most controversial provision in the Directive and the 
one which raised more public awareness. There are however several requirements 
which all have to be fulfilled in the detention of any third-country national: 
a. Lack of other less coercive measures 
According to Article 15(1) detention is only possible if there are no other sufficient 
but less coercive measures which can be applied effectively in a specific case. Hence, 
Member States’ authorities cannot automatically resort to detention without having 
taken into consideration other options. 
b. Detention as a preparation for the return or the removal process  
Moreover, Article 15 also provides that the aim of the detention has to be to pre-
pare the return and/or carry out the removal process. Thus, detention has to aim 
exclusively at removing the third-country national concerned. 
c. There is a reasonable prospect of removal 
According to Article 15.4, detention ceases immediately to be justified when the 
reasonable prospect of removal no longer exists. In such a situation the person con-
cerned shall be released immediately. The term ‘reasonable prospect of removal’ has 
been interpreted by the Court in Kadzoev.46 It only exists when a real prospect of re-
moval is possible taking into consideration the maximum period of detention. This 
will vary in the different Member States depending on their implementation of the 
Directive but has a maximum limit of 18 months. Moreover, the Court goes on, 
‘that reasonable prospect does not exist where it appears unlikely that the person 
concerned will be admitted to a third country, having regard to those periods’.47 
Hence, when a Member State faces a situation similar to the one in Kadzoev, where 
the country of origin does not recognise the person as being its citizen, the third-
country national has to be immediately released since there is no reasonable pros-
pect of removal in the period laid down by the Directive. That should also be the 
case when the practice has proven the impossibility to send third-country nationals 
back to certain countries of origin due, for example, to the lack of a readmission 
agreement. 
d. Detention up to six months can only take place in a limited number of situations 
Detention in order to prepare the return and/or carry out the removal process can 
take place, in particular, in two situations: when there is a risk of absconding or 
when ‘the third-country national concerned avoids or hampers the preparation of 
                                                        
46  See for an analysis of the facts in Kadzoev: E. Mincheva, ‘Case Report on Kadzoev, 30 Novem-
ber 2009’, European Journal of Migration and Law 12/3 (2009), pp. 361-371. 
47  Case C-357/09 PPU, Said Shamilovich Kadzoev (Huchbarov), [2009] ECR I-11189, paragraph 67. 
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return or the removal process’ (Article 15(1). The words ‘in particular’ suggest that 
this list is not exhaustive. However, in the absence of a reference to national law, 
these concepts have a Union law meaning and are subject to general principles of 
Union law such as non discrimination or proportionality. Indeed, Recital 16 ex-
pressly makes the use of detention subject to the principle of proportionality. 
Hence, Member States cannot, for example, automatically detain a person solely on 
the basis of his/her nationality. 
e. Detention for another 12 months can only take place in two situations 
The same Union law meaning applies to the grounds for extending an initial deten-
tion period of a maximum of six months for another 12 months owing to a lack of 
cooperation by the third-country national concerned, or when there are delays in 
obtaining the necessary documentation from third countries.48 This is an exhaustive 
list which will have to be interpreted restrictively, as it provides an exception to the 
general rule of a maximum period of detention of six months. 
Accordingly, all these requirements can be understood as a representation of the 
principle of proportionality by which detention ‘shall be for as short a period as 
possible and only maintained as long as removal arrangements are in progress and 
executed with due diligence’ (Article 15(1) second indent). The lack of any of these 
requirements represents a breach of the detention proviso and means that the third-
country national has to be immediately released. As the Court has recently pointed 
out in El Dridi, there is a gradation of measures in the return procedure, from the 
measure which allows the third-country national concerned the most liberty, namely 
granting a period for the voluntary departure, to the most restrictive one, namely 
detention. The principle of proportionality has to be observed throughout the 
whole procedure.49  
3. The Situation of Migrants in an Irregular Situation who cannot be expelled 
The previous section has looked at some of the most important issues that the na-
tional Courts and the CJEU, as well as national administrations and the Commis-
sion, will have to take into consideration when interpreting the Directive. There is 
nonetheless a vital question which remains open in the Directive: what is the situa-
tion of those third-country nationals who after having been imprisoned in a Mem-
ber State for the established time period cannot be expelled and hence remain in 
the territory of that Member State? This question is in fact more relevant since the 
Kadzoev ruling. Indeed, Mr. Kadzoev has no legal status in Bulgaria after his release 
since there are no legal provisions in Bulgaria to issue a residence permit to an ir-
regularly staying third-country national. Hence he cannot obtain a job for example 
and depends on charity for his subsistence.50 Should third-country nationals in this 
                                                        
48  Article 15(6) of the Directive. 
49  Case C-61/11, Hassen El Dridi, 28 April 2011, not yet published in the ECR, paragraph 41. 
50  Mincheva 2009, at p. 369. 
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situation be granted a residence permit? Is there any solution provided by the Direc-
tive?  
The Directive is not entirely clear in this regard. Once released, the person will 
still normally be covered by a return decision or removal order and Articles 8 and 
14 of the Directive will apply.  However, could these third-country nationals obtain 
a residence permit? This is in my view the key remaining question. I think there are 
four possible paths that may be taken in order to try to provide an answer for this 
question. I will look in turn at the Directive itself, the possibility to adopt new legis-
lation and the role of the Courts (notably the ECtHR and the CJEU). I will con-
clude with some examples of practices in Spain which aim at addressing this issue 
and which might provide a useful guidance for other Member States. 
3.1 The Directive 
The first option to solve such a situation is provided in the Directive itself. Article 
6(4) reads as follows: 
 
Member States may at any moment decide to grant an autonomous residence 
permit or other authorisation offering a right to stay for compassionate, humani-
tarian or other reasons to a third-country national staying illegally on their terri-
tory. In that event no return decision shall be issued. Where a return decision 
has already been issued, it shall be withdrawn or suspended for the duration of 
validity of the residence permit or other authorisation offering a right to stay. 
 
Hence the Directive provides a possibility, but not an obligation, for Member States 
to grant residence permits to third-country nationals in such a situation. Indeed, 
Recital 12 encourages Member States to address the situation of third-country na-
tionals who cannot be removed.51 This does not constitute in any case an obligation 
to regularise them. Nevertheless, Member States have the chance to grant a resi-
dence permit which will surely be beneficial not only for the third-country national 
concerned but also for the authorities themselves, as well as society at large.  
3.2 New Legislation 
A possible second option would be to adopt new legislation regarding regularisation 
procedures in the EU. This would require a proposal by the Commission coupled 
with its acceptance by the Parliament and the Council. The Commission already 
mentioned the issue in a 2008 Communication prior to the adoption of the Stock-
                                                        
51  Recital 12 reads as follows: ‘The situation of third-country nationals who are staying illegally 
but who cannot yet be removed should be addressed. Their basic conditions of subsistence 
should be defined according to national legislation. In order to be able to demonstrate their 
specific situation in the event of administrative controls or checks, such persons should be 
provided with written confirmation of their situation. Member States should enjoy wide dis-
cretion concerning the form and format of the written confirmation and should also be able 
to include it in decisions related to return adopted under this Directive.’ 
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holm programme. While pointing out that, in its view, effective return measures are 
an indispensible element of the EU’s immigration policy and that indiscriminate 
large-scale regularisations should be avoided, the Commission also acknowledged 
the need to leave open the possibility for individual regularisations52 as well as the 
importance of developing ‘a common approach on regularisation, including mini-
mum requirements for early information sharing’.53 Whereas the Parliament might 
be sympathetic to this idea, this is probably not the case for some Member States in 
the Council. Indeed, the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum adopted by 
the European Council in 2008 called ‘to use only case-by-case regularisation, rather 
than generalised regularisation, under national law, for humanitarian or economic 
reasons’.54 In line with this position, the Stockholm programme only mentions the 
need ‘to improve the exchange of information on developments at national level in 
the area of regularisation, with a view to ensuring consistency with the principles of 
the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum’55 whereas the Commission’s Ac-
tion Plan implementing the Stockholm programme simply disregards the issue.56 
In addition, this option seems even more difficult if the Directive on residence 
permits issued to third-country nationals who are the victims of trafficking in hu-
man beings57 is considered. This Directive only defines ‘the conditions for granting 
residence permits of limited duration, linked to the length of the relevant national 
proceedings, to third-country nationals who cooperate in the fight against trafficking 
in human beings or against action to facilitate illegal immigration’.58 The protection 
granted to this people is very limited since as soon as the conditions for the granting 
of the residence permit cease to be satisfied or if a decision adopted by the compe-
tent authorities terminate the proceedings, the residence permit is withdrawn.59 
Thus, it seems difficult to foresee European legislation in which Member States 
would provide migrants in an undocumented situation with more protection than 
victims of trafficking in human beings. 
                                                        
52  Commission Communication, A Common Immigration Policy for Europe: Principles, Ac-
tions and Tools, COM (2008) 359 final, 17.6.2008, p. 18. 
53  Ibid., p. 14. 
54  Council of the European Union, European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, 13440/08, 
Brussels 24 September 2008, adopted on 16 October, p. 7. 
55  Council of the European Union, the Stockholm Programme: An Open and Secure Europe 
Serving and Protecting Citizens, 5731/10, Brussels, 3 March 2010, p. 109. 
56  European Commission, Communication on Delivering an Area of Freedom, Security and Jus-
tice for Europe’s Citizens: Action Plan Implementing the Stockholm Programme, COM 
(2010) 171 final, Brussels, 20 April 2010. 
57  Council Directive 2004/81/EC of 29 April 2004 on the residence permit issued to third-
country nationals who are the victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the 
subject of an action to facilitate illegal immigration, who cooperate with the competent au-
thorities, OJ 2004  L 261/19. 
58  Ibid., Article 1. 
59  Ibid., Article 13. 
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3.3 The Courts 
The third option is to see what tools national and European courts (both the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the CJEU) have at their disposal in or-
der to grant a residence permit to migrants in an undocumented situation. The first 
step would be to see to what extent fundamental rights might play any role in this 
regard. Also, the recent ruling by the CJEU in Zambrano opens new possibilities.  
According to Recital 24 in the preamble, the Directive respects the fundamental 
rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights of the EU. This is re-stated in Article 1 where fundamental rights 
are considered as general principles of Union law as well as international law. There 
are some cases from the ECtHR regarding fundamental rights and irregular mi-
grants which are worth mentioning.  
The first one is Berrehab.60 Here, a Moroccan national was denied a residence 
permit after having divorced from his Dutch wife with whom he had a daughter. 
This was considered to constitute a violation of his right to family life under Article 
8 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). This case is relevant since it 
was the first time in which a third-country national ‘succeeded in establishing a 
right to residence as a fundamental human right contrary to the opinion of the state 
(including the courts of the state)’.61 
A second case is however more relevant: Rodrigues da Silva.62 Here, the first appli-
cant was a Brazilian national who entered the Netherlands in 1994 with a tourist 
visa which she overstayed. Soon afterwards she started a three years relationship 
with a Dutch national, Mr Hoogkamer, with whom she conceived a daughter in 
1996 who automatically obtained Dutch citizenship. During that time, Ms Rodri-
gues could have applied to regularise her residence in the Netherlands but neither 
she nor her partner made any such application.63  After three years the relationship 
broke up and the Dutch father was granted child custody. Ms Rodrigues, nonethe-
less, stayed working in the country and continued to care for the child despite of the 
fact that she had been requested by the Dutch Government to leave in 1999. The 
Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 8 and granted her a right 
to regularize her irregular stay since the economic well-being of the country did not 
outweigh Ms Rodrigues’ rights under Article 8.64 As Thym argues, this case illus-
trates the potential of Article 8 to grant undocumented migrants ‘a right to regular-
ize their irregular stay under the proportionality test’.65 
                                                        
60  Berrehab [1988] Ser. A 138. 
61  E. Guild (2004), The Legal elements of European Identity: EU citizenship and Migration Law, Euro-
pean Law Library, The Hague: Kluwer Law International 2004, p. 16. 
62  ECtHR, judgment of 31 January 2006, No 50435/99, Rodrigues da Silva & Hoogkamer v the 
Netherlands. See on this D. Thym, ‘Respect for Private and Family Life under Article 8 ECHR 
in Immigration Cases: a Human Right to Regularize Illegal Stay?’, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 57(1),2008,  pp. 87-112. 
63  Rodrigues da Silva, paragraph 34. 
64  Rodrigues da Silva, paragraph 44. 
65  Thym 2008, p. 101. 
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Rodrigues da Silva raises several questions such as to what extent the right to pri-
vate life could play a similar role in an analogous case and, if so, after how many 
years. It is however central to mention that one of the key elements which made the 
Court take such a decision was that ‘in the present case the Government indicated 
that lawful residence in the Netherlands would have been possible on the basis of 
the fact that the first applicant and Mr Hoogkamer had a lasting relationship’ be-
tween 1994 and 1997. This made the ECtHR to distinguish this unusual case from 
other similar ones.66 
A final case that I would like to mention is also unusual in its facts. In Zam-
brano67 a couple of Colombian nationals, Mr and Mrs Ruiz Zambrano, who had ar-
rived in Belgium, in 1999 and 2000 respectively, applied for asylum. Their applica-
tions were rejected and they were ordered to leave Belgium. Nevertheless, the order 
also included a non-refoulement clause stating that they should not be sent back to 
their country in view of the situation in Colombia.68 Hence, they fell into a limbo 
since they did not have an immigration status but the authorities would not take 
any steps to expel them.69 In the following years they had two children born in Bel-
gium who acquired Belgian citizenship. Mr Zambrano’s successive applications to 
regularise his situation were rejected. Finally, the Employment Tribunal in Brussels 
referred the case to the CJEU. By its questions, the Brussels Tribunal essentially 
asked whether Mr and Mrs Zambrano had a residence and work right in Belgium as 
parents of two EU citizens who resided in the Member State of which they are na-
tionals.70 The fact that the two Belgian children were residing in Belgium made sev-
eral Member States, as well as the Commission, submit observations arguing that 
this was an internal situation since there was no link with Union law. Whereas the 
Court established that the Citizens Directive 71 did not apply to the situation at 
hand, it concluded, by contrast, that Article 20 TFEU, conferring Union citizenship 
on every person holding the nationality of a Member State, was applicable.    
In fact, the Court re-stated its understanding of citizenship of the Union as ‘the 
fundamental status of nationals of the Member States’72 and established that Article 
20 TFEU precludes any national measure which may endanger its enjoyment.73 This 
would be the case, the Court contended, if Mr and Mrs Zambrano had to leave the 
territory of the Union as that would mean that the two Belgian (and hence EU citi-
                                                        
66  Rodrigues Da Silva, paragraph 43. 
67  Case C-34/09, Gerardo Ruiz Zambrano v Office national de l’emploi (ONEm), ECR 2011. 
68  Ibid., paragraph 15. 
69  E. Guild (2011), The Court of Justice of the European Union and Citizens of the Union: A Revolution 
Underway? The Zambrano judgment of 8 March 2011, European Union Democracy Observatory 
on Citizenship, at http://eudo-citizenship.eu/citizenship-news/453-the-court-of-justice-of-the-
european-union-and-citizens-of-the-union-a-revolution-underway-the-zambrano-judgment-of-8-
march-2011 (accessed 22 March 2011). 
70  Case C-34/09, Zambrano, paragraph 36. 
71  Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on 
the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within 
the territory of the Member States, OJ 2004 L158/77. 
72  Case C-34/09, Zambrano, paragraph 41. 
73  Ibid., paragraph 42. 
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zens) children would have to leave as well so as to accompany their parents. Hence, 
the CJEU decided that their parents had to be granted a residence as well as a work 
permit as otherwise, ‘those citizens of the Union, would, as a result, be unable to 
exercise the substance of the rights conferred on them by virtue of their status as 
citizens of the Union’.74 
In effect, this means that all parents of EU minor citizens, no matter what their 
nationality or immigration status, must be given the right to live and work in the 
Member State where they reside for as long as the children are minors and remain 
dependent on them. It does not matter in that regard that the child is the citizen of 
the Member state where the family is residing.75 
The cases just mentioned, albeit very important, do not influence the situation 
of many third-country nationals in an undocumented situation. Hence, it is impor-
tant to assess national practices which address the issue.  
3.4 National Practices: the Spanish Case 
I would like to conclude this Section by mentioning some examples of the possibili-
ties that Member States have in their sphere of competence to deal with irregular 
migration while trying to appreciate the fact that each case might demand different 
solutions. The new Spanish regulations, further developing its Immigration law, 
which entered into force on 30 June 2011, provide some examples of measures that 
Member States might take. I will follow by enumerating the most relevant ones. 
a. Befallen irregularity 
First, the new rules try to reduce the situation known as befallen irregularity. Be-
fallen irregularity refers to those cases in which a migrant who had a regular status 
at one point in time shifts to irregular status due to the impossibility to fulfil the 
conditions to renew his/her residence permit (for example because they could not 
prove that they have been working in the previous year).76 This has been an impor-
tant ‘source of irregularity’ in Spain77 and the new rules provide more mechanisms 
to tackle the situation. For example, those migrants who become unemployed will 
see their residence permit renewed if his/her registered partner or spouse is regu-
larly present in Spain and they prove sufficient resources between both of them.78  
With the previous rules there was no possibility to renew the permit by proving the 
registered partner’s resources but only the spouse’s.  
                                                        
74  Ibid., paragraph 44. 
75  Guild 2011. 
76  A. Triandafyllidou, ‘Irregular Migration in Europe in the Early 21st Century’, in A. Trian-
dafyllidou (ed.), Irregular Migration in Europe. Myths and Realities, Surrey: Ashgate 2010, pp. 1-
22, at 8. 
77  C. González-Enríquez, ‘Spain: Irregularity as a Rule’ in A. Triandafyllidou (ed.), Irregular Mi-
gration in Europe. Myths and Realities, Surrey: Ashgate 2020, pp. 247-266, atp.  258. 
78  See Article 71 of Real Decreto 557/2011, de 20 de abril, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento 
de la Ley Orgánica 4/2000, sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España y su inte-
gración social, tras su reforma por la Ley Orgánica 2/2009 (hereafter 2011 Spanish Regula-
tion), BOE 30 de abril de 2011. 
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b. The Rodrigues da Silva situation  
Second, a similar situation to the one in Rodrigues Da Silva has been anticipated. 
The new rules lay down that those undocumented migrants who are parents of a 
Spanish minor child and who have parental authority will be granted a residence 
permit.79  
c. Domestic violence 
Third, women in an undocumented situation who have suffered domestic violence 
and who have denounced it would not be expelled. Instead, they would now obtain 
a temporary residence and work permit which would also be granted to their chil-
dren. If the criminal procedure ends with a verdict in which it is proved that the 
woman has suffered domestic violence she would obtain a five years residence per-
mit and would be able to apply for a long-term residence permit.80  
d. Individual regularisation 
Finally, several extraordinary regularization procedures have taken place in Spain 
since 1985.81Apart from these extraordinary programmes, the Spanish law also fore-
sees other individual forms of regularisation such as the arraigo.82 This procedure, 
which was a novelty introduced in the 2000 Law on immigration, provides that a 
migrant may obtain a residence and work permit after having irregularly resided in 
Spain for a period of time if settlement in proved.83 There are several possibilities in 
order to certificate that settlement but I will only refer to two of them. First, a third-
country national may prove that there has been a labour settlement. The main req-
uisites in this case is to have resided in Spain for two years, have a clean criminal re-
cord and provide evidence that there has been a labour relation with an employer 
for a period of six months.84 Second, a third-country national may demonstrate that 
there has been a social settlement. In order to corroborate that the person has to 
have resided for a period of three years, have a clean criminal record, provide a job 
offer for a period of one year and either have family links with other third-country 
nationals residing in the country85 or produce a social integration report issued by 
                                                        
79  Article 124 of the 2011 Spanish Regulation.  
80  Ibid., Articles 131-134. 
81  See on this: R. Aguilera Izquierdo, ‘El Acceso de los Inmigrantes Irregulares al Mercado de 
Trabajo: Los Procesos de Regularización Extraordinaria y el Arraigo Social y Laboral’, Revista 
del Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales 63, 2006, pp. 175-195; J. Arango and C. Finotelli, 
‘Spain’, in M. Baldwin-Edwards and A. Kraler (eds.), REGINE Regularisations in Europe. Study 
on Practices in the Area of Regularisation of illegally staying Third-country Nationals in the Member 
States of the EU, Appendix A: Country Studies, Vienna: ICMPD 2009, pp. 83-93; C. González-
Enríquez 2010. 
82  Arraigo could be translated as settlement. 
83  R. Aguilera Izquierdo 2006, at p. 178. 
84  Article 124 of the 2011 Spanish Regulation. With the previous rules the third-country na-
tional had to prove a labour relation of one year and not six months as it is the case now. 
85  This refers to family links with a spouse, ascendants or descendants. The new rules also in-
clude the possibility to prove family links with a registered partner. See Article 124 of the 
2011 Spanish Regulation. 
RETURNS DIRECTIVE: POSSIBLE LIMITS AND INTERPRETATION 
23 
the authorities of the regular place of residence. The importance of the mechanism 
cannot be ignored since there were 79.433 permits granted in 200986 and 56.228 in 
2008.87 
The new Spanish rules are a step in the right direction as they try to grasp the 
complexity of the issue in an effort to understand that irregular migrants are an 
amazingly heterogeneous category. In the absence of an EU competence on the mat-
ter, other Member States could take similar steps to ensure that those irregular mi-
grants who cannot be returned obtain a work and residence permit.88 
4. Conclusion 
The critiques to the Returns Directive have not been unwise. This affirmation needs 
however to be qualified. First of all, Member States may generously implement some 
of its provisions. Significantly, Article 4 provides Member States with the option to 
apply or adopt more favourable provisions, provided they are compatible with the 
Directive. Moreover, the Council included a final political statement declaring that 
the implementation of the Directive should not be used in itself as a reason to jus-
tify the adoption of provisions less favourable to persons to whom it applies. A 
quick glance at how Member States are transposing the Directive reveals some im-
provements as well as some deterioration from the point of view of undocumented 
migrants’ rights. For instance, voluntary departure is now the general rule and has 
been implemented for the first time in some Member States, such as Spain. More-
over, Article 7 on voluntary departure is capable of having direct effect and hence, 
migrants may claim a right deriving directly from the Directive in those countries 
which have not correctly implement it, such as Italy. The end result of a voluntary 
departure is the same (expulsion) but the procedure is much less intrusive (no de-
tention and the possibility not to impose an entry ban). There are other aspects of 
the Directive, such as detention, which some countries, such as Spain, Italy or 
Greece, have used to increase their respective detention periods.89 This has its coun-
terweight in the various guarantees that Member States have to respect when detain-
ing someone and which have been detailed above. 
The remaining key issue is to see what happens with those third-country nation-
als in an irregular situation who cannot be expelled. The Directive offers Member 
States the possibility to grant them at any moment an autonomous residence per-
                                                        
86  Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración, Anuario Estadístico del año 2009. 
87  Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmigración, Anuario Estadístico del año 2008. There is unfortunately 
no data available for previous years. 
88  See other policy recommendations in S. Carrera, E.Guild and M. Merlino (2010), ‘Policy 
Recommendations’, in S. Carrera and M. Merlino, Assessing EU Policy on Irregular Immigration 
under the Stockholm Programme, Brussels: CEPS 2010, pp. 32-35. 
89  The detention period has increased from 40 to 60 days in Spain, from two to six months in 
Italy and from three to twelve in Greece. See D. Acosta Arcarazo (2009), ‘Latin American Re-
actions to the Adoption of the Returns Directive’, op.cit. A French draft Bill not yet adopted 
at the time of writing this paper also increases the detention period in France from 32 to 45 
days. See Projet de Loi relatif à l’immigration, à l’intégration et à la nationalité, p. 10.  
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mit. This provision should be generously implemented as it goes in the right direc-
tion of understanding the difficulty of dealing with such a heterogeneous category 
of people with just one measure aiming at expulsion.  
The role of the Courts will be also essential in seeing how the Directive deals 
with this issue. In fact, as of 1 May 2011, the CJEU had received not less than ten 
references for a preliminary ruling from Italian courts, some of which will probably 
have been solved by the time this book will be published. Among the various issues 
raised by these courts, some of the questions seek clarification as to whether Article 
15 on detention precludes a Member State, in this case Italy, from sentencing to a 
new term of imprisonment under criminal law those third-country nationals staying 
unlawfully, and who have already been detained, solely on account of their failure 
to cooperate in the deportation procedure and in particular failure to comply with 
the removal order issued by the administrative authorities. As it was expected,90 the 
CJEU answered in the negative in Case C-61/11 El Dridi. In fact, the Court raised 
two points in order to support its argumentation. First, there is the need to observe 
the fundamental rights of the third-country nationals concerned.91 Second, and very 
interestingly, ‘chain detentions’ risk jeopardising the objective of the Directive 
which is to establish an effective policy of removal and repatriation of irregular mi-
grants.92  
This ruling has an immediate effect not only in Italy but also in other countries 
such as the Netherlands which were debating the possibility to introduce similar 
measures to the Italian ones.93 The importance of this ruling will have to be prop-
erly assessed in future research. The remaining cases before the CJEU will also 
prove central in the interpretation of the Directive as well as the possibility opened 
to the Commission to point out those national practices which are in breach of the 
Directive and launch infringement proceedings where necessary. 
 
 
                                                        
90  Hailbronner 2010, p. 1544. 
91  Case C-61/11, Hassen El Dridi, 28 April 2011, not yet published in the ECR, paragraph 42.  
92  Ibid., paragraph 59. 
93  See on these measures Meijers Committee, Memorandum on immigration and asylum in the VVD-
CDA Coalition Agreement of 30 September 2010, Utrecht, 8 November 2010, at pp. 15-16. 
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The Negotiations on the Return Directive: Challenges, 
Outcomes and Lessons learned from an NGO Perspective 
 
 
Kris Pollet 
1. Introduction 
The return directive is among the first legal instruments in the field of EU immigra-
tion and asylum law that has been adopted under what was still the co-decision pro-
cedure at the time.1 Contrary to the negotiations on the first phase instruments in 
the field of asylum, the European Parliament was fully involved as a co-legislator 
while qualified majority and not unanimity was required in the Council for its 
adoption. For many stakeholders engaging at EU level with its emerging immigra-
tion and asylum policy, the negotiations on the return directive were a first learning 
experience about how the co-decision procedure works in practice and what its im-
plications are in terms of transparency.  
The first part of this contribution will provide some general reflections on the 
negotiation process from an NGO-perspective and in particular how the level of 
transparency varies in the different stages of the process.2 In a second part some ob-
servations will be made with regard to the final outcome of the negotiations from a 
human rights perspective. Notwithstanding the European Parliament‟s involvement 
in the decision-making process, the return directive contains a number of provisions 
that potentially undermine protection of human rights of persons subject to re-
moval from EU Member States as well as a harmonised approach across the EU.  
2. Negotiating the Return Directive under Co-decision 
As indicated above, the first phase instruments adopted in the field of asylum had 
all been adopted by unanimity in the Council and after consultation of the Euro-
pean Parliament. This is often cited as one of the reasons why the existing asylum 
acquis generally establishes a relatively low level of protection and allows for consid-
erable discretion for the Member States as well as numerous exceptions and deroga-
tions to the standards set in the directives. As the veto of one Member State was 
enough to block the adoption of a piece of legislation, it is inevitable that Commis-
                                                        
1  Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty the co-decision procedure has become the or-
dinary legislative procedure. See Article 294 TFEU. As at the time of negotiations on the re-
turn directive the procedure was still known as the co-decision procedure, the latter term will 
be used for the purposes of this article.  
2  For an in-depth analysis see F. Lutz, The Negotiations on the Return Directive, Comments and Ma-
terials, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2010.  
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sion proposals had to be watered down considerably in order to find agreement. In 
addition, harmonisation in this context was only possible as long as the EU legal 
norm reflected national practice to a sufficient degree and did not require too many 
fundamental amendments to national legislation or administrative practices and 
tools.3  
At the same time, the Council was under no obligation to take seriously into ac-
count the views of the European Parliament as it was only to be „consulted‟. This 
meant I practice that the reports adopted by the European Parliament on the asy-
lum instruments were sometimes simply ignored by the Council and thus European 
Parliament‟ influence on EU legislation in this field remained very limited.4 
This changes fundamentally with co-decision of course. The European Parlia-
ment is a co-legislator together with the Council and no legal instrument can be 
passed without its approval. As the European Parliament was generally supportive of 
building in strong human rights safeguards in the immigration and asylum instru-
ments in the period of the adoption of the first phase asylum instruments, many ob-
servers expected a generally positive impact of the involvement of the European Par-
liament in the discussions on new asylum and immigration legislation at EU level. 
Moreover, when the Commission proposal on the return directive was presented 
the expectation was at least that through the involvement of the European Parlia-
ment the legislative process would become more transparent and would allow for a 
better-informed debate contributing to a more ambitious level of human rights pro-
tection. It is clear that this only partly materialised. This is far from saying that the 
European Parliament‟s involvement did not have any positive impact at all. It cer-
tainly did but not to the level as some might have hoped for in advance.  
Obviously co-decision did not fundamentally change the process in the Council 
which remains as opaque as before with discussions take place in technical working 
groups bringing together national experts from the Member States in closed meet-
ings. Member States‟ positions with regard to the various aspects of the Commis-
sion‟s proposal as well as later compromise versions are not officially published as 
long as the negotiations last. Only at the very end of the process, the general posi-
tion of each Member State against or in favour of the final compromise is made 
public.  
It must also be noted that the return directive has been discussed under 6 differ-
ent presidencies that sometimes had very different approaches to the Commission‟s 
proposal. EU presidencies of course can steer the negotiations to a certain extent as 
                                                        
3  A clear example is Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards on procedures in Member 
States for granting and withdrawing international protection of 1 December 2005. It incorpo-
rates procedural notions such as the European Safe Third Country concept, that were at the 
time of adoption of the directive only known in one Member State, while it allows Member 
States to derogate from almost every basic guarantee, including the right to a personal inter-
view. See OJ 2005 L 326/13.  
4  See the European Parliament‟s report on the Asylum Procedures Directive. None of its 
amendments were finally taken over by the Council. See European Parliament, Report on the 
amended proposal for a Council Directive on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for 
granting and withdrawing refugee status, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 
A6-0222/05.  
THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE RETURNS DIRECTIVE 
27 
they may prioritise certain files which they consider to be politically important 
whether for national or European purposes and consequently speed up the discus-
sions or on the contrary slow down negotiations on other legislative proposals con-
sidered less important. This may result in varying degrees of intensity with which a 
legislative proposal is being discussed in the Council depending on the priority give 
by the EU Member State holding the EU Presidency. This was also what happened 
in the case of the return directive. While the United Kingdom and Austria hardly 
organised meetings on the Commission‟s proposal during their respective presi-
dency, Finland made some proposals with a view to reaching a compromise within 
the Council. Germany, on the other hand, suggested an approach which completely 
dismantled the Commission proposal in a way which, if adopted, would have re-
moved most of the human rights safeguards and at the same time would have de-
prived the instrument from any meaningful harmonising effect. However, this ap-
proach was not followed by the Portuguese and Slovenian Presidencies that stayed 
closer to the spirit of the Commission proposal although this did not prevent them 
from watering down the human rights standards in the Commission‟s proposal at 
the same time.5 
The complete lack of transparency of the process in the Council is in sharp con-
trast to the open and transparent way in which the Commission proposal was being 
debated within the European Parliament, through public discussions in the LIBE 
Committee where the Rapporteur‟s draft report as well as amendments proposed by 
other LIBE Committee Members were discussed. However, also within the Euro-
pean Parliament the process lost its transparent nature as soon as it reached the 
stage of the so-called informal trilogues after the adoption of the Weber report in 
the LIBE Committee in September 2007.6 These discussions between the rappor-
teur, the Commission and the Presidency of the Council aim at finding a compro-
mise between the European Parliament‟s and the Council‟s position. From that 
moment hardly any information about the discussions between the three institu-
tions was made public, except when the rapporteur reported back in a meeting of 
the LIBE Committee on the state of play of the negotiations. However, the informa-
tion provided would usually remain general and would get into the technical details 
of compromises that were being discussed between the rapporteur and the Council. 
The idea behind the informal trilogues is that they should help to increase efficiency 
and speed up the process but they were initially intended to be used only to deal 
with issues which were of a purely technical nature and therefore not controversial. 
However, since the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, the informal trilogues 
                                                        
5  For an overview of the main evolutions during the various presidencies see D. Acosta, The 
Good, the Bad and the Ugly in EU Migration Law: Is the European Parliament Becoming 
Bad and Ugly? (The adoption of Directive 2008/15: The Returns Directive), European Journal 
of Migration and Law 11, 2009, pp. 19-39.  
6  European Parliament, Report on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-
country nationals, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, A6-0339/2007 
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have increasingly been used to deal also with politically sensitive issues and this has 
been criticised as adding to the democratic deficit.7  
Moreover, the interinstitutional agreement between the Council and the EP ac-
cording to which they will as much as possible aim to conclude first reading agree-
ments makes systematic use of this highly informal approach almost indispensable.8 
The advantages are clear: it allows a considerable degree of flexibility for both insti-
tutions as there are no time limits involved. A first reading agreement only requires 
a simple majority in plenary while an absolute majority is needed in second reading. 
In case of a second reading, the Council needs to take a position within 3 months 
after the EP has adopted its position. However, on the other hand such an approach 
risks weakening the position of the European Parliament. Indeed, the urge to con-
clude a first reading agreement with the Council is likely to push the European Par-
liament to compromise as it is under pressure to avoid second readings.  
The way the European Parliament positioned itself in the negotiations on the re-
turn directive may to a certain extent have been determined the fact that this was 
indeed one of the first important dossiers for the LIBE Committee that was to be 
decided under co-decision. The European Parliament was apparently very keen to 
present itself as a reliable and reasonable actor in the decision-making process. In 
order not to jeopardise the negotiations, in particular the rapporteur seemed reluc-
tant to push for too high standards of protection of fundamental rights and proce-
dural safeguards. Both the EPP and the ALDE clearly had made the assessment that 
is was preferable to have a directive than not to have it and they were prepared to go 
a long way in the direction of the Council‟s position on certain points in order to 
save the directive. Therefore pragmatism was the key word, even if it meant accept-
ing a compromise that includes a possibility to detain for 18 months, an obligation 
to return in case of irregular stay and an obligatory entry-ban for certain categories 
of irregular migrants.  
Moreover, the debate within the European Parliament was for a long time 
dominated by the rapporteur and the shadow-rapporteurs, with only a handful of 
other Members of the European Parliament (MEP) engaging in the debate on a 
regular basis. The majority of MEP only engaged in the public debate at a very late 
stage, when the political deal already had been made and it was clear that there 
would be a majority in favour of the compromise. The debate in the public domain 
was also almost exclusively narrowed down to the 18 months detention issue. As a 
result, other aspects of the directive with a potentially negative impact, such as the 
obligation to return,9 the extensive possibilities to exclude certain third country na-
tionals from the scope of the directive;10 the obligation to impose an entry ban in 
                                                        
7  As it leads to „enhancement of efficiency “at the expense of accountability”‟. See Acosta, at 
p. 24.  
8  See European Parliament, Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, 7th Parliamentary term – 
March 2011, ANNEX XX : Joint Declaration of the European Parliament, the Council and the 
Commission of 13 June 2007 on practical arrangements for the codecision procedure (Article 251 of the 
EC Treaty). 
9  Article 6(1) Return directive.  
10  Article 2(2) Return directive.  
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principle11 or the possibilities for Member States to derogate form the obligation to 
a period for voluntary departure, including providing no such period at all12 were 
largely ignored in the political debate.  
Finally, it should be noted that a number of MEP have voted along national in-
terests and taking into account their national governments‟ position. It is no coin-
cidence that most of the Spanish socialists in plenary voted in favour of the com-
promise whereas the position of the Socialist group was to vote against the com-
promise text. The Spanish government was in favour of the compromise text and 
wanted to close the discussion. This also shows how national interests play an im-
portant role and how the European Parliament at times seems to be only European 
by name but not by nature. Such attitudes may eventually question the role the 
European Parliament as an institution can play in the co-decision process.13  
3. Assessing the Outcome of the Negotiations 
There are different ways in which to assess the outcome of the negotiations on the 
return directive. Here the outcome of the negotiations will be briefly evaluated from 
three different angles: the level of human rights protection provided in the direc-
tive, its potential effect in terms of harmonisation and the impact of the European 
Parliament‟s involvement as a co-legislator.14 From a human rights perspective the 
result is disappointing as it provides in general for a rather minimal level of human 
rights protection for third country nationals in the process of return while certain 
provisions risk undermining human rights standards. The provisions on detention 
are a clear example of the disappointingly low level of protection that is offered in 
the directive. The excessive maximum 18 months period of detention for the sole 
purpose of removal laid down in Article 15(6) of the directive was at the centre of 
the debate during the negotiations and has provoked a lot of criticism worldwide.15 
As the directive is the first international legal norm setting a benchmark for the 
maximum length of detention, it may not be in contradiction with any interna-
tional law standard as such but it certainly sets a questionable example for the rest 
                                                        
11  Article 11(1) Return directive.  
12  Article 7(4) Return directive.  
13  This was recently illustrated again by the joint declaration of EPP MEPs and EPP Ministers in 
the Council on the EU‟s asylum policy which includes detailed positions that are directly re-
lated to the Commission proposals recasting the first phase asylum instruments. See EPP 
Common Position on „Perspectives of the EU asylum system‟, 17 November 2010.  
14  For a detailed critical analysis of the directive see ECRE, ECRE Information Note on the Direc-
tive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common 
standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (here-
inafter ECRE Information Note on Return Directive). Available at www.ecre.org.  
15  See for instance, Organisation of American States, „Action on the European Union‟s Returns 
Directive on Migration Issues‟, CP/RES.938 (1654/08), 26 June 2008, and the XXXV Meet-
ing of the Common Market Council of MERCOSUR, Declaracion de los presidentes de los 
estados parte del Mercosur y estados associados sobre la „Directiva de Retorno‟, San Miguel de 
Tucumàn, 1 July 2008.  
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of the world and has become the symbol of the EU‟s approach irregular migration. 
Some Member States have made use of the transposition of the directive to increase 
the maximum period of detention in their national legislation.16 
The directive furthermore introduces an obligation for Member States to issue a 
return decision to any third country national staying illegally on their territory, 
without prejudice, however, to a number of exceptions17 and an obligation to take 
all necessary measures to enforce the return decision if no period of voluntary de-
parture was granted or if the obligation to return has not been complied with.18 
These provisions establish a new principle of EU immigration law without stating at 
the same time an explicit prohibition for Member States to issue a return decision 
or effect removal where this would be contrary to their obligations under human 
rights law. While Article 5 imposes an obligation on Member States to respect the 
principle of non-refoulement while implementing the directive, it only requires the 
Member States to take due account of the best interests of the child, family life and 
the state of health of the third-country national. This establishes a very weak legal 
standard as regards the Member States‟ obligations and does not provide sufficient 
guarantees that return decisions or removal decisions shall not violate the range of 
human rights of the third country national concerned.19 This is problematic as it 
may leave third-country nationals in an ambiguous situation where they could still 
receive a return decision while under Article 9(1) of the directive their removal must 
be postponed as it would violate the principle of non refoulement. As a result, the 
obligation to issue a return decision could push third-country nationals into situa-
tions of irregular stay where this could have been avoided. This is only partly cov-
ered by the exception in Article 6(4) of the Directive allowing Member States at any 
moment to grant an autonomous residence permit or other authorisation offering a 
right to stay for compassionate, humanitarian or other reasons as this is entirely to 
the discretion of the Member States.  
                                                        
16  For an overview of the maximum time limits of detention for removal purposes in the 27 EU 
Member States see Fundamental Rights Agency, Detention of third-country nationals in return pro-
cedures, November 2010 (Conference Edition), at p. 45. According to the report, as of No-
vember 2010, three EU Member States (Greece, Italy and Spain) had increased the length of 
detention while Bulgaria, which had no maximum time limit of detention in its national legis-
lation prior to the transposition of the directive, introduced a maximum period of detention 
of 18 months. See Fundamental Rights Agency, at p. 46.  
17  „Member States shall issue a return decision to any third-country national staying illegally on 
their territory…‟ See Article 6(1) Return directive.  
18  Article 8(1) Return directive.  
19  It should be noted that the Commission proposal contained an explicit prohibition in Article 
6(4) to issue a return decision: „Where Member States are subject to obligations derived from 
fundamental rights as resulting, in particular, from the European Convention on Human 
Rights, such as the right to non-refoulement, the right to education and the right to family 
unity…‟ Moreover, where such a decision had already been issued, it had to be withdrawn. See 
COM(2005) 391 final, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying 
third-country nationals, 1 September 2005.  
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Another problematic provision in this regard is Article 11 introducing an obliga-
tion for Member States to issue entry bans together with the return decision if no 
period for voluntary departure has been granted or if the obligation to return has 
not been complied with. Such an entry ban shall in principle not exceed five years 
but may be longer and even indefinite if the third country national represents a se-
rious threat to public policy, public security or national security. Although it is ex-
plicitly stated that the provision shall apply without prejudice to the right to inter-
national protection as defined in the Qualification Directive, it is clear that an entry 
ban may function as a practical obstacle for a person in need of international pro-
tection to cross the external borders of the EU Member States and access the asylum 
procedure. As the human rights situation in the country of return may change after 
the third country national has been returned, he or she may be forced to leave again 
and apply for protection in the EU. It will require rigorous monitoring of the way 
border checks are being implemented to ensure that the safeguard in Article 11(5) 
of the Directive is complied with in practice.20  
At the same time, the directive allows Member States to exclude potentially large 
categories of irregularly staying third country nationals from the scope of the direc-
tive and therefore a number of provisions that are crucial for effective protection of 
fundamental rights during the return process. Member States may decide not to ap-
ply the directive to third country nationals who are subject to a refusal of entry at 
the border or „who are apprehended or intercepted by the competent authorities in 
connection with the irregular crossing by land, sea or air of the external border of a 
Member State and who have not subsequently obtained an authorisation or a right 
to stay in that Member State‟.21 The directive contains no further geographical or 
time limitation with regard to the vague term „in connection with the irregular 
crossing‟ of an external border which may thus include apprehension in any loca-
tion after a considerable amount of time after the crossing of the border. It would 
therefore be possible for Member States not to apply the standards laid down in the 
directive to those third country nationals who entered the territory irregularly and 
resided for several years on the territory of that Member States without obtaining a 
residence permit before being apprehended during for instance a routine police 
check. This is important as it also means that those third country nationals would 
be deprived from the human rights safeguards laid down in the directive such as the 
right to an effective remedy,22 procedural safeguards including the right to have rea-
soned decisions on return removal and entry bans in writing as well as information 
on available legal remedies,23 and safeguards with regard to judicial review of deten-
tion for the purpose of removal.24 Those safeguards, which are essential in any re-
                                                        
20  In order to uphold the right to asylum as guaranteed in Article 18 of the EU Charter on Fun-
damental Rights, clear procedures must be in place at the borders as well as in Member States‟ 
embassies allowing for swift withdrawal of entry bans for persons wishing to seek asylum. The 
mandatory registration of entry bans in the SIS is likely to further undermine access to protec-
tion in EU Member States. See ECRE Information Note on Return Directive at p. 16.  
21  Article 2(2)(a) Return Directive.  
22  Article 13 Return Directive.  
23  Article 11 Return Directive  
24  Article 15(2) and (3) Return Directive.  
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turn process, are not included in Article 4(4) listing the provisions in the directive 
Member States must observe with regard to those third-country nationals they ex-
clude from the scope of the directive.25  
This is however, not to say that all is negative from a human rights perspective. 
The directive does establish a number of procedural safeguards that must be ob-
served by Member States in the process of return of irregularly staying third country 
nationals. These include for instance the obligation for Member States to issue rea-
soned decisions on return, removal and entry bans in writing which must include 
information on the available legal remedies and the right to an effective remedy. 
Also the obligation for Member States in Article 14(2) to provide third country na-
tionals whose removal has been postponed or who have been granted a period of 
voluntary return with a written confirmation thereof in accordance with national 
legislation constitutes an important guarantee in practice. It provides third country 
nationals in those situations with legal certainty as to their presence on the territory 
vis-à-vis all authorities and may therefore prevent unnecessary confusion and facili-
tate access to basis social and economic rights pending return. Finally, the manda-
tory involvement of „appropriate bodies other than the authorities enforcing return‟ 
before a return decision in respect of an unaccompanied minor can be taken should 
contribute to better-informed decision making with regard to return of unaccompa-
nied minors. However, as will be discussed below, all too often those provisions that 
establish standards contributing to a higher protection of third country national‟s 
fundamental rights allow for exceptions and derogations that fundamentally weaken 
those standards at the same time.  
Also from a perspective of harmonisation the directive is rather disappointing. 
The objective of the directive is to establish common rules concerning return, re-
moval, use of coercive measures, detention and entry bans and the directive sets out 
common standards and procedures to be applied in Member States for returning ir-
regularly staying third country nationals. However, in many ways the directive only 
provides a very incomplete general framework for return procedures in the Member 
States, leaving much to the discretion of Member States. Moreover, almost all key 
provisions of the directive allow Member States at the same time to derogate to such 
an extent from the „common‟ standards and key principles set out that they risk se-
riously undermining the harmonising effect the directive is supposed to have, while 
at the same time rendering the procedural safeguards for the third country nationals 
concerned almost meaningless.  
A clear example of the latter is the priority of voluntary return over forced re-
turn, a key principle that is at the core of the directive.26 The tool to ensure that this 
principle is complied with in practice is the period of voluntary departure that as a 
                                                        
25  These concern Article 8(4) and (5) (limitations on the use of coercive measures); Article 9(2)(a) 
(postponement of removal); Article 14(1)(b) and (d) (emergency health care and taking into 
account needs of vulnerable persons); and Article 16 and 17 (detention conditions). The 
standard set in Article 4(4) is one of „treatment and level of protection that is no less favoura-
ble than as set out‟ in the Articles mentioned.  
26  See recital 10 stating that „where there are no reasons to believe that this would undermine 
the purpose of a return procedure, voluntary return should be preferred over forced return 
and a period of voluntary departure should be granted‟.  
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principle must be granted to every third country national who is subject to a return 
procedure, which is laid down in Article 7 (1). The key importance of a period of 
voluntary return within the framework of the directive is even reinforced by the 
mandatory extension of such period by an appropriate period „where necessary‟ and 
in view of „the specific circumstances of the individual case, such as the length of 
stay, the existence of children attending school and the existence of other family 
and social links‟.27 An appropriate period for voluntary return is an important guar-
antee for the third country national that allows him or her to properly prepare re-
turn and to comply voluntarily with the return decision. However, at the same time 
the principle set out in Article 7 risks to be seriously undermined in practice in two 
ways. Firstly Article 7(1) itself allows for Member States to grant a voluntary depar-
ture period of between 7 days and 30 days.28 In order to be meaningful a period of a 
least 30 days should be provided to third country nationals in order for them to 
make the necessary arrangements to prepare the actual return. The provision of 
shorter periods of voluntary departure and in particular an extremely short period 
of 7 days undermines the effectiveness of the guarantee and therefore the priority of 
voluntary return over forced return. Second, Article 7(4) even allows Member States 
not to provide a period of voluntary departure or a period shorter than 7 days in 
cases where an application for legal stay has been dismissed as manifestly unfounded 
or fraudulent or if the person poses a risk to public policy. It means in practice that 
any asylum seeker whose claim has been rejected as manifestly unfounded can be 
denied a voluntary departure period. In light of the increasing use of the notion of 
manifestly unfounded or fraudulent applications in asylum procedures in the EU 
Member States,29 this could affect a potentially large number of irregularly staying 
third country nationals. In case voluntary departure is not granted, the return deci-
sion must in addition be accompanied by an entry ban in accordance with Article 
11(1).  
Another example of the considerable room for derogation from basic guarantees 
the directive allows is Article 12 according to which return decisions, entry-ban de-
cisions and decisions on removal shall be issued in writing and give reasons in fact 
and in law as well as information on the available remedies. The right of the person 
affected by an individual decision to have the reasons explained is a general princi-
ple of EU law developed in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice. It is also laid 
down in the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights as part of the principle of good 
administration.30 Member States must also ensure, upon request, a written or oral 
translation of the main elements of the decision related to return, including on the 
                                                        
27  Article 7(2) Return Directive. Member States are also encouraged to „provide for enhanced re-
turn assistance and counseling and make best use of the relevant funding possibilities offered 
under the European Return Fund‟. See recital 10.  
28  The LIBE Committee report proposed „as a matter of principle…‟, „an appropriate period for 
voluntary departure of at least four weeks‟.  
29  Which is also encouraged by the Asylum Procedures Directive which allows Member States to 
consider applications rejected in an accelerated procedure as manifestly unfounded. See Arti-
cle 22 of Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for 
granting and withdrawing international protection of 1 December 2005.  
30  Article 41 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.  
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available remedies in a language the third country national concerned understands 
or may reasonably be presumed to understand. Both principles constitute important 
guarantees to ensure that the person concerned is informed of and understands the 
reasons for the return-related decisions taken and is informed timely of the oppor-
tunities to challenge those decisions. These are essential preconditions for a return 
procedure that is fair and respects fundamental rights of those subject to return. 
However, these guarantees are the same time seriously weakened by providing 
Member States with the possibility to „limit the information on reasons in fact 
where national law allows for the right to information to be restricted‟31 and with 
the possibility to exclude third country nationals who entered the territory of a 
Member State irregularly and have not subsequently obtained an authorisation or 
right to stay in the Member States from the right to receive a written or oral transla-
tion of the main elements of return-related decisions. In the latter case Member 
States are under an obligation to give return related decisions by means of a stan-
dard form, the content of which is however to be determined in national legislation. 
Here too, the directive allows for making an exception to a fundamental guarantee 
for a potentially large category of irregularly staying third country nationals. Stan-
dard forms can hardly be a substitute for well-reasoned individual decisions in fact 
and in law that allow the third country national to better understand and accept the 
reasons of the return decision that has been taken. This is acknowledged in recital 6 
of the preamble to the directive which explicitly states that when using standards 
forms for decisions related to return, Member States must respect the principle that 
„decisions taken under this Directive should be adopted on a case-by-case basis and 
based on objective criteria, implying that consideration should go beyond the mere 
fact of an illegal stay‟. It remains to be seen to what extent this derogation will be 
applied in practice in the Member States and if so how the use of standard forms 
will be reconciled with the requirement of case-by-case decision making in the con-
text of return.32 Here too, if interpreted broadly, the exceptions allowed under Arti-
cle 12 to the principle of a reasoned decision and information on the available legal 
remedies, risk rendering these important guarantees meaningless for a large number 
of irregularly staying third country nationals subject to decisions related to return.  
Finally, the directive provides Member States with considerable room for ma-
noeuvre in so called emergency situations. In those situations Member States may 
decide to allow for periods of judicial review longer than those provided for under 
Article 15(2) and to take urgent measures in respect of the conditions of detention 
derogating from those set out in Articles 16(1) and 17(2). The Directive only de-
scribes in very general terms what an emergency situation is and what the criteria 
should be for determining whether such a situation exists or not. These refer to „an 
                                                        
31  This may be in particular, but not exclusively, „in order to safeguard national security, defence, 
public security and for the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal of-
fences‟. See Article 12(1), second paragraph.  
32  The use of standard forms may eventually be counterproductive for Member States as unnec-
essary appeal procedures may be avoided where return decisions clearly show that all aspects 
of the individual‟s situation as well as the situation in the country of return have been prop-
erly addressed. Where appeals procedures are being lodged, well-reasoned decisions also facili-
tate the work of the appeal body. 
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exceptionally large number of third-country nationals to be returned‟ and an „un-
foreseen heavy burden on the capacity of detention facilities‟ or „administrative or 
judicial staff‟. The assessment of whether such an emergency situation exists is not 
being undertaken at EU level but is entirely left to each Member State wishing to 
make use of this possibility. The only condition being that the Commission must be 
informed whenever a Member State resorts to such exceptional measures or no 
longer applies them, Article 18 allows for remarkable flexibility in applying an im-
portant procedural guarantee, the right to a speedy judicial review. Moreover, it also 
allows Member States to make use of prison accommodation to detain third-country 
nationals for the sole purpose of return without being under an obligation to sepa-
rate them from ordinary prisoners and without having to offer families detained 
„separate accommodation guaranteeing adequate privacy‟. Whereas the guarantees 
in Article 16 and 17 of the directive with regards to detention conditions and de-
tention of minors and families already provide for a very weak standard, the possi-
bilities for Member States to derogate from these provisions in ill-defined „emer-
gency situations‟ potentially further undermines the protection of fundamental 
rights under the directive of third country nationals detained for the purpose of re-
moval.  
As far as the impact of the European Parliament‟s involvement on the outcome 
of the negotiations is concerned, it is clear that the assessment is mixed. As men-
tioned above, whereas the European Parliament in pre-co-decision times often pro-
filed itself as an unconditional advocate for high standards of human rights protec-
tion in EU immigration and asylum legislation, it adopted a much more pragmatic 
approach as a co-legislator while negotiating the return directive. The European Par-
liament‟s involvement certainly prevented further watering down of certain stan-
dards in the directive but one can not ignore the fact that the European Parliament 
had to accept a number of compromises which differ considerably from the report 
adopted in September 2007 in by the LIBE Committee. In addition to the already 
mentioned period for voluntary departure that according to the LIBE Committee 
should have been at least 4 weeks, the following examples can be mentioned here. 
With regard to the situation where a third-country national staying irregularly on 
the territory of a Member State is subject of a pending procedure for renewing his 
or her residence permit, the European Parliament had proposed to impose an obli-
gation on Member States to refrain from issuing a return decision.33 The compro-
mise consisted in a much weaker wording according to which „that Member State 
shall consider refraining from‟, leaving it eventually at the discretion of the Member 
State concerned to issue a return decision or not. The LIBE Committee also use-
fully proposed to ensure continued access to reception conditions where the return 
decision temporarily can not be implemented because return needs to be postponed 
or the period for voluntary departure is extended. The LIBE Committee‟s proposals 
to further strengthen the Commission‟s proposal inter alia by providing that rejected 
asylum seekers who had benefited from reception conditions under Directive 
2003/9/EC prior to the return decision to continue benefiting from those condi-
                                                        
33  By changing the „may‟-provision proposed by the Commission into a „shall‟-provision. See 
LIBE Report A6-0339/2007, 20 September 2009, Amendment 29.  
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tions in those situations did not survive the negotiations. Eventually only a very 
weak Article 14 on safeguards pending return was included in the directive.  
Also Article 11 on entry bans is an example of where the European Parliament 
had to make considerable concessions. The European Parliament had proposed to 
make the inclusion of re-entry bans in removal orders optional in principle and to 
state explicitly that withdrawal of the re-entry ban by one Member State shall be ef-
fective throughout the Union. However, Article 11 of the return directive confirms 
the mandatory nature of entry bans in two cases, links entry bans to return deci-
sions and does not make reference to the consequences of withdrawal of an entry 
ban by one Member State.34 As many return decisions are eventually not being im-
plemented in practice, linking mandatory entry bans to return decisions instead of 
removal orders obviously widens the scope of entry bans and the number of third 
country nationals affected by such instrument.35  
As regards the most controversial aspect of the directive, the maximum period of 
detention, it should be noted that the maximum period of 18 months of detention 
was suggested by the European Parliament itself, whereas the initial Commission 
proposal only allowed for a maximum period of detention of 6 months without 
possibility to prolong that period under no circumstances. The LIBE Committee 
proposed to allow detention in principle for maximum 3 months, extendable to 18 
months in case of lack of cooperation from the third country national concerned, 
delays in obtaining the necessary documentation or proven threat to public secu-
rity.36 Article 15 of the directive allows for a maximum period of 6 months of deten-
tion with a possibility to extend this period with another 12 months if the removal 
operation is likely to last longer due to lack of cooperation of the third country na-
tional or delays in obtaining the necessary documentation. Whereas some Member 
States were opposed to including a maximum period of detention in the directive, 
the final compromise, an excessively long maximum period of immigration deten-
tion as a common EU standard can hardly be considered as a major victory for the 
European Parliament. Moreover, the LIBE Committee‟s partial37 support for the 
Commission proposal to provide for mandatory judicial review of a decision to de-
tain taken by an administrative authority within 48 hours did not survive the nego-
tiations as only the much weaker standard of a „speedy‟ judicial review was accept-
able to the Council.38 However, whereas the Commission proposal imposed an ob-
                                                        
34  Whereas the European dimension of entry bans is explicitly emphasised in the preamble. See 
recital 14 stating that „the effects of national return measures should be given a European di-
mension by establishing an entry ban prohibiting entry into and stay on the territory of all the 
Member States‟. 
35  See also A. Baldacinni, „The Return and Removal of Irregular Migrants under EU Law: An 
Analysis of the Returns Directive‟, European Journal of Migration and Law 11, 2009, pp. 9-10.  
36  See LIBE Report A6-0339/2007, 20 September 2009, Amendment 60. 
37  The LIBE Report had again weakened the Commission proposal on this point. Whereas the 
Commission proposal provided that detention decisions could in principle only be taken by 
judicial authorities and only in urgent cases by administrative authorities, the LIBE report 
amended this to allow for detention decisions to be issued by „administrative or judicial au-
thorities‟. See LIBE Report A6-0339/2007, 20 September 2009, Amendment 56. 
38  Article 15(2) Return Directive.  
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ligation on Member States to detain third country nationals staying irregularly on 
the territory of a Member State where there are serious grounds to believe that there 
is a risk of absconding, the LIBE Committee proposed to change this into a „may‟ 
provision. Article 15(1) of the directive now states that Member States „may only‟ 
keep in detention third country nationals subject to return procedures although the 
grounds for detention are not exhaustively listed and include the situation where 
the third-country national avoids or hampers the preparation of return or the re-
moval process, which is arguably open to broad interpretation.  
Finally, the LIBE Committee‟s definition of risk of absconding for the purpose 
of the directive was further modified during the negotiations with the Council. The 
European Parliament usefully made reference to the existence of „serious‟ reasons 
defined by individual and objective criteria and limited the use of the concept to 
those third country nationals who are „already subject to a return decision or a re-
moval order‟. Moreover, it also explicitly added that „the risk of absconding shall 
not automatically be deduced from the mere fact that a third country national is il-
legally resident on the territory of a Member State‟. The latter was necessary to avoid 
that a too broad interpretation of the risk of absconding, a key concept in the 
Commission proposal but which was not defined, would undermine crucial safe-
guards in the directive with regard to the period for voluntary departure, detention 
or indirectly entry bans in practice. The definition laid down in Article 3(7) of the 
return directive contains no reference to „serious‟ and refers the definition of „objec-
tive‟ criteria upon which reasons for believing that the third country national may 
abscond must be based, to national legislation. As a result, Member States have con-
siderable discretion with regard to determining the situations in which a risk of ab-
sconding may be presumed, shifting de facto the burden of proof to the applicant to 
rebut such presumption, which may be extremely difficult to do in practice. Article 
3(7) also lacks the crucial part in the LIBE Committee definition excluding a pre-
sumption of risk of absconding derived from the mere fact of staying irregularly on 
the territory of a Member State. Nevertheless, this is now part of the general refer-
ence in the preamble to the fact that „decisions taken under the Directive should be 
adopted on a case-by-case basis and based on objective criteria, implying that con-
sideration should go beyond the mere fact of an illegal stay‟.39  
4. Conclusion 
The negotiations on the return directive have shown both the power and the weak-
nesses of the European Parliament as a co-legislator. The involvement of the Euro-
pean Parliament in the co-decision procedure certainly prevented an even lower 
level of human rights protection in the directive. At the same time, political realism 
within the European Parliament also resulted in the acceptance of questionable 
compromises and a watering down of human rights safeguards in the directive. Also 
from the perspective of harmonising return practices between Member States the re-
sult is disappointing. To what extent the directive really establishes common stan-
                                                        
39  See recital 6 (emphasis added).  
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dards on return, as its title suggests, is open to interpretation, in particular in light 
of the numerous exceptions and derogations to key safeguards and principles in the 
directive. In this respect the outcome of the negotiations on the return directive 
under the co-decision procedure does not seem to differ that much from the out-
come of the negotiations on the first phase asylum instruments in pre-co-decision 
times. With the adoption of the return directive the European Parliament has lost 
its virginity as a co-legislator in the area of EU immigration and asylum law and has 
demonstrated its capacity to broker deals with the Council also in an extremely sen-
sitive area such as standards on return of irregularly staying third country nationals. 
However, in order to do so it had to make considerable concessions with regard to 
the level of human rights protection in the directive. In this respect the negotiations 
on the return directive have also illustrated the limitations of the European Parlia-
ment‟s role as a promoter of high human rights standards in the co-decision proce-
dure.  
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One of the most important instruments of the Returns Directive is the Entry Ban. 
For any person, it is an extremely serious obstacle for free movement if one is effec-
tively prevented from entering the continental part of the European Union, even if 
it is only for a period of time. For some reason, the Entry Ban as a measure under 
EU law has not received much academic attention yet. In this presentation, I will try 
to show the characteristics of the Entry Ban as it has been regulated in the Directive. 
I also will try to make a connection between this Entry Ban and another EU meas-
ure which has very similar features: the alert in the Schengen Information System 
(SIS). Basically I will argue that these two measures are two sides of the same coin. 
An Entry Ban will be of no practical effect without an SIS alert.  
I have two preoccupations which will determine the structure of my argumenta-
tion of today. 
Firstly, I am worried about the risk that Entry Bans will be applied as a rule, not 
as an exceptional measure. The Directive shows a double face in that respect, 
whereas Article 11 of the Directive opens in the first paragraph with a clearly man-
datory provision as to the application of Entry Bans, which is, however, mitigated by 
very wide discretionary provisions authorising Member States to refrain from issuing 
an Entry Ban. What is the rule and what is the exception? Member States may make 
different choices in implementing the Directive. I will plead for an interpretation of 
the Directive under which an Entry Ban must not be regarded a routine but rather 
an exceptional measure. 
Secondly, I am worried about the complete lack of legislative co-ordination be-
tween the Returns Directive and the SIS-Regulation as to the common features of 
Entry Ban and SIS alert. There is a real risk that both measures may arbitrarily be 
applied separately or cumulatively without any guarantee with regard to a proper 
and transparent balancing of interests. I will plead for reparatory EU legislation. 
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a) The Returns Directive as a Set of Minimum Standards 
While the Directive is clearly meant to provide instruments for an effective return 
policy and migration management (preamble nr. 4), it is also meant to provide a set 
of minimum standards for the individuals concerned. The most explicit indication 
thereof is nr 11 of the Preamble, speaking of a ‘common minimum set of legal safe-
guards on decisions related to return (…) to guarantee effective protection of the in-
terests of the individuals concerned’. Another indication is nr. 24 of the Preamble 
stating that the ‘Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the princi-
ples recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union’. 
Further, the Preamble stresses the importance of proportionality in nr 13. And 
Preamble nr 6 states that, ‘according to general principles of EU law, decisions 
taken under this Directive should be adopted on a case-by-case basis and based on 
objective criteria, implying that consideration should go beyond the mere fact of an 
illegal stay’. 
In the text of the Directive itself, Article 4(3) secures that the Member States 
may adopt or maintain provisions that are more favourable to a person to whom it 
applies. I seems legitimate to conclude that less favourable provisions are prohib-
ited. 
This is important for the interpretation and implementation of the Entry Ban 
provisions as I will try to demonstrate.  
b) Typifying the Entry Ban 
There are only two provisions in the Directive explicitly dealing with the phenome-
non of an Entry Ban: Article 3(6) and Article 11. If we want to know what an Entry 
Ban is about, we will have to do some close reading of the definition in article 3(6). 
‘Entry ban’ is, according to this article,  
- an administrative or judicial decision or act  
- prohibiting entry into and stay on the territory of the Member States  
- for a specified period,  
- accompanying a return decision 
‘Administrative or Judicial Decision or Act’ 
It is striking that the Directive refrains from specifying which authority should issue 
an Entry Ban and also leaves undecided whether it should be a decision or an act. 
The most plausible explanation for this highly unspecific definition seems to be, 
that the Directive is meant to cover all national versions of an entry ban existing in 
the Member States, all types and variations of measures prohibiting entry into and 
stay on the territory. 
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‘Prohibiting Entry into and Stay on the Territory of the Member States’ 
Another striking aspect is that the Entry Ban is intended to cover the territory 
not only of the state issuing the prohibition but also the territories of other Member 
States. However, nowhere in the Directive do we find any provision effectuating this 
result. The mere fact that a decision is decorated with the solemn name of ‘EU En-
try Ban’ does not automatically vest such a decision with executive power in other 
member states. Is there a gap in the Directive?  
I think not. Though the Directive is clearly lacking a satisfactory explanation on 
this issue, I am convinced that the solution of this riddle must be sought in the SIS-
regulation and the Schengen Borders Code. (13) I will elaborate on that point here-
under. 
‘For a specified period’ 
In my view, this must mean that a limitation in time is an essential characteristic of 
the EU Entry Ban. This conclusion is supported by Article 11(2) of the Directive: 
‘The length of the entry ban shall be determined with due regard to all relevant cir-
cumstances of the individual case and shall not in principle exceed five years’. It is 
apparently not allowed to issue an Entry Ban for an unlimited period.  
‘Accompanying a return decision’ 
I do not believe that this element of the definition is constitutive, in the sense that 
an entry ban which is not accompanied by a return decision would fall beyond the 
scope of the Directive. Rather do I think that the authorities of a Member State is-
suing such an Entry Ban are under the obligation to consider making a return deci-
sion as yet.  
Summarised 
Any national version of an Entry Ban with regard to third country nationals falls 
within the ambit of the Returns Directive and must, consequently, be reshaped in 
conformity with the Directive. As of 24 December 2010, any Entry Ban must be for 
a specified period of time and must be accompanied by a return decision.  
Via an accompanying alert in the Schengen Information System the effect 
is brought about that the entry ban also works in other Member States. 
c) Discretionary Power for the Member States 
In the life of an Entry Ban there are two moments of discretion leading to its birth. 
First, when a decision must be made about a Return Decision. Subsequently, when 
the decision must be made as to whether a Return Decision shall be accompanied 
by an Entry Ban. I will pay attention to both moments. 
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Issuing the Return Decision 
Point of departure of the Directive is, that there must be either a residence right or a 
Return Decision. There is no room for maintaining an ambiguous situation in 
which a person is neither legally present nor obliged to leave the territory. Article 6 
(1) says that Member States shall issue a Return Decision to any third-country na-
tional staying illegally on their territory. The only alternative mentioned in para-
graphs 4 and 5 of Article 6 is to offer a right to stay. 
In other words, issuing a Return Decision means a moment of balancing of in-
terests. 
It is not just about notifying a person that he has to leave but also considering 
whether it is appropriate to offer a residence right or a right to stay. I already cited 
preamble nr 6, stating that decisions taken under the Directive shall be adopted on 
a case-by-case basis and based on objective criteria, implying that consideration 
should go beyond the mere fact of an illegal stay. Once a Return Decision is issued, 
an obligation for the person concerned to leave the country is established. 
Deciding on an Entry Ban 
The mere existence of a Return Decision, however, does not mean that it should 
always be accompanied by an Entry Ban. Unfortunately, the rules on the issuing of 
an Entry Ban are far from unequivocal. I already mentioned the double face of Arti-
cle 11 of the Directive as it is both extremely mandatory and extremely permissive.  
The first paragraph says that Return Decisions shall be accompanied by an entry 
ban (a) if no period for voluntary return has been granted or (b) if the obligation to 
return has not been complied with. If an Entry Ban is mandatory indeed for all 
cases in which a person did not leave the territory in time, it covers a vast majority 
of all irregular migrants. If, in addition, an Entry ban may - according to the last sen-
tence of the first paragraph - be issued in other cases, that is, when the person still 
has time to leave voluntarily, the Ban may conceivably cover all irregular migrants 
known to the authorities. In its extreme form of implementation Article 11(1) may 
lead to an automatic issuing of Entry Bans to a majority irregular migrants. In a let-
ter to of 27 may 2008, the Meijers Committee has urged the Council and the Euro-
pean parliament to ensure that the final text of the Directive would ensure an indi-
vidual assessment. This has not resulted in an amendment. So now the question is 
whether the harsh potential of Article 11(1) may be mitigated by means of interpre-
tation. The best option is to look at the last two sentences of the third paragraph of 
Article 11.  
Surprisingly, this part of paragraph 3 gives a very wide authorisation to refrain 
from issuing an Entry Ban or to withdraw or suspend it for humanitarian reasons, 
or for other reasons. How should we read this? I can see three avenues of thought: 
1. Stressing the consequence of ambiguity 
It could be argued that a genuinely mandatory character of this provision is hardly 
conceivable if Member States are at the same time allowed to make exceptions for 
any reason, that is, for humanitarian or other reasons. This may lead to the conclu-
sion that Member States are free to install a far more discretionary system, according 
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to which an Entry Ban is not automatically issued but only after an assessment of 
the merits of the individual case. 
2. Looking at the object and purpose of the Directive 
The Court of Justice has repeatedly stated that the provisions of a Directive like this 
must be interpreted in the light of the fundamental rights enshrined in both the 
ECHR and the Charter.1 This is also confirmed in preamble 24 of the Directive. If 
we look at preamble nr 6 of the Directive we see that general principles of EU law 
are placed on the foreground. Decisions taken under the Directive shall be adopted 
on a case-by-case basis and based on objective criteria, implying that consideration 
should go beyond the mere fact of an illegal stay. Further Preamble 13 expressly in-
vokes the principle of Proportionality, stating that the use of coercive measures 
should be expressly subject to the principles of proportionality and effectiveness 
with regard to the means used and objectives pursued. 
On the basis of these observations it could be argued that a Member State is not 
only allowed to install a discretionary system in its national legislation with regard to 
the issuing of Entry Bans, but may even be obliged to do so by the principle of pro-
portionality – notwithstanding the mandatory impression created in the first para-
graph of Article 11. 
3. Copying the formulation of the Directive  
However, it is also arguable that the Directive is clear in its formulation. A third 
avenue would be copying the formulation of Article 11 placing the mandatory char-
acter on the foreground and using the discretionary room for individual assessment 
only in exceptional cases.  
It will be for the Court of Justice to decide which approach is correct. 
d) The SIS alert 
Now we come to the main complication that I want to address in this article. Long 
before the Returns Directive was even drafted, we did already have an Entry Ban in 
European Union Law. That is the SIS alert. Any SIS-alert leads to an effective pro-
hibition of entry to the territories of all Schengen States, which covers and overlaps 
the continental part of the European Union. The United Kingdom and Ireland are 
not taking part in the Schengen acquis. Neither are they participating in the Returns 
Directive. The Schengen Borders Code provides that Member States must refuse 
entry to any person whose name has been entered in the SIS. By way of exception a 
Member State may allow entry restricted to its own territory. The same applies for 
the refusal of visas under the Visa Code. 
How must we see the relation between this Schengen Entry Ban and the Entry 
Ban of the Returns Directive? Can they exist apart from each other? If so, under 
what conditions? 
 
                                                        
1  CoJ EU 4 March 2010, Chakroun, Case 478/08. 
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The principal answer should be that we do not know. There is no provision, 
even hardly an indication in either the Directive or the SIS legislation showing us 
the way. 
What I can do is, to present my own reflections on the problem. I will try to 
conceive the relation between the two Entry Bans in such a manner, that they com-
plement each other, rather than competing. This might be possible if we consider 
the SIS-alert primarily as a supportive instrument enabling the EU Entry Ban to 
have effect in the continental territories of the European Union.  
We saw, that the Returns Directive does not contain any operational provision 
giving the Entry Ban the effect that it pretends to have. Only in combination with a 
SIS-alert will an Entry Ban effectively bar entry and residence in the territory of 
other Member States. This would be in conformity with the character of the SIS-
alert as an additional measure which never stands alone but always serves to rein-
force a national alert.  
This would practically mean that an Entry Ban of the Returns Directive should 
always be accompanied by an SIS alert. This would arguably imply that the criteria 
for issuing the one should also be applicable to the other. We already saw what the 
criteria for issuing an Entry Ban are. What criteria do we have for issuing an SIS-
alert? 
Before answering this question I must point at a problem of applicable law.  
It is a little bit difficult to find the authoritative source of law, whereas the new 
SIS-Regulation already entered into force long ago but nevertheless the Regulation 
is not operational yet. Strictly speaking, the legal basis of the SIS alert should there-
fore be sought in the old provisions of the Schengen Implementing Convention. 
But for the purposes of this article, I deem it justified to take the new text of the SIS 
II Regulation as the major point of reference. 
In Article 24 of the SIS II Regulation we see that an alert is allowed on two 
grounds:  
a.  threat to public policy or public security or to national security.  
b.  the fact that the third-country national has been subject to a measure involving 
expulsion, refusal of entry or removal which has not been rescinded or sus-
pended, that includes or is accompanied by a prohibition on entry or, where ap-
plicable, a prohibition on residence, based on a failure to comply with national 
regulations on the entry or residence of third-country nationals. 
 
These criteria are, in my view, easily reconcilable with the criteria for issuing an En-
try Ban under the Returns Directive. In both sets of cases, a Member State is al-
lowed – not obliged - to issue a Return Decision and an Entry Ban. 
Important is, that the SIS II Regulation also stresses the importance of the pro-
portionality principle in an even more convincing way than the Returns Directive. 
Article 21 of the Regulation requires that, before issuing an alert, Member States 
shall determine whether the case is adequate, relevant and important enough. And 
the first paragraph of Article 24 states that an alert in the SIS should be based on a 
decision taken on the basis of an individual assessment. 
We saw earlier that there may be discussion as to what discretion Member States 
have in issuing an Entry Ban. If we accept that an Entry Ban can only be effective in 
cases where an alert in the SIS is allowed, there is one reason more to accept that 
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the issuing of an Entry Ban must always be subject to a proportionate and individ-
ual assessment. 
It goes without saying that the lack of co-ordination between the Returns Direc-
tive and the SIS-II Regulation can only be repaired by the EU legislature. But this 
may be a time-consuming operation. In the meantime we should try to deal with the 
observed problems by seeking a reasonable and practical interpretation of the avail-
able provisions. 
e) Concluding remarks 
Two preoccupations were at the basis of this contribution, (a) worries about a po-
tential automatic and arbitrary application of Entry bans and (b) worries about lack 
of co-ordination in the issuing of two different EU Entry Bans. 
I hope to have made a contribution to an understanding of the relevant law ac-
cording to which Entry Bans and SIS-alerts must only be applied in combination 
and should only be issued after a proportionate and individual assessment. 
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Principles of the Returns Directive and the Lack of 
Procedural Guarantees 
 
 
Michele Cavinato* 
Introduction 
In December 2008, Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for 
returning illegally staying third-country nationals1 (hereafter ‘the Returns Directive’ or 
‘the Directive’) was approved after three years of difficult negotiations under the co-
decision procedure.2  
The final compromise between the European Parliament and the Council in-
cludes important references and safeguards related to international protection both 
in the preamble and the operative part of the text.  
Recital 8 of the Directive requires the existence of a fair and efficient asylum sys-
tem which respects the principles of non-refoulement.  
Recital 23 specifies that the application of the Returns Directive is without 
prejudice to the obligations resulting from the Geneva Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951, as amended by the New York Protocol of 31 
January 1967.  
Thereafter, recital 24 states that the Directive respects the fundamental rights 
and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union.  
With the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009, the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights3 has become binding EU primary law. Its Article 18 states 
that ‘the right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva 
Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of 
refugees and in accordance with the Treaty establishing the European Community.’ In other 
words, recital 24 also refers, inter alia, to the responsibility that Member States have 
to abide by the obligations stemming from the 1951 Geneva Conventions.  
                                                        
*  The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not represent the position of UNHCR 
or the United Nations.  
1  European Union, Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying 
third-country nationals, 16 December 2008, 2008/115/EC, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/ 
refworld/docid/496c641098.html. 
2  See Fabian Lutz, The Negotiations on the Return Directive, Nijmegen: Wolf Legal Publishers 
2010. 
3  European Union, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 7 December 
2000, Official Journal of the European Communities, 18 December 2000 (2000/C 364/ 
01), available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3b70.html.  
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In addition to the preamble provisions referring to the 1951 Geneva Conven-
tions and the right to asylum, the operational part of the text mentions the non-
refoulement principle three times in Article 4(4)(b), Article 5 last indent and Article 
9(1)(a).  
Article 4 of the Directive4 clarifies that Member States must respect the non-
refoulement principle also with regard to third country nationals who may be ex-
cluded from the scope of the Directive. These persons are defined by Article 2 (2) of 
the Directive as those apprehended or intercepted ‘in connection’ with the irregular 
crossing of the external border of a Member State and have subsequently not ob-
tained an authorization to stay or those that are subject to return as a criminal law 
sanction or as a consequence of a criminal law sanction.5  
Article 5 also requires Member States to respect the non-refoulement principle 
when applying the Directive. This is a general safeguard clause which applies to 
third-country nationals falling within the scope of the Directive.  
As a further guarantee, Article 9 (1)(a) obliges Member States to postpone re-
moval when this would violate the principle of non-refoulement. This particular safe-
guard is meant to guarantee, inter alia, persons whose international protection needs 
arise sur place.  
In addition, Article 11 (5) specifies that, even in cases where a return decision 
has been accompanied by an entry ban preventing the third country national from 
entering the Union for a certain period of time, the issuance of an entry ban should 
not prejudice the right to refugee and subsidiary protection status as defined by the 
Qualification Directive.6  
Both the preamble and the operational part of the text thus seem to include suf-
ficient guarantees with regard to the right to asylum and the principle of non-
refoulement. However, in the absence of specific procedural safeguards and of fair 
and efficient asylum system in some Member State,7 the risk of refoulement could still 
arise for third country nationals who may have international protection needs.  
                                                        
4  Article 4 (4): ‘With regard to third-country nationals excluded from the scope of this Directive 
in accordance with Article 2(2)(a), Member States shall: […] (b) respect the principle of non -
refoulement’. 
5  Article 2(2) Return Directive: ‘Member States may decide not to apply this Directive to third-
country nationals who: (a) are subject to a refusal of entry in accordance with Article 13 of the 
Schengen Borders Code, or who are apprehended or intercepted by the competent authorities 
in connection with the irregular crossing by land, sea or air of the external border of a Mem-
ber State and who have not subsequently obtained an authorisation or a right to stay in that 
Member State; (b) are subject to return as a criminal law sanction or as a consequence of a 
criminal law sanction, according to national law, or who are the subject of extradition proce-
dures’. 
6  European Union: Council of the European Union, Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 
2004 on Minimum Standards for the Qualification and Status of Third Country Nationals or Stateless 
Persons as Refugees or as Persons Who Otherwise Need International Protection and the Content of the 
Protection Granted, 19 May 2004, 2004/83/EC, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/ 
docid/4157e75e4.html. 
7  This has been, for instance, acknowledge by the ECHR in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece. The 
Court deemed ‘that its analysis of the obstacles facing asylum seekers in Greece clearly shows 
that applications lodged there at this point in time are illusory’. M.S.S. v. Belgium and 
→ 
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For instance, the right to an effective remedy may be undermined by Article 12 
(3) which allows Member States not to provide a translation of the main elements of 
decisions related to return, including information on the available legal remedies.  
Due to the absence of specific procedural safeguards, two categories of third 
country nationals are in particular at risk of being prevented from accessing interna-
tional protection or of being returned to persecution: those issued with an entry 
ban; and those who do not fall within the scope of application of the Directive be-
cause ‘apprehended or intercepted by the competent authorities in connection with the irregu-
lar crossing of the external border of a Member Stare’.  
Entry Bans and Protection Needs 
An entry ban is an administrative or judicial decision or act prohibiting a third 
country national from (re-)entering into and staying on the territory of the EU for a 
specified period of time.8 Article 11 (1) requires that the decision to return a third 
country national be accompanied by an entry ban in two specific cases.9 It also 
grants Member States wide discretion by providing them with the possibility to issue 
an entry ban ‘in other cases’. Potentially, all return decisions could be accompanied 
by an entry ban.  
Article 11 (5)10 contains a general saving clause which has been included to pre-
vent that the issuance of an entry bans indirectly leads to an erosion of the right to 
seek asylum. However, despite this clause, the absence of adequate procedural guar-
antees may generate concerns with regard to the respect of the right to asylum and 
the non-refoulement principle.  
In fact, the Directive does not contain provisions indicating the body responsi-
ble for, the procedure involved and the timeframe necessary to obtain withdrawal of 
an entry ban. These would be essential to ensure the respect of the right to asylum.11 
To be effective, an entry ban will have to be entered into the Schengen Informa-
tion System (SIS), a database which is used, inter alia, to maintain and distribute in-
formation on individuals for purposes of border control. The Convention Imple-
                                                        
Greece, Application no. 30696/09, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 21 
January 2011, para 357, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d39bc7f2.html. 
8  See Art 3(6) of the Directive. 
9  Article 11 (1) Returns Directive: ‘Return decisions shall be accompanied by an entry ban: (a) if 
no period for voluntary departure has been granted, or (b) if the obligation to return has not 
been complied with. In other cases return decisions may be accompanied by an entry ban’. 
10  Article 11(5): ‘Paragraphs 1 to 4 shall apply without prejudice to the right to international 
protection, as defined in Article 2(a) of Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on 
minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country nationals or stateless per-
sons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of 
the protection granted, in the Member States’. 
11  See: ‘UNHCR Observations on the European Commission’s Proposal for a Directive on common stan-
dards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals 
(COM(2005) 391 final)’, December 2005, at: http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/ 
43a6c2352.pdf.  
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menting the Schengen agreement allows Member States to enter alerts and to ex-
change data on persons who have been issued an entry ban.12 At the beginning of 
2008, there were 700,000 such alerts in the SIS.13 The Returns Directive is likely to 
enlarge considerably the scope of entry refusal alerts.14  
In case of changed circumstances in the country of origin and/or a change of 
circumstances related to the third country national giving rise to international pro-
tection needs, the existence of an entry ban and related SIS Alert, is likely to pre-
vent the asylum-seekers from entering the European Union, and consequently from 
accessing an asylum procedure. In fact, the third country national would be either 
denied entry at the external border or denied a visa in the territorial representation 
of EU Member States.  
Potential violations of the non-refoulement principle may also be generated by the 
provision of Article 11(4) of the Directive. Entry bans and related SIS alerts are EU-
wide. If a third country national issued with an entry ban tries to re-enter the EU 
through another Member State than that which issued the entry-ban, that Member 
State is obliged to ‘consult the Member State having issued the entry ban’. Pending the 
consultation, the third country national may not be granted entry. This would 
amount to violation of Article 33 of the 1951 Geneva Convention.  
Third Country Nationals Excluded from the Scope of the Directive  
In accordance with Article 2 (2), a third country national may be considered to fall 
outside the scope of the Directive when apprehended or intercepted in connection 
with the irregular crossing of the border. The Directive does not define what ‘in 
connection with the irregular crossing of the border’ means.  
In view of visa regulations and other entry restrictions, many persons seeking 
protection are compelled to enter the EU in an irregular manner. In principle, they 
may all be considered as falling outside the scope of the Directive. As a conse-
quence, they would not enjoy some of its guarantees and it would be difficult for 
them to have enforced the saving clause against non-refoulement included in Article 4 
(4).  
As they fall outside the scope of the Directive, there is no obligation for Member 
States to issue an individual return decision ex Article 6 (1).15 For the same reason, 
                                                        
12  European Union, Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985 between the 
Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
French Republic, on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Common Borders (‘Schengen Implementa-
tion Agreement’), 19 June 1990, Article 96, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/doc-
id/3ae6b38a20.html. 
13  See SIS Database Statistics aas at 1 January 2008, Council Document 5441/08 of 30 January 
2008.  
14 `A. Baldaccini, ‘ The Return and Removal of illegal migrants under EU Law: An analysis of 
the Returns Directive’ , European Journal of Migration and Law, 11/1, 2009, p. 10.  
15  Article 6(1): ‘Member States shall issue a return decision to any third country national staying 
illegally on their territory, […].’ 
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the Directive does not grant them access to an effective remedy as provided for by 
Article 13.16  
From a practical point of view it will be very difficult for those falling outside the 
scope of the Directive to claim protection and demonstrate that their return may 
violate the non-refoulement principle.  
Evidences of breaches of the non-refoulement principle for third country na-
tionals falling outside the scope of the Directive have been registered in connection 
with the application of readmission agreements. 
Article 2 (2) allows Member States to use accelerated procedures which are gen-
erally provided for in bilateral as well as EU readmission agreements. Through these 
accelerated procedures, if a person has been apprehended in the border region17 of 
a Member State after irregularly crossing the border coming directly from the terri-
tory of a the state party to a readmission agreement, the Member State may submit a 
readmission application within two working days following such person's apprehen-
sion.18 On the receiving end, a reply has to be given within two working days after 
the date of receipt of such application. If there was no reply within such a short de-
lay, the transfer shall be deemed to have been agreed to.19 In other words, in appli-
cation of a readmission accelerated procedure, a third country national can be re-
turned to a third country where s/he can be at risk of persecution or further re-
foulement within four days.  
This very short time limit renders practically impossible access to asylum proce-
dure or to seek an effective remedy against the return. This has been recently docu-
mented by a research that found evidences of violation of the non-refoulement prin-
ciple following the application of the accelerated procedures. Out of 161 refugees, 
migrants, and asylum-seekers interviewed in Ukraine, Slovakia, and Hungary, Hu-
man Right Watch received 50 testimonies of persons who said they had been re-
turned from Slovakia or Hungary. Most of them said they had asked for asylum 
upon arrival in those countries, but that their pleas had been ignored and they had 
                                                        
16  However, considering that the right to an effective remedy is a general principle of EU law 
and a fundamental right (Article 47 Charter Fundamental Rights), one could argue that third 
country nationals outside the scope of the Directive have the right to appeal in any case. 
17  In the EU Readmission Agreements, the meaning of border region varies. The most common 
definition is the one listed, inter alia, in Article 1 (l) of the EU-Ukraine Readmission Agree-
ment, i.e. ‘an area which extends up to 30 kilometers from the common land border between 
a Member State and’ the third country, ‘as well as the territories of seaports including custom 
zones, and international airports of the Member States and’ the third country. Agreement be-
tween the European Community and Ukraine on the readmission of persons, 18 December 
2007, OJ L 332/48, Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/downloadFile. 
do?fullText=yes&treatyTransId=11681. 
18  See for instance Article 6 (3) 3 of the Agreement between the European Community and the 
Russian Federation on readmission, 17 May 2007, OJ L 129/40, available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/ LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:129:0040:0060:EN:PDF. 
19  See for instance Article 11 (3) and (4) of the EU-Russian Federation Readmission Agreement. 
Ibidem.  
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been swiftly expelled.20 The findings of the research thus confirm that in the ab-
sence of procedural guarantees, Article 2(2)(a) of the Directive leads, through the 
application of accelerated readmission procedure, to violation of the right to seek 
asylum.  
The application of Article 2(2) and consequent exclusion from enjoyment of cer-
tain guarantees foreseen by the Directive may trigger violation of the non-refoulement 
principle also in other cases. This would be the case, for instance, of a third country 
national who is about to be returned and become a refugee ‘sur place’ because the 
situation in his/her country of origin suddenly changes. As s/he falls outside the 
scope of the Directive, the postponement of the removal ex Article 9 (1) would not 
be guaranteed. In addition, s/he would not even access to the remedies foreseen by 
Article 13. 
Applications for International Protection made by Third Country Nationals 
while in Detention for the Purposes of the Removal 
Recital 9 states that  
 
‘a third-country national who has applied for asylum in a Member State should 
not be regarded as staying illegally on the territory of that Member State until a 
negative decision on the application, or a decision ending his or her right of stay 
as asylum seeker has entered into force’.  
 
The first part of the recital is clear as it states that, as long as a third country na-
tional has applied for asylum and the first instance responsible authority21 has not 
taken a negative decision with regard to his/her case, the Returns Directive does 
not apply and s/he cannot be returned.  
The second part of recital 9 makes reference to the right of the third country na-
tional to stay as asylum-seeker and to the decision ending this right to stay.  
The provision is important as it regulates when a rejected asylum-seeker previ-
ously in pre-removal detention falls within the scope of the acquis on asylum and 
when within the scope of the Returns Directive.  
In cases where automatic suspensive effect is granted by national legislation, the 
decision ending the right to stay refers to the final decision22 taken by the court of 
tribunal i.e. a decision which is no longer subject to a remedy. In cases where an in-
                                                        
20  Human Rights Watch, Buffeted in the Borderland, The Treatment of Migrants and Asylum Seekers in 
Ukraine, 16 December 2010, ISBN: 1-56432-716-7, p. 3, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/ 
refworld/docid/4d1049262.html. 
21  Article 4 Asylum Procedure Directive. 
22  According to Article 2 (d) of the Asylum Procedure Directive, ‘final decision’ means a deci-
sion on whether the third country national or stateless person be granted refugee status by vir-
tue of Directive 2004/83/EC and which is no longer subject to a remedy within the frame-
work of Chapter V of this Directive irrespective of whether such remedy has the effect of al-
lowing applicants to remain in the Member States concerned pending its outcome, subject to 
Annex III to this Directive’; 
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terim measure should be requested to a court or a tribunal to obtain the right to 
stay pending the outcome of the second instance proceeding, ‘decision ending the right 
to stay’ refers to the decision on the interim measure. In this case, if the request for 
an interim measure is responded to in the positive, the decision ending the right to 
stay refers to the final decision. 
This has been reiterated by the Court of Justice of the European Union that, in 
Saïd Shamilovich Kadzoev v. Direktsia ‘Migratsia’ pri Ministerstvo na vatreshnite 
raboti.23 
Recital 9 is in line with Article 7 (1) of the Asylum Procedure Directive24 which, 
apart from few exceptions, grants applicants for refugee status the right to remain in 
the territory of the Member State pending the examination of their application in 
accordance with the first instance procedure. These two provisions ensure that the 
right to asylum as recognised by the Charter of Fundamental rights is upheld. 
 
Applicants for international protection fall therefore outside the scope of the Re-
turns Directive. This applies as well to third country nationals applying for asylum 
when in detention to prepare the return and/or carry out the removal process. After 
their application for asylum, the Returns Directive cannot be resorted to in order to 
maintain them in pre-removal detention. The applicants will fall under different le-
gal rules, 25 those governing the asylum acquis.  
In this framework, Article 18 (1) of the Asylum Procedure Directive clearly states 
that Member States shall not hold a person in detention for the sole reason that 
s/he is an applicant for asylum. Nevertheless, the Reception Conditions Directive26 
allows Member States to confine applicants for international protection to a particu-
lar place in accordance with their national law when it proves necessary for example 
for legal reasons or public order.  
Whether a third country national in pre-removal detention should be kept in 
detention after s/he applies for asylum, it is a decision that should be taken by 
Member States in accordance with the conditions laid down by the provision of EU 
and national law. This decision to ‘confine’ the applicant for international protec-
tion to a particular place may be appealed.27 It is then for the national courts to es-
                                                        
23  Saïd Shamilovich Kadzoev v. Direktsia ‘Migratsia’ pri Ministerstvo na vatreshnite raboti, Case C-
357/09, European Union: European Court of Justice, 30 November 2009, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4b14ecb090c1.html 
24  European Union: Council of the European Union, Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 Decem-
ber 2005 on Minimum Standards on Procedures in Member States for Granting and Withdrawing 
Refugee Status, 2 January 2006, 2005/85/EC, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/ 
docid/4394203c4.html. 
25  Kadzoev v. Direktsia ‘Migratsia’, para 45, op.cit.  
26  European Union: Council of the European Union, Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 
2003 Laying Down Minimum Standards for the Reception of Asylum Seekers in Member States, 6 Feb-
ruary 2003, 2001/0091 (CNS), available at:  http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ddcfd-
a14.html. 
27 Article 21(1) Reception Condition: ‘Member States shall ensure that negative decisions relat-
ing to the granting of benefits under this Directive or decisions taken under Article 7 which 
individually affect asylum seekers may be the subject of an appeal within the procedures laid 
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tablish whether staying in a detention centre after having applied for asylum while 
in pre-removal detention complies ‘with the provision of community and national law 
concerning asylum seekers’.28  
In addition, detention of asylum-seekers should be in accordance with interna-
tional law. According to UNHCR guidelines,29 detention of asylum-seekers may be 
resorted to only in four cases i) to verify identity, ii) to determine the elements on 
which the claim to refugee status or asylum is based, iii) to deal with cases where 
refugees or asylum-seekers have destroyed their travel and/or identity documents or 
have used fraudulent documents in order to mislead the authorities of the State in 
which they intend to claim asylum; or iv) to protect national security or public or-
der.  
In the first case, the identity of the third country national who has applied for 
asylum when in pre-removal detention is already known. Hence, in principle, 
his/her detention would not be justified. The same applies in the third case. 
With regard to the second case, UNHCR guidelines clarify that the asylum-
seeker may be detained exclusively for the purposes of a preliminary interview to 
identify the basis of the asylum claim. This ground cannot be used to justify deten-
tion for the entire status determination procedure, or for an unlimited period of 
time.  
Detention for reasons of national security and public order relates to cases where 
there is evidence to show that the asylum-seeker has criminal antecedents and/or af-
filiations which are likely to pose a risk to public order or national security should 
he/she be allowed entry.  
Final Remarks 
Despite the guarantees contained in the Returns Directive, certain of its provisions 
and the lack of procedural safeguards could trigger violations of the right to asylum 
and of the non-refoulement principle. In particular, the two most dangerous provisions 
are those allowing Member States to exclude third country national apprehended in 
connection with the irregular crossing of the border from the scope of the Directive 
(Article 2(2)(a)) and to issue entry bans (Article 11). Aware of the above, some 
Member State has adopted corrective measures while transposing the Directive. 
Hungary for instance did not transpose Article 2(2) thus ensuring that every third 
country national is protected by the guarantees included in the Directive. Other 
Member States should follow the good practice given by Hungary. In addition, 
                                                        
down in the national law. At least in the last instance the possibility of an appeal or a review 
before a judicial body shall be granted’. 
28  Kadzoev v. Direktsia ‘Migratsia’, para 46.  
29  UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR's Revised Guidelines on Applicable Criteria and 
Standards relating to the Detention of Asylum-Seekers, 26 February 1999, available at: http:// 
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3c2b3f844.html; see also: UN High Commissioner for Refu-
gees, Detention of Refugees and Asylum-Seekers, 13 October 1986, No. 44 (XXXVII) - 
1986, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae68c43c0.html. 
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Member States should, inter alia, ensure that procedures for the withdrawal of entry 
bans are in place and are known to third country nationals.  
Detention of third country nationals applying for asylum while in detention for 
the purpose of removal should be in line with international, EU and national law. 
At the moment, the Reception Conditions Directive grants Member States the pos-
sibility to regulate detention in national law. If an appeal is introduced, it is for the 
national courts to determine whether detention of the third country national that 
has applied for asylum complies with the domestic legislation. In certain instances, 
the guarantees provided for by national legislation. . are not in line with interna-
tional standards.  
The European Commission (EC) has issued a proposal to recast the Reception 
Conditions Directive30 which also regulates detention. The proposal contains effec-
tive guarantees.31  
When and if approved, clearer common standards and guarantees for detention 
will be set also for those applying for international protection while in detention for 
the purposes of the removal. Unfortunately that time will not come soon as Mem-
ber States are opposing the recast process. 
 
                                                        
30  European Union: European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and 
of the Council laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers (Recast), 3 Decem-
ber 2008, COM(2008) 815 final, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/ 
493e8ba62.html. 
31  Article 8, 9, 10 an 11 recast Reception Conditions Directive. Ibidem. 
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The implementation of the Returns Directive in Sweden 
 
Alexandra Wilton Wahren 
1. The Swedish Legislation Process 
The Inquiry Stage 
Before the Government can draw up a legislative proposal, the matter in question 
must be analysed and evaluated. The task may be assigned to officials from the min-
istry concerned, a commission of inquiry or a one-man committee. Inquiry bodies, 
which operate independently of the Government, may include or co-opt experts, 
public officials and politicians. The reports setting out their conclusions are pub-
lished in the Swedish Government Official Reports series (Statens Offentliga 
Utredningar, SOU). 
The Referral Process 
Before the Government takes up a position on the recommendations of a commis-
sion of inquiry, its report is referred for consideration to the relevant bodies. These 
referral bodies may be central government agencies, special interest groups, local 
government authorities or other bodies whose activities may be affected by the pro-
posals. This process provides valuable feedback and allows the Government to gauge 
the level of support it is likely to receive. If a number of referral bodies respond un-
favourably to the recommendations, the Government may try to find an alternative 
solution. 
Government Bill 
When the referral bodies have submitted their comments, the ministry responsible 
drafts the bill that will be submitted to the Riksdag. If the proposed law has impor-
tant implications for private citizens or the welfare of the public, the Government 
should first refer the proposal to the Council on Legislation to ensure that it does 
not conflict with existing legislation. 
The Parliamentary Process 
Responsibility for approving all new or amended legislation lies with the Riksdag 
(Swedish parliament). Legislative proposals, whether proceeding from the Govern-
ment or a private member, are dealt with by one of the parliamentary committees. 
Any of the Riksdag's 349 members can table a counter-proposal to a bill introduced 
by the Government. Such a proposal is called a motion. If a motion is formally 
adopted in the Riksdag, the Government is bound to implement its provisions. 
When the committee has completed its deliberations, it submits a report and the 
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bill is put to the chamber of the Riksdag for approval. If adopted, the bill becomes 
law. 
Promulgation 
After its successful passage through the Riksdag, the new law is formally promul-
gated by the Government. All new or amended laws are published in the Swedish 
Code of Statutes (abbreviated in Swedish as SFS). 
2. The Legislation Process and the Returns Directive 
The task of looking at how the Returns Directive best should be implemented into 
Swedish law was given to an commission of inquiry in February 2009. A judge from 
one of the Migration Courts was appointed inquiry chair. To assist him eight ex-
perts was appointed. One from the Migration Board, one from the Police, one from 
the Ministry for Social Affairs, three from the Ministry of Justice and one professor 
from Uppsala University. Their report was presented in June 2009 and was then re-
ferred for consideration. 
The next step to take in the legislation process is that the Government should 
decide on a proposal to be referred to the Council on Legislation. This has not yet 
been done and before that the Government proposal is not official. This report on 
the implementation of the Returns Directive in Sweden is therefore based on the 
report from the inquiry.  
Most of the provisions in the Directive are implemented by already existing pro-
visions in Swedish legislation. In this report only the proposed changes to the Swed-
ish legislation are presented. 
3. Period for Voluntary Departure 
According to Article 7 in the Directive a return decision shall provide for an appro-
priate period for voluntary departure.  
There is already a provision in the Swedish Aliens Act that says that an alien, as 
a general rule, shall leave Sweden in two or four weeks depending on what kind of 
return decision has been made. The difference from the Directive is that there is no 
period for voluntary departure decided on in the return decision. 
In the report from the inquiry it is proposed that a period for voluntary depar-
ture shall be decided on in the return decision. This period shall be seven to thirty 
days. If there are special grounds a longer period can be decided. The period for 
voluntary departure can also be prolonged if there are special grounds.  
There are a number of exceptions from the main rule of a period for voluntary 
departure. 
Such a period shall not be decided on if 
-  there is a risk of absconding, 
-  the alien poses a risk to public policy, public security or national security, 
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-  the alien are apprehended in connection with the irregular crossing of the exter-
nal border, 
-  an application for a residence permit has been refused as manifestly unfounded, 
or 
-  if the alien has been expelled by a criminal court as a sanction for a committed 
crime.  
 
If during the period for voluntary departure there is a risk of absconding or the 
alien poses a risk to public policy, public security or national security, it is proposed 
that the period for voluntary departure can be withdrawn.  
4. Risk of absconding  
According to Article 3 in the Directive ‘risk of absconding’ means the existence of 
reasons in an individual case which are based on objective criteria defined by law to 
believe that a third-country national who is the subject of return procedures may ab-
scond. 
There are no such criteria for determining risk of absconding in the Swedish 
Aliens Act. In the report from the inquiry such a provision is proposed. The new 
provision states that when deciding on whether there is a risk of absconding the au-
thorities shall take due account to if the alien 
-  has absconded before, 
-  has stated that he or she is not willing to leave the country after a return deci-
sion,  
-  has presented different identities, 
-  has not tried to prove his or her identity and thus made the decision on an ap-
plication for asylum more difficult, 
-  has presented reasons for an asylum application that has not been correct, for 
example used false documents, 
-  has returned against an entry ban, 
-  has been convicted of a crime, or 
-  has been expelled because of a crime. 
 
These criteria are at present used when deciding on an entry ban.  
5. Entry ban 
According to the Swedish Aliens Act a return decision can be accompanied by an 
entry ban. There are no time limits for entry bans. An entry ban is usually issued for 
two years. When an alien is expelled because of a committed crime the expulsion 
order is always accompanied by an entry ban. In those cases the entry ban is usually 
valid for a longer period than two years and can be issued without time limit. 
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In the report from the inquiry it is proposed that a return decision that is not com-
bined with a period for voluntary departure shall be accompanied by an entry ban 
unless there are humanitarian grounds. 
It is also proposed that an entry ban shall be issued if an alien has not left Swe-
den when a period for voluntary departure has expired unless there are humanitar-
ian grounds. 
When a return decision is combined with a period for voluntary departure it 
shall contain information on the fact that an entry ban might be issued if the alien 
does not comply with the return decision.  
An entry ban shall be valid for five years or less unless the alien is expelled be-
cause of a committed crime or poses a risk to public policy, public security or na-
tional security. 
Victims of trafficking in human beings shall only be subject of an entry ban if he 
or she poses a risk to public policy, public security or national security. 
It is also proposed that an entry ban shall be issued if a period for voluntary de-
parture is withdrawn unless there are humanitarian grounds. 
6. Detention 
According to the Swedish Aliens Act an alien who has attained the age of 18 may be 
detained for the purpose to enforce a refusal-of-entry or expulsion order. A deten-
tion order may only be issued if there is reason on account of the alien’s personal 
situation or the other circumstances to assume that the alien may otherwise go into 
hiding or pursue criminal activities in Sweden. A child may also be detained for the 
purpose to enforce a refusal-of-entry order if there is an obvious risk that the child 
will otherwise go into hiding and thereby jeopardise an enforcement that should 
not be delayed and it is not sufficient for the child to be placed under supervision. 
A child may also be detained for the purpose to enforce a refusal-of-entry order if on 
a previous attempt to enforce the order it has not proved sufficient to place the 
child under supervision. 
When the purpose is to enforce a refusal-of-entry or expulsion order an alien 
may be detained for at most two months unless there are exceptional grounds for a 
longer period. There is no absolute time limit. It is up to the authorities and courts 
to decide when grounds for detention exist and when it is no longer appropriate to 
hold an alien in detention. A child may not be detained for more than 72 hours or, 
if there are exceptional grounds, for a further 72 hours. 
In the report from the inquiry it is proposed that the time limits in the Directive 
should apply. So in order to hold an alien in detention for a longer period than six 
months there has to be a lack of cooperation by the alien or delays in obtaining 
necessary documentation. Detention can never last for more than 18 months.  
In the report from the inquiry an amendment to the Aliens Act stating that 
families who are detained shall be provided with separate accommodation is also 
proposed. 
An amendment stating that children who are detained shall have the possibility 
to engage in leisure activities appropriate to their ages is also proposed. It is very 
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unusual that children are detained and this is just a clarification. It is already the 
practice if children are detained. 
7. Return of Unaccompanied Minors 
Article 10.2 in the Directive states that before removing an unaccompanied minor 
from the territory the authorities shall be satisfied the the or she will be returned to 
a member of his or her family, a nominated guardian or adequate reception facili-
ties in the State of return.  
There is no such provision in the Aliens Act but it is the practice when unac-
companied children are removed. It is now proposed to amend the Aliens Act with 
such a provision.  
8. Remedies 
In the report from the inquiry it is proposed that a decision to issue an entry ban, a 
decision not to withdraw an entry ban and a decision to withdraw a period for vol-
untary departure can be appealed to a Migration Court. The decision from the Mi-
gration Court can be appealed to the Supreme Migration Court. Leave to appeal is 
required. 
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The Implementation of the Returns Directive 
(2008/115/EC) in Hungary 
 
 
Tamás Molnár 
I.  The Legislative Process 
The preparatory works aiming at transposing Directive 2008/115/EC of 16 De-
cember 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning 
illegally staying third-country nationals (hereinafter: Returns Directive) had started 
in May 2010 when an ad hoc inter-ministerial working group was set up, composed 
not only by representatives of the ministries concerned, but those from the Office of 
Immigration and Nationality (hereinafter: OIN) and the National Police Headquar-
ters as well.   
The draft implementing legislation was elaborated in course of autumn 2010, 
then during the interministerial coordination process, led by the Ministry of Inte-
rior, NGOs working in the field of migration as well as UNHCR and IOM have 
been consulted. The bill implementing the Returns Directive was sent to the Par-
liament in October 2010, and the Parliament adopted the implementing Act in the 
end of November 2010. Formally speaking, the implementing Act (Act CXXXV of 
2010 on the legal harmonisation of migration laws) modified the already existing le-
gal framework, namely Act II of 2007 on the entry and stay of third-country nation-
als, Act LXXX of 2003 on legal aid and legal assistance, Act XXXI of 1997 on the 
protection of children as well as Act V of 1972 on the Prosecution Service.  
After having enacted these legislative amendments, further by-laws have been 
adopted in form of a government decree modifying the Implementing Government 
Decree of Act II of 2007 (Government Decree No. 290/2010 of 21 December 
2010) and a ministerial decree (Decree of the Minister of Interior No. 12/2010 of 
23 December 2010) amending the technical rules on forced removal and detention. 
The entire implementing legislation package entered into force on the same day, on 
24 December 2010, respecting the deadline for transposing the Returns Directive. 
II.  Main Provisions of the Returns Directive and their Implementation 
1.  As regards the scope ratione materiae of the implementing legislation, only the ex-
tradition procedures are excluded from the field of application of the Returns 
Directive and not governed by the rules of the latter, in accordance with Article 
2(2) of the Directive. Extradition procedures fall purely under the ambit of 
criminal law, regulated by a specific law (Act XXXVIII of 1996 on the interna-
tional criminal legal aid). 
2.  Regarding the general principles laid by the Returns Directive (Article 5), such as 
the best interests of the child, the right to family life, the respect for the state of 
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health of the third country national concerned, and the observance of the prin-
ciple of non-refoulement, these all are reflected in the implementing legislation, 
appearing in several concrete provisions. 
3.  When implementing the rules on the issuance of a return decision (Article 6(1)) the 
authorities‟ previously existing discretion power had to be narrowed. Conse-
quently the main rule is the issuance of a return decision (by the OIN or the Po-
lice) in case of an illegally staying third-country national, there is no grey zone 
anymore. As far as Article 6(2)-(5) are concerned; Hungary implemented all these 
optional clauses, which ensure some kind of flexibility in the system. 
4.  Another important issue is the number of return decisions. The general rule is to is-
sue one single document, incorporating all the relevant decisions (Article 6(6) al-
lows this solution). This means that the return decision, the removal order and 
the entry ban; or the return decision and the permission for voluntary departure 
are in the same document issued by the immigration authority. The same holds 
true for the rejection of a residence permit application, when such a rejection 
and the return decision are contained in the same decision, too. In specific cases 
these are separate acts, e.g. if voluntary departure is extended or in case of post-
poned removal. At first instance, administrative decision is issued.  
5.  The effect of  the return decision is the obligation to leave not only the territory of 
the Republic of Hungary, but the whole territory of the Schengen States, in or-
der to give European dimension to the effects of national return measures (as re-
called in recital 14 in the preamble of the Directive and indirectly in Article 
3(6)).  
6.  Voluntary departure is the main rule in the scheme established by the Directive. 
Hungary fully implemented the relevant rules. Using the margin of appreciation 
given by Article 7(2), the period for voluntary return may be extended by 30 days 
or if the child is attending to elementary or high school, until the end of the se-
mester. It is to be highlighted that until the end of the period for voluntary de-
parture the person concerned is considered as staying legally in Hungary, certi-
fied with different kinds of administrative decisions (e.g. decision rejecting the 
application for residence permit; decision withdrawing the residence permit; the 
return decision itself; decision extending the period for voluntary departure). 
Following Article 7(3) obligation to stay at a certain place may be imposed, for 
certain categories of returnees (e.g. those lacking adequate financial resources; 
not having adequate housing etc.). Article 7(4) of the Directive is also fully im-
plemented; we established specific, detailed grounds for refraining from granting 
voluntary departure period or granting shorter period than 7 days (e.g. if the 
person is under entry ban or SIS alert; the returnee expressly denied to leave 
voluntarily). In practice, we already have a well-functioning voluntary return sys-
tem, including the Assisted Voluntary Return (AVR) program carried out by 
IOM in cooperation with the OIN (more then 200 returnees in the AVR pro-
gram per a year since 2007).  
7.  As regards removals, the amending Act inserted a new provision in the national 
legislation in order to implement Article 8(2) of the Directive. Moreover, the ef-
fective forced return monitoring mechanism as foreseen by Article 8(6) is carried 
out by the Prosecution Service, being an independent constitutional institution, 
solely responsible for the Parliament. The Prosecution Service has the main re-
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sponsibility for controlling the legality of the functioning of the public admini-
stration and its competence on forced return monitoring covers all phases of the 
return procedure. The detailed and technical rules on removals are found in a 
separate ministerial decree (Decree of the Minister of Justice and Law Enforce-
ment No. 27/2007 of 24 May on the detailed rules of removal operations as 
amended in December 2010). These provisions cover, inter alia, the following: 
human rights safeguards (principle of respecting human dignity); food and drink 
to be provided every hour to the returnee; only restricted physical enforcement 
measures are permitted (no spraying, mask or tranquilizer); in case of removal by 
air, policemen shall be unarmed etc.   
8.  When it comes to the postponement of removal, all the compulsory cases are fully 
implemented. Furthermore, it is to be noted in this regard that under Hungar-
ian legislation, the definition of non-refoulement encompasses both the refugee 
law and the general human rights law meaning of the term. This very principle 
does not only apply in refugee law context (cf. Article 33 of the 1951 Geneva 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees), but it is also an established hu-
man rights principle as enshrined directly in the 1984 Convention against Tor-
ture (Article 3). Moreover, it stems indirectly, on the universal level, from the 
1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 7 on the 
prohibition of torture), reaffirmed by the practice of respective treaty bodies 
(Human Rights Committee, Committee against Torture); as well as on the re-
gional level from the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights (Article 3 
on the prohibition of torture), the content of the latter further elaborated by the 
massive jurisprudence of the European Court on Human Rights (ECrtHR). Un-
der contemporary international law, it is submitted that non-refoulement is a corol-
lary principle of prohibiting torture (i.e. an extraterritorial application of the lat-
ter). The principle of non-refoulement is assessed ex officio by the relevant authori-
ties (OIN and the Police) in all stages of the return procedure. 
9.  As for the entry bans (Article 11), Hungarian legislation transposed in a detailed 
manner the „may clause‟ in Article 11(1), last sentence. According to this, in all 
non-compulsory entry ban cases the authority takes into consideration the fol-
lowing circumstances: type and weight of the breach of the law; personal circum-
stances; effect of re-entry to public policy, public security or national security. 
The length of an entry ban is no more than 5 years (at least 1 year since it is cal-
culated in years). As an exception, it can last up to 10 years if the illegally staying 
third country national represents a serious threat to public policy, public security 
or national security. Entry bans run from the day of leaving the territory of the 
Schengen States.   
Another type of entry ban („stand alone entry ban‟) is regulated in the Hungar-
ian legislation, not falling under the scope of the Returns Directive. This is the 
case when the third country national stays outside the territory of Hungary and 
banning his/her entry is based on international obligations (e.g. UN Security 
Council resolutions, such as UNSC Res. 1970 (2011) or 1973 (2011)) or EU 
Council Decisions imposing travel bans as sanctions).  Suspension of an entry 
ban (Article 11(3)) is guaranteed under the Hungarian implementing legislation 
on humanitarian grounds, moreover it can be withdrawn if the circumstances 
have fundamentally changed (clausula rebus sic standibus rule).  
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10. Procedural safeguards are of utmost importance in carrying out a humane return 
policy. We have fully implemented Article 12(1)-(2), therefore all decisions re-
lated to return are in writing, containing the necessary motivation and reference 
to the available remedies as well. Hungary has not opted for a separate form pro-
vided in Article 12(3) second sentence. The legislation sets forth a wide array of 
effective remedies:  
- There is judicial review available (within 8 days) against a) a decision rejecting 
the application for residence permit (containing also the return decision); b) 
a decision withdrawing the residence permit (containing also the return deci-
sion); and c) a separate return decision. The court shall decide within 15 
days. 
-  Against an entry ban (incorporated in a separate decision), administrative 
appeal can be submitted within 24 hours and the appeal shall be decided 
within 8 days by the immigration authority.  
-  If expulsion is a criminal law sanction (ordered by criminal court) it is carried 
out by the immigration authority and this latter can be challenged in form of 
a complaint against removal.  
-  Against a separate removal order a complaint against removal may be submit-
ted within 24 hours and the appeal shall be decided within 5 days by the 
immigration authority. 
-  Similarly, complaint against the conditions of removal may also be submitted 
to the competent immigration authority. 
-  Finally the enforcement of removal may be suspended by application. 
 
11. The possibility to obtain legal advice, representation and where necessary linguistic as-
sistance (Article 13(3)) is provided on the applicants cost for the time being. As 
for the free of charge legal assistance contained in Article 13(4), this provision 
will be implemented by 24t December 2011 (Act LXXX of 2003 on legal aid and 
legal assistance will be modified).  
12. There are two types of detention under Hungarian immigration law. First, deten-
tion pursuant to the Returns Directive is only allowed with the purpose of pre-
paring removal. Besides the grounds set forth in Article 15(1) there are other 
grounds for detaining illegally staying third country nationals which are the fol-
lowing: if the obligation to stay in a certain place is seriously or repeatedly vio-
lated; the returnee failed to report as ordered; or released from imprisonment. 
However, detention is always used as a measure of last resort only when confisca-
tion of the travel document or the obligation to stay at a certain space is not 
enough to prepare the return. Detention is ordered by the immigration author-
ity in writing (including motivation in fact and law). Its duration lasts 72 hours; 
then the immigration authority shall file its request for an extension beyond the 
72-hour time limit at the local court within 24 hours from the time when or-
dered. The court may grant an extension of detention under immigration laws 
for a maximum duration of 30 days at a time. Any additional 30-day extension 
of detention under immigration laws may be requested at the court by the im-
migration authority, where the court must receive the request within 8 working 
days prior to the due date for extension. The maximum duration of detention is 
6 months. In duly justified and exceptional cases detention can be extended un-
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der the same conditions as described above with a maximum of 6 months if 
there is a lack of cooperation by the third country national or there are delays in 
obtaining the necessary documentation from the third country. All in all after 
the maximum 12 months the person shall be set free, with the possibility to im-
pose an obligation to stay at a certain place.  
Secondly detention can also be ordered so as to establish the identity or the le-
gality of stay of the person concerned (this case not falling into the material 
scope of the Return Directive). Its duration lasts 72 hours ordered by the immi-
gration authority then the court can extend it once up to 30 days.  
Specific rules apply to unaccompanied minors: they can under no circumstances 
be detained. Families with minor children can only be detained as a measure of 
last resort (where the aim of the detention cannot be reached by other less coer-
cive measures) but only for a maximum of 30 days. When the authority decides 
to impose detention on a family it shall take into account the best interests of 
the child.  
Detainees shall be provided with information on their rights and obligations (in 
their mother tongue or a spoken language) as well as their consular authorities 
shall be informed (on request or if a bilateral consular agreement stipulates so). 
Immigration detainees are placed in specialised facilities these are the so called 
“guarded shelters” (one located at the Budapest Liszt Ferenc International Air-
port and three others in the countryside), which provide a minimum of 5sqm 
and 15 cubic meter of space per person. The implementing decrees have been 
modified in order to improve the conditions of immigration detention. The new 
rules stipulate that families (including spouses) shall be accommodated together 
and separately from other detainees in a separate department guaranteeing the 
basic conditions of family life (a minimum of 8sqm). According to the new rules 
detention centres shall ensure the education of minor detainees if that is justi-
fied by the length of detention. The modified ministerial decree sets out that 
adequate special medical care shall be provided for those detainees who have 
been subject to torture, rape or other violent acts in the country of origin in or-
der to sufficiently treat the trauma caused by these acts. Finally, the implement-
ing legislation specifies a set of rights for immigration detainees: healthcare; 
food; contacting family members, legal representatives and consular authorities; 
freedom of expressing her/his religion, daily 1 hour of outdoor activities and 
specific treatment for minors.  
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1.  Lack of Transposition and the Principle of Sincere Cooperation 
The transposition of Directives in Italy is carried out once yearly with a bill which is 
enacted by Parliament at the initiative of the Government. This Legge comunitaria – 
2009 (-10, etc…), as the Act is called, lists all the Directives which came into force in 
previous years and which are to be implemented in Italy. Where the implementa-
tion requires major changes, the government is required by law to enact a bill of 
implementation within a three-month time-limit if the deadline for the Directive is 
about to expire or has already expired, or to respect the same deadline provided for 
in the Directives. 
In addition to this general procedure of implementation, Government and Par-
liament can implement a Directive by using the traditional legislative tools, such as 
an act of parliament, a government bill, a regulation or a decree. 
None of these tools were used by the Government to implement Directive 
2008/115/EC.1 According to the official declarations delivered by the Home Secre-
tary, the Government intentionally failed to include the Returns Directive among 
those to be implemented. As we know, a member State can avoid the implementa-
tion of a Directive only when its national law is already in line with the obligations 
set forth in that act. This is not the case here since Italy‟s rules on expulsion differ 
radically from those provided for in the Directive. Therefore, Italy is in blatant vio-
lation of the obligation to implement the Returns Directive.2 
Moreover, according to the principle of sincere cooperation entrenched in Art. 
4, par. 3, TEU and as interpreted by the ECJ,3 member States must take advantage 
of the time limit provided for in a Directive, to do their utmost to respect the dead-
line of the Directive which is to be implemented. In particular, member States can-
not enact a law which is manifestly in contrast with the Directive to be imple-
mented, thereby hindering the implementation process. In fact, Italy made two ma-
jor changes to the Aliens Law (Legislative Decree no. 286/1998) in 2009. The first 
                                                        
1  An attempt to include Directive 2008/115/EC among the Directives to be implemented by 
the Government with a delegated act was made during the debate of Government proposals, 
both in 2009 and in 2010, but without success. The 2010-proposal, expected for the 31st 
January 2011, has not yet been introduced.  
2  From the Home Office‟s most recent press releases, it would seem that the Government has 
been persuaded by the Commission that its strategy was not permitted by the Directive. For 
this reason it is likely that the Government will have to issue an urgent decree by the end of 
this month to implement the Directive. This kind of decree has the same force as a law, but 
lasts for 60 days within which time it must be converted into law by the Parliament. 
3  ECJ, Inter-Environnement Wallonie, 18 December 1997, C-129/96. 
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one concerns the maximum length of detention while awaiting an expulsion order 
and the second one concerns the introduction of the crime of illegal entry and stay. 
As far as the first change is concerned, on the basis of Art. 15, par. 5 of the Re-
turns Directive, the government has increased the maximum period of detention for 
the purpose of expulsion from 60 to 180 days. 
As regards the latter modification, for the first time in Italian law, illegal entry 
and stay have been defined as a crime and are punishable with a fine that can be 
transmuted to expulsion. This criminal offence has been much criticised because it 
is clear that as nobody will pay the fine the result will be expulsion in all cases: es-
sentially, the effect of this crime amounts to an administrative violation. The main 
difference is the resulting increase in the workload for police officials and the judi-
cial system as aliens must be processed in a very short time. Notwithstanding the 
criticism and the protests, the crime remains in force. It would seem that the Gov-
ernment‟s main reason for these actions is to avoid the implementation of the Re-
turns Directive. The Home Secretary has stated officially that the Government 
would implement the Directive without changing the recently enacted rules on mi-
gration law by referring to Art. 2, par. 2, subparagraph b, which allows MS „not to 
apply the Directive to third-country nationals who are subject to return as a criminal 
sanction or as a consequence of a criminal law sanction…‟.4 Since all illegally enter-
ing aliens are sanctioned with a fine which is then changed to expulsion, most ex-
pulsion orders are, in fact, criminal sanctions. According to the Home Office inter-
pretation these expulsions lie outside the scope of application of the Directive.  
Nonetheless, the Government‟s strategy has several weak points.5 First of all, Art. 
2, par. 2, subparagraph b, provides the Government with an option to limit the 
scope of application of the Directive. This option must be an official Government 
choice and should be provided for by a law, most logically the law implementing the 
Directive. A simple declaration by the Home Office, however official, cannot be 
considered sufficient. As the Government has neither implemented nor enacted any 
other law which aims to take advantage of the options provided for by Art. 2, par. 2, 
subparagraph b, the exclusion clause has no effect. The same applies to Art. 2, par. 
2, lett. a, concerning the option to limit the scope of application to refusals of entry. 
Secondly, we should consider whether the reasoning of the Home Office is cor-
rect, and in particular whether member States may limit the scope of application in 
all cases where expulsion is a consequence of the crime of illegal entry or stay. Ac-
cording to the general principles of EU law we should interpret this clause narrowly, 
otherwise the object of the Directive will be so limited that it will actually have no 
useful effect. According to Art. 2, par. 1, the directive applies to those staying ille-
gally on the territory: Member States should not avoid the implementation of the 
directive by qualifying this illegal entry and stay as a crime. This does not rule out 
the crime of illegal entry and stay „per se‟, but excludes that crime from those covered 
by Art. 2, par. 2, subparagraph b. As EU law must be interpreted in order that its ef-
fects may be of use, Art. 2, par. 2, subparagraph b shall be interpreted narrowly thus 
                                                        
4  Camera Deputati – Senato della Repubblica, Comitato Schengen, 14 April 2010, p. 11. 
5  The Court of Justice, as commented on below, made a very brief reference to Art. 2, § 2, sub-
paragraph b, at § 49 of its decision, excluding its relevance in that case. 
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excluding expulsions connected with a crime that has been instituted to punish the 
same behaviour that is „sanctioned‟ in the Directive with an expulsion, i.e. the illegal 
entry and stay of foreigners. It is not possible to call this behaviour a crime, thus 
avoiding the implementation of the Directive.6 In the El Dridi case commented on 
below, the Court of Justice made a very brief reference to Art. 2, par. 2, subpara-
graph b, that excluded its relevance in that case but also affirmed that „the criminal 
penalties referred to in that provision do not relate to non-compliance with the pe-
riod granted for voluntary departure‟.7 
Moreover, the fact that the Government has provided for the crime of illegal en-
try and stay in order to avoid the implementation of the Directive clashes with the 
general principle of EU law of sincere cooperation between States and EU Institu-
tions. In fact, a State which changes its law in order to avoid the implementation of 
the Directive goes against the requirements of EU law, as rather than using the 
transposition time to make every attempt to implement the Directive, the State is 
exploiting this period to think up a strategy to avoid implementation.  
Finally, we should question whether the crime of illegal entry and stay is permit-
ted by the Directive. According to Art. 4, par. 3,  of the Directive Member States 
cannot provide for more restrictive measures but only more favourable ones. This 
rule applies within the material scope of application of the Directive that is com-
mon standards and procedures for returning illegally staying third country nationals 
(art. 1). Thus member States are free, outside that scope of application, to stipulate 
the treatment of irregular staying aliens, even imposing criminal sanctions for the il-
legal stay. The only obligation upon member States is not to interfere with the aim 
of the Directive. This will be further explained below as the same reasoning could 
be applied to the criminal law sanctions adopted during the expulsion procedure 
which were interpreted by the Court of Justice in the El Dridi case.8 For this reason 
it could be argued that the crime of illegal entry set forth by Art. 10-bis legislative 
decree no. 286/1998 is allowed by the Directive; that crime is sanctioned with a 
fine which can be annulled in case of expulsion and does not hinder the execution 
of the latter. Some doubts of conformity are arisen by the crime of illegal staying, al-
though the sanctions is the same of the crime of illegal entry. The Returns Directive 
is inspired by a dimension that is exclusively administrative and states that the sanc-
tions of the illegal stay is the expulsion, without further sanctions, neither adminis-
trative nor criminal. The same „administrative‟ context is provided for in the guide-
lines of the Council of Europe which are recalled at recital no. 3 of the Returns Di-
rective. This point, together with the exclusion of more restrictive provisions, let us 
deem that the Directive rules out criminal law sanctions, at least within its scope of 
application that is the expulsion of aliens irregularly staying. The Court of Justice 
                                                        
6  F. Viganò and L. Masera refer to this „strategy‟ as a sort of truffa delle etichette, „labeling fraud‟. 
Below at note 21. 
7  El Dridi, § 49. 
8  See below at paragraph 5. 
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has already stated that a national law, even a criminal one, may be in contrast with a 
Directive, notwithstanding that that Directive expressly does not rule it out.9 
2.  Limiting the Damage: the Circular of December 17, 2010 
The Home Office issued a circular on December 17, 2010, being fully aware that af-
ter the December 24 the Directive could have come into effect, notwithstanding the 
lack of transposition.10 The „choice of forms and methods‟ necessary to implement 
the Directives does not require national law. Indeed, Art. 20 of Directive 
2008/115/EC states that „[M]member States shall bring into force the laws, regula-
tions and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive […]‟. 
However, the Court of Justice has clearly stated that a circular is not a provision 
which fulfils the obligation to implement EU law. ECJ has clearly stated that it is 
not necessary to adopt a law,11 but also that „[A]as regards the various circulars 
produced by the Italian Republic, it is sufficient to observe that it is settled case-law 
that mere administrative practices, which by their nature are alterable at will by the 
authorities and are not given the appropriate publicity, cannot be regarded as 
constituting the proper fulfillment of a Member State's obligations under the Treaty 
[…].‟12  
Moreover, this circular is not sufficient to fulfil the obligation to implement the 
Directive even from a material point of view. The circular starts by assuming that 
despite the fact that after the December 24 an alien could appeal to the court by al-
leging contrast between the law and the Directive, and that these grounds of appeal 
                                                        
9  „In the second question the national court asks, essentially, whether, in incorporating the 
provisions of the Directive on solvents into its internal legal order, the state to which it is 
addressed may prescribe “obligations and limitations which are more precise and detailed 
than, or at all events different from, those set out in the Directive”, requiring in particular 
information not required by the Directive to be affixed to the containers. The combined 
effect of articles 3 to 8 of Directive no 73/173 is that only solvents which „comply with the 
provisions of this Directive and the annex thereto‟ may be placed on the market and that 
member states are not entitled to maintain, parallel with the rules laid down by the said 
Directive for imports, different rules for the domestic market. Thus it is a consequence of the 
system introduced by Directive no 73/173 that a member state may not introduce into its 
national legislation conditions which are more restrictive than those laid down in the 
Directive in question, or which are even more detailed or in any event different, as regards the 
classification, packaging and labeling of solvents and that this prohibition on the imposition 
of restrictions not provided for applies both to the direct marketing of the products on the 
home market and to imported products‟; ECJ, 5 April 1979, Ratti, case 148/78, paragraphs 
25-27. 
10  Ministero dell‟interno, Dipartimento della Pubblica Sicurezza, Prot. 400/B/2010, 17 Decem-
ber 2010, in www.asgi.it. 
11  Commission v. Belgium, 2nd December 1986, case 239/85, [ECR] 1986, p. 3645; 20th Novem-
ber 2003, Commission v. France, C-296/01; 3rd April 1987, Commission v. Italy, case 363/85, 
[ECR] 1987, p. 1733. 
12  Commission v. Italy, 1999, C-315/98, [1999]; see also Commission v Italy, C-316/96, [1997] ECR 
I-7231, par. 16. 
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could be well founded, the arguments of the expulsion decisions will assume a stra-
tegic weight. Such arguments must be well grounded so it will be possible to assess 
the conformity between the Returns decisions and the Returns Directive and to 
„neutralize the appeals‟.13 Following an examination of the main rules of the Direc-
tive, the circular gives some operative guidelines envisaging a careful examination of 
each alien‟s position in order to ascertain if there are reasons to give a permit of 
stay, or whether it is impossible to provide for an appropriate period for voluntary 
departure. This point is quite bizarre: the circular invites the police to ascertain 
whether it is possible or impossible to execute the order with a period for voluntary 
departure (e.g. to consider the risk of absconding), while national law does not leave 
the option of voluntary departure, because when aliens are staying illegally they will 
be removed with coercive measures. Therefore, the circular would seem to suggest 
to the police to make expulsion decisions in accordance with the Directive but at 
the same time it excludes the possibility of giving the alien an appropriate period for 
voluntary departure, as this would be in contrast with national law. Indeed, one of 
the most significant contrasts between the Directive and Italian law is the propor-
tionality of coercive measures, which is practically absent in the Italian law.  
Finally, the circular quite surprisingly states that the current national law con-
forms to the Directive,14 and recommends that the police should not actually 
change either their procedures or the way they conduct their interviews to take into 
consideration the specific circumstances of aliens case by case. It does, however, re-
quest that the police change their motivations when issuing expulsions in order „to 
neutralize the effects of judicial remedies‟ that could potentially be invoked when 
asking national courts to recognise the effects of the Directive. These motivations 
must show that the circumstances of individual aliens have been taken into account 
and that decisions have been grounded on specific motivations and not made 
automatically. Furthermore, the motivations must show that the expulsion orders 
satisfy the principle of proportionality enshrined in the Directive. 
3.  The Current National Law  
It is worth considering the main points of current legislation in order to assess how 
it contrasts with the Returns Directive.15 
The decision for return is ruled by Art. 13 Legislative Decree no. 286/1998, 
which provides for different kind of expulsions:16 
                                                        
13  Circular, p. 2. 
14  Ibidem, p. 6.  
15  This is not an analytical comparison between the Directive and the Italian law, therefore I will 
focus only on the most subtle points of contrast, leaving apart those rules with which national 
law already fulfils the requirements set forth in the Directive.  
16  Here I am not taking into consideration expulsion orders issued as a criminal law sanction or 
as a consequence of a criminal law sanction provided for art. 15 and 16 T.U. 286/1998; see 
G. Savio, ‘Respingimento, espulsione trattamento e accompagnamento alla frontiera(i presup-
posti e le procedure), la revoca ed il reingresso, la segnalazione Schengen‟, in P. Morozzo della 
→ 
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-  Expulsion for reasons of public order or national security, issued by the Home 
Secretary (Art. 13, par. 1); expulsion in the case of illegal entry and stay issued by 
the Police (Art. 13, par. 2). The first kind of expulsion does not raise problems 
of conformity with the Directive as according to art. 7, par. 4, of the Directive, 
Member States may refrain from granting a period of voluntary departure when 
the person poses a risk to public policy, public security or national security. 
-  Expulsion exclusively for the non-renewal of the permit to stay, which concerns a 
minority of cases. In this case national law provides for the return decision to be 
executed with an order to leave the territory within five days where the permit of 
stay has not been renewed or has been revoked. If the alien does not respect the 
order then coercive measures will apply. This part of the legislation could be eas-
ily amended to conform to the Directive by raising the number of days from five 
to seven. Periods shorter than seven days are allowed only if there is a risk of the 
person absconding or if the person poses a risk to public policy, or in case of un-
founded or fraudulent applications for a legal stay. However, article 7 requires 
something more than a simple period for the voluntary departure; therefore the 
simple extension of the number of days would not be sufficient. According to 
Art. 7, member States shall extend the period for voluntary departure and take 
into account all the specific circumstances of each individual case; moreover, 
member States should impose certain obligations in order to avoid the risk of 
absconding. This means that even where there may be the risk of a person ab-
sconding, member States cannot automatically neglect the period of voluntary 
departure. On the contrary, they should assess the risk of potential absconding 
in each case, together with the individuals‟ circumstances and then choose the 
best solution: a period of voluntary departure; a period of voluntary departure 
accompanied by certain obligations; a shorter period of voluntary departure or 
no period of voluntary departure. 
-  The third and most generalised order of expulsion, which is made for illegal en-
try and stay and issued by the Police (Art. 13, par. 2), raises a number of serious 
problems. In these cases expulsion is executed coercively: the foreigner is physi-
cally transported out of the MS even where an appeal has been lodged against 
the return decision. If removal is not possible the alien is detained in a special 
centre for a period of up to 180 days (initially thirty days, then renewed for an-
other thirty and confirmed again for a total of 180 days). At the end of this pe-
riod, or when detention is not possible (e.g. when there is no space available in 
the centres) the police issue the alien with an order to leave the territory within 
five days (art. 14, par. 5-bis, Legislative Decree n. 286/1998). The violation of 
this police order is judged a crime and entails the mandatory arrest of the alien, 
fast-track proceedings and a sanction of anything from one to four years of de-
tention (art. 14, par. 5-ter, Legislative Decree n. 286/1998). Along with the or-
der to leave, the police issues a new return decision to be executed immediately 
(art. 14, par. 5-ter, Legislative Decree n. 286/1998) or where this is not possible, 
the alien is given a new removal order. The violation of this second order is 
                                                        
Rocca, (ed.), Immigrazione e cittadinanza: Profili normativi e orientamenti giurisprudenziali, Torino 
2008, pp. 131-172. 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RETURNS DIRECTIVE IN ITALY 
77 
judged to be a crime and entails detention from one to five years (art. 14, par. 5-
quater, Legislative Decree n. 286/1998). As we can see, all those crimes are pro-
vided for in Art. 14, Legislative Decree no. 286/1998, i.e. the article relating to 
the execution of expulsion. 
4.  The Contrast between the Directive and the Italian Law on Expulsion 
There are several points of contrast between this system and the one provided for by 
the Directive. First of all in the Directive coercive measures are provided for as a last 
resort when voluntary departure is not possible because of the risk of aliens ab-
sconding. In the national law, on the other hand, voluntary departure is not even 
provided for as a possible way to execute the expulsion; coercive measures alone are 
available, and there is no gradualism in the execution of expulsion. This is the most 
evident contrast, and means that the two systems differ radically. In this case it is 
not significant that the framework of the Directive also means that the majority of 
expulsion orders will be executed without voluntary departure, due to the high risk 
of absconding, because the law must nevertheless envisage the possibility of a period 
for voluntary departure. If this were not so, there would be no difference between 
this kind of expulsion and deportation. 
This difference is clear when we examine article 11 of the Returns Directive, ac-
cording to which an entry ban shall accompany the return decision when there is no 
voluntary departure or when the alien has not complied with the obligation to re-
turn. The opportunity of avoiding an entry ban should encourage the alien to de-
part voluntarily and comply with the return decision. On the contrary, Art. 13, par. 
13, Legislative Decree no. 286/1998 provides for an automatic ten-year entry ban 
which can be shortened in exceptional circumstances by a maximum of five years. 
Such a modification would depend on the behaviour of the alien while in Italy. In 
the Directive, on the other hand, the maximum length of an entry ban is five years 
and the period is fixed upon according to the circumstances of each individual case. 
In fact, the entry ban can exceed five years only in cases where there is a serious 
threat to public policy, public security or national security. 
As far as detention is concerned, national law provides for a maximum period of 
180 days. This period is far shorter than that of the Directive which stands at six 
months, and can even be extended up to 18 months. However, there is a contrast 
here also because Art. 15, § 1, of the Directive requires that „[a]ny detention shall be 
for as short a period as possible and maintained as long as removal arrangements 
are in progress‟ and, at § 2, that the person should be released immediately when 
there is no reasonable prospect of removal or the detention ceases to be justified, 
while in the Italian law there is no rule allowing for the release of aliens when re-
moval is impossible prior to the 180-day detention period. In fact, the national law 
envisages that the alien could even remain in detention after the end of this period 
because of the chain of crimes connected with expulsion. Moreover, Art. 15, § 3, 
requires for a review „at reasonable intervals of time‟ and „subject to the supervision 
of a judicial authority‟, reviews which are absent in Italian legislation. 
While Art. 15 of the Directive states that when the maximum period of deten-
tion has expired the alien should be released, there is no provision concerning the 
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status of third country nationals who are staying illegally but cannot be removed. 
Only recital no. 12 states that member States should define the basic conditions of 
subsistence of such persons. On the contrary, Italian law provides for new expulsion 
orders and criminal sanctions following the violation of these orders, and thus im-
poses imprisonment. These crimes, these criminal sanctions and this detention oc-
cur after the procedure ruled by the Directive has ended. Indeed, as the Directive 
neither provides for criminal sanctions nor rules them out, it is questionable 
whether they conform to the Directive or not. As we will see, this is the point that 
has been most debated in Italy after the government‟s failure to transpose the Direc-
tive.  
Lastly, there is another point of contrast concerning the right to an effective 
remedy as granted by Art. 13 of the Returns Directive. The concept of an effective 
remedy has been developed by the Court of Justice to give meaning to the rights set 
forth in EU law, and to avoid member States hindering the enjoyment of EU rights 
with procedural rules that could render those rights ineffective. The right to an ef-
fective remedy is also enshrined in Art. 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, which is based on Art. 13 ECHR. The European Court of Human Rights 
has developed an interesting case-law concerning the right to an effective remedy, 
even in connection with the expulsion of aliens invoking Art. 3 ECHR. The Court 
has stated that the execution of expulsion should be suspended in order that the 
remedy is effective.17 Italian Law provides for remedy against an expulsion decision 
but it expressly states that this remedy can be enjoyed outside Italy through the Ital-
ian Embassy or consular authorities, while no possible suspension of the execution 
is envisaged. It is likely that in the near future the Court of Justice will be asked to 
interpret Article 13 of the Returns Directive in connection with provisions such as 
those present in current Italian law. If the rights set forth in the Charter are to cor-
respond to rights guaranteed by the ECHR, it is likely that in the near future the 
Court of Justice could give interesting judgments, enhancing the protection of fun-
damental rights of foreigners and also concurring to grant the effective application 
of the rights set forth in the ECHR.  
5.  The Effects of the Untransposed Directive and References to the Court of 
Justice 
Since December 25, lawyers, academics, judges and public prosecutors have been 
dealing with the effects of the Returns Directive on national law, despite the fact 
that it has not been implemented yet. As the law provides for expedited procedures 
                                                        
17  ECHR of 30 October 1991, Vilvarajah and others v. United Kingdom, Application no. 
13163/87, § 117-127; 11 July 2000, Jabari v. Turkey, § 50. See also the cases concerning the 
interim measures ordered by the Court to the member States when they are expelling or ex-
traditing an alien who faces a real risk to be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, ECHR of 4 February 2005, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, Appl. 
no. 46827/99. 
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in case of offences connected with expulsion, the Directive has been invoked for the 
first time during criminal proceedings.  
Judges have therefore already explored the issue of the direct effects of the Direc-
tive and of its single articles. This has triggered a lively debate among lawyers, aca-
demics, judges and public prosecutors. Special training sessions for judges have been 
planned to address this specific question as it is not very common for criminal 
judges and lawyers to be called upon to deal with directives and their direct effects. 
The non-application of the Returns Directive has turned out to be an extremely ef-
fective way of raising awareness among a number of criminal law experts of the im-
pact that EU law may have on Italian law. In fact, there is a sort of reluctance to 
admit that principles stated by the ECJ in cases of conflict between EU law and na-
tional law would also apply to criminal law; the constitutional rule imposing a reser-
vation of law in criminal matters is the main hindrance towards the direct applica-
tion of EU law in criminal matter (Art. 25, par. 2, It. Constitution), especially when 
the EU measure is a directive that must be implemented by a Member State.18 
Hence, while almost everybody agrees that the system set down in the Directive and 
that envisaged in Italian law are in contrast, huge divergences have been expressed 
about the practical consequences and the possible effects of the Directive. 
A minority of judges and prosecutors have assumed that the Directive would 
produce no direct effects as its rules are not sufficiently clear, precise and uncondi-
tional. A number of them based their position on the radical difference between the 
Directive and Italian law, arguing that an entirely new system of expulsion is re-
quired. These judges and prosecutors affirm that the Directive does not clearly 
stipulate how the expulsion must be issued and that, were Italian law not applied, a 
sort of vacuum would be created making it impossible to expel an alien who is not 
legally staying in the territory of a member State. Therefore they have raised the 
question with the Italian Constitutional Court, which is responsible for judging on 
the conformity between a law and an EU measure that is not directly applicable or 
which does not produce direct effects.19 Other legal professionals have assumed that 
the Directive does not rule out crimes if they can be interpreted as additional sanc-
tions against unlawfully resident aliens, and that there is no need to invoke the Di-
rective in the criminal proceedings. 20  
                                                        
18  This opinion is based on personal experience as adviser to judges and lawyers on the EU Di-
rective. See also F. Viganò replying to the criticisms about the direct effects of the Return Di-
rective into Italian law, in http://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/materia/3-/41-/-/328-
il_dibattito_continua__ancora_in_tema_di_direttiva_rimpatri_e_inosservanza_dell___ordine
_di_allontanamento. 
19  F. Focardi, Ancora sull’impatto della direttiva comunitaria 2008/115/CE sui reati di cui all’artt. 14 
co. 5-ter e 5-quater d.lgs. 286/1998, in www.penalecontemperaneo.it  
20  This is the main argument; other arguments have been put forward by different Courts: see 
Tribunale of Bologna, 29 December 2010; Procura della Repubblica press oil Tribunale di 
Torino, 23 December 2010. 
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On the contrary the majority of law experts, lawyers, judges and prosecutors have 
stated that the Directive can produce direct effects as some of its articles stipulate 
rights that can be invoked directly by aliens and applied by judges.21 
Other judges, not convinced of the suitability of this Directive to produce direct 
effects, have chosen a third path: they have preferred not to tackle the problem of 
interpreting the Directive themselves but have referred the question to the Court of 
Justice for a preliminary ruling so that the Court may rule on the correct interpreta-
tion of the Directive and thus decide if the existing Italian law conforms to its pro-
visions.22 Following these references, the Corte di Cassazione-Sezioni Unite23 has also 
raised similar questions with the Court of Justice. All the references have been 
made during criminal proceedings against aliens who had breached the order to 
leave the country, and each of them invoked the interpretation of Articles 15 and 
16, concerning the detention of the alien to be deported. In one of these references, 
the judge expressly asked for an urgent preliminary ruling according to Art. 267, 
par. 4, TFEU and 104.b) ECJ Regulation, as the defendant was a detainee. The 
Court ruled on this reference on April 28, 2011.24 
6.  The Assessment of the Court of Justice in El Dridi 
Most of these doubts have been clearly resolved by the Court of Justice with the El 
Dridi judgment, which is the second one concerning the Returns Directive.25 
The Court‟s ruling opens by recalling that the aim of the Directive is to establish 
common standards and procedures which must be applied for returning third coun-
try nationals who are staying illegally. Therefore member States may depart from the 
standards set forth in the Directive only where allowed. In fact, the ECJ affirms that 
while MS may adopt or maintain legislation more favourable than Directive 
2008/115, they are not allowed to apply stricter standards. This is a very important 
point because it fixes the standards of the Directive as the minimum, common to all 
the Member States. Different rules are allowed, but only if more favourable than 
                                                        
21  F. Viganò, L. Masera, „Illegittimità comunitaria della vigente disciplina delle espulsioni e pos-
sibili rimedi giurisdizionali‟, Rivista italiana di Diritto Processuale Penale, 2010. See also the spe-
cial section of the on-line journal Diritto Penale Contemporaneo, in http://www.penalecon-
temporaneo.it/materia/3-legislazione_penale_speciale/41-stranieri, with several in-depth ana-
lyses of the Directive and the criminal sanctions provided for in Italian legislation. In ASGI, 
http://www.asgi.it/home_asgi.php?n=1516&l=it there is a special dossier devoted to the Di-
rective and its implementation in Italy with the list and texts of the decisions of the Italian 
Courts. Among these, see in particular Procura della Repubblica presso il Tribunale di Firenze 
R.G.N.R. 252/2011, 6 January 2011; Tribunale di Torino, 8 January 2011;  
22  Reference C-43/11, Assane Samb, lodged on 31st January 2011 (Milan); Reference C-60/11, 
Mohamed Mrad, lodged on 9 February 2011 (Ragusa); reference C-50/11, Lucky Emegor, lodged 
on 4 February 2011 (Ivrea); reference C-63/11, John Austine, lodged on 11 February 2011 
(Rovereto). 
23  It is a sort of Grand Chamber. 
24  28 April 2011, El Dridi, C-61/11. 
25  The first one is Kadzoev, 30 November 2009, C-357/09 PPU. 
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those provided for by the Directive. Whilst this position can be understood in those 
States that have not seen a mass influx of aliens and which have constitutional con-
straints on the treatment of aliens, it is obvious that if different, more favourable 
rules exist this will necessarily obstruct one of the main objectives of the common 
migration policy, i.e. to avoid secondary movement of aliens. Indeed recital 4 states 
that the Directive should establish a horizontal set of rules applicable to all third 
country nationals who do not, or who no longer, fulfil the conditions for entry, stay 
or residence in a Member State. 
The Court goes on to underline the general context of the Directive and in par-
ticular the gradation of the measures to be taken in order to enforce the Return de-
cision „a gradation which goes from the measure which allows the person concerned 
the most liberty, namely granting a period for his voluntary departure, to measures 
which restrict that liberty the most, namely detention in a specialised facility; the 
principle of proportionality must be observed throughout those stages‟.26 This mani-
fest contrast and the breach of the duty to transpose the Directive into Italian law 
are the Leitmotiv of the whole judgment, hence the various statements of the Court 
have to be interpreted in light of them. 
According to the Court these measures are provided for by Art. 15 and 16 in an 
unconditional and clear manner so that „no other specific elements are required for 
them to be implemented by Member States‟.27 Therefore the Court eliminates all 
the doubts raised as regards the direct effects of these articles. It is worth mention-
ing that the direct effects concern not only the time limit of detention, but all the 
measures concerning the execution of expulsion. The Court does not explain why 
these rules are clear and unconditional, but this is in line with her traditional stance 
on direct effects. The Court usually expounds at greater length on why a provision 
does not produce direct effects, explaining why a right granted by the Directive is 
not unconditional or sufficiently clear to be applied directly by national authorities, 
than when it states that a measure produces direct effects.28 From the case law we 
can infer the principle that when there is a right that can be enforced by judges, the 
Court affirms that the provision of the Directive produce direct effects. Thus it is 
the suitability of a provision to be enforced before the courts that will determine 
whether or not the provision will be qualified as producing direct effects. 
The Court then observes the radical difference between the two systems of re-
moval: that established in the Directive and that provided for by Italian law. On this 
basis the Court then goes on to examine the conformity of the criminal sanctions 
with the system provided for by the Directive. According to the Court, criminal 
sanctions are not ruled out by the Directive and hence Member States remain free 
to adopt criminal measures when the measures adopted „have not led to the ex-
pected results being attained‟.29 In particular the Court interprets Art. 8, § 4, of the 
Directive, according to which Member States may use coercive measures to remove 
aliens who resist removal, by excluding that criminal sanctions may be included 
                                                        
26  El Dridi, par. 41.  
27  Ibidem, par. 47. 
28  19 November 1991, Francovich and others, C-6/90, 1991 ECR I-5357. 
29  El Dridi, par. 52.  
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among these coercive measures. The Court has said the criminal sanctions should 
be adopted by Member States when the coercive measures provided for by Art. 8, § 
4, of the Directive, such as the removal of aliens set forth by Art. 13, § 4, of Legisla-
tive Decree No. 286/1998, have not proved successful. 
Therefore criminal sanctions lie outside the scope of application of the Direc-
tive. For this reason they are not forbidden and as the Court says, „Member States 
remain free to adopt measures, including criminal law measures, aimed inter alia at 
dissuading those nationals from remaining illegally on those States‟ territory‟30. The 
ECJ in her stance has always said when Member States act in an exclusive compe-
tence, such as that of criminal matters in the area of illegal immigration and illegal 
stays, they must respect EU law and should not deprive a Directive of its effective-
ness.31 According to the Court the criminal offences set forth by Art. 14 (5b) of Ital-
ian Law do not conform to the principle of proportionality and risk „jeopardising 
the attainment of the objective pursued by that Directive‟. As far as the principle of 
proportionality is concerned, the Court does not explain why the criminal offence 
infringes such a principle; the only rational explanation is that the Court considers 
a sanction that ranges from one to four years as disproportionate. As regards the 
second point, the Court seems to consider that the penalty applied in the national 
context is liable to frustrate and to delay the enforcement of the Return decision. 
Moreover, the Court has said that the Directive precludes „a sentence of imprison-
ment to be imposed on an illegally staying third-country national on the sole ground 
that he remains, without valid grounds, on the territory of that State, contrary to an 
order to leave that territory within a given period‟.32 The Court has not expressly 
said that all the criminal sanctions are ruled out by the Directive, but that these 
criminal sanctions do not conform to the system provided for by the Directive.  
We may wonder which criminal sanctions would be allowed by the Directive. 
From the above we know that: MS may adopt provisions regulating the situation in 
which coercive measures have not resulted in the removal of a third country na-
tional; those measures could be also criminal law measures; those criminal law 
measures should not infringe the Directive and should respect the principle of pro-
portionality and effectiveness with regard to the means used and the objective pur-
sued; those criminal laws cannot provide for a custodial sentence; those measures 
should aim to enforce the Return decision which continues to produce its effects. 
The Kadzoev judgment could also be useful in this regard. First of all the Court 
has said that „[…] as is apparent in particular from paragraphs 37, 54 and 61 above, 
Article 15(6) of Directive 2008/115 in no case authorises the maximum period de-
fined in that provision to be exceeded. The possibility of detaining a person on 
grounds of public order and public safety cannot be based on Directive 2008/115. 
None of the circumstances mentioned by the referring court can therefore consti-
tute in itself a ground for detention under the provisions of that Directive. Conse-
quently, the answer to Question 4 is that Article 15(4) and (6) of Directive 
2008/115 must be interpreted as not allowing, where the maximum period of de-
                                                        
30  Ibidem, par. 52. 
31  Ibidem, par. 54-55. 
32  Ibidem, par. 62. 
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tention laid down by that Directive has expired, the person concerned not to be re-
leased immediately on the grounds that he is not in possession of valid documents, 
his conduct is aggressive, and he has no means of supporting himself and no ac-
commodation or means supplied by the Member State for that purpose‟.33 
The Court has also said that it is not possible to detain a person for the purpose 
of removal without respecting the time-limit and the conditions set forth in the Re-
turns Directive.34 We could argue that criminal sanctions regarding aliens who are 
staying illegally after a decree of expulsion are allowed, but only if they are not con-
nected with the execution of the expulsion.  
In conclusion we could say that it is possible to have crimes connected with the 
violation of the order to leave the territory but they should be structurally different 
from the expulsion and its enforcement. Moreover, they should be proportional 
and similar to the crimes provided for similar violations. It is not clear why aliens 
should be condemned to detention while citizens are condemned with fines. The 
fact that in the Italian law the crimes are set out in the Aliens law and appear in two 
paragraphs of Art. 14, entitled „execution of expulsion‟, would seem to indicate that 
these crimes are disallowed, because they are crimes connected with the execution 
of the expulsion. 
7.  The Effects of the Judgment and the Issue of Retroactive Application 
In accordance with previous decisions, the Court of Justice ruled that national court 
judges must apply any provision of a Directive with direct effects and disregard 
legislative provisions in the MS that are inconsistent with it, thus ensuring the full 
effectiveness of EU rules.35 The judge must therefore conform any ruling in na-
tional proceedings to the Directive and not apply Art. 14, paragraph 5-b, and hence, 
release the defendant from prison. This is in accordance with the approach of those 
judges who from December 25 onwards considered the Directive as having direct 
effects and thus did not consider domestic legislation to be applicable. 
                                                        
33  Kadzoev, above note 25. 
34  „Detention for the purpose of removal governed by Directive 2008/115 and detention of an 
asylum seeker in particular under Directives 2003/9 and 2005/85 and the applicable national 
provisions thus fall under different legal rules. […] 48. Consequently, the answer to Question 
1(b) is that a period during which a person has been held in a detention centre on the basis of 
a decision taken pursuant to the provisions of national and Community law concerning asy-
lum seekers may not be regarded as detention for the purpose of removal within the meaning 
of Article 15 of Directive 2008/115‟, Kadzoev, above note 25, paragraphs 45-48. 
35  This is a traditional principle of EU law which applies to the so-called vertical dispute, i.e. 
with an individual acting against a State to enforce a right recognized in an EU Directive, such 
as the one in El-Dridi. As we know the Court ruled that a Directive that has not been imple-
mented cannot be invoked in a dispute between private parties, as it only envisages obligations 
on States and the legal situation of individuals cannot, therefore be aggravated by this Direc-
tive if it is not implemented by the State; 26 February 1986, Marshall, case 152/84, 1986 ECR 
723; 14 July 1994, Faccini Dori, C-91/92, ECR 1994, I-3325. 
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However, it is not only the Italian courts that must respect the ruling. The inter-
pretation expressed by the Court on a number of provisions in the Directive is 
binding on the national courts of all Member States where the same Directive is 
applicable.36 The Court also stated that the temporal effects of judgments handed 
down under the preliminary ruling are retroactive from the date when the act came 
into force. This is subject to the possibility of limiting the effects over time and 
according to the specific circumstances and reasons which led to the interpreta-
tion.37 
In the El Dridi ruling, the Court added a further clarification, and that is that 
the national court must apply the ruling while taking „due account of the principle 
of the retroactive application of the more lenient penalty, which forms part of the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States [ ...].‟38 This clarification 
concerns an aspect that differs from that of the retroactive effects of the sentence; 
here the Court places emphasis on national criminal law. In a previous judgment, 
which also involved the relationship between criminal law and European Union 
regulations, the Court had ruled that the principle of retroactivity of a more lenient 
penalty is among the fundamental rights of the European Union.39 In light of this 
principle we should consider that the application of national rules that are 
inconsistent with the Directive might extend not only to the expiry of the deadline 
for its implementation (December 24, 2010) but also to the date when the Directive 
came into force (January 20, 2009). This is in fact jus superveniens and applicable to 
proceedings pending even if they refer to events that occurred before the date when 
the Directive came into force. 
In the Kadzoev judgment the Court also stated that „[...], Article 15(5) and (6) of 
Directive 2008/115 apply immediately to the future consequences of a situation 
that arose when the previous rules were in force. The answer to Question 1(a) is 
therefore that Article 15(5) and (6) of Directive 2008/115 must be interpreted as 
meaning that the maximum duration of detention laid down in those provisions 
must include a period of detention completed in connection with a removal pro-
cedure commenced before the rules in that Directive become applicable‟.40 This 
judgment concerned a third-country national held for deportation for a period of 
longer than the 18 months envisaged in the Directive. Although the measure had 
been adopted before the Directive came into force (N.B. not before the expiry date 
for implementation), the Court considered the effects of the sanction (detention) to 
be no longer valid from the moment that the Directive came into force. 
                                                        
36  The Court gave the same judgment regarding the analogical application of a principle with 
reference to different acts; Cilfit 
37  This could be the case where judgments are made on the basis of an evolutionary interpreta-
tion of the act; see Clifit.  
38  El Dridi, cit., par. 61 
39  This principle was invoked in the well-known case of Berlusconi in which the national court 
requested the Court of Justice to rule on false accounting and the European Directive on 
companies; judgment of 3 May 2005, C-387/02, Berlusconi and Others, 2005 ECR I-3565, 
paragraphs 67-69. 
40  Court of Justice, Kadzoev, par. 38-39. 
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When this principle is applied to Italian law, it affects all the prison sentences 
currently being served, even if they were applied before the Directive came into 
force. The same conclusion could be reached if, by analogy, we apply Article 2, par. 
2, of the Italian Criminal Code which gives retroactive effect to the repeal of laws in 
criminal matters.41 However, it should be noted that the Court of Justice has clearly 
stated that the failure to apply national legislation does not mean this is abrogated 
or annulled. Annulment or abrogation is within the realm of the national legislator. 
The Constitutional Court expressed the same interpretation in judgment 1984 no. 
170.42 
The problem concerning the application over time of the principles affirmed by 
the Court, as with the effects of the Directive which has not been implemented in 
our system, may also be relevant with respect to the ban of entry (five years in the 
Directive and ten years in Italian law). There can be no doubt that all the bans 
placed after December 25, 2010 should apply the lesser term provided for in the 
Directive; this will necessarily involve a series of consequences, especially as regards 
the emergence of irregular work, or the procedures regarding entry for purposes of 
work. However, if the principle expressed in the Kadzoev ruling is applied, the 
Directive should be applicable to the current effects of any action taken before it 
came into force, i.e. even to orders issued before January 2009. 
On the other hand, where expulsions are concerned the conclusions are 
different. The Court did not comment on expulsions as it did not come within the 
scope of her ruling. However, the radical divergence of current orders of expulsion 
from the EU Directive is more than evident and, incidentally, affirmed by the 
Court in the El Dridi ruling. Nevertheless, according to the Kadzoev principle the 
Directive applies only to the effects of measures adopted earlier and not to the acts 
themselves. The Directive cannot therefore be applied to actions taken prior to its 
entry into force or, more specifically, before its implementation into national law or 
the deadline for its implementation, namely December 25, 201043. From that date 
onwards, however, it shall also apply to expulsions ordered in accordance with 
national legislation and contrary to the provisions of the Directive. 
8.  Returns Directive, Schengen Acquis and Temporary Protection 
It is interesting to consider whether a timely implementation of the Returns 
Directive would have affected the treatment of the people who have arrived in Italy 
following the popular unrest experienced, above all, in Tunisia and Libya. 
                                                        
41  A hypothesis put forward by L. Masera during the Verona conference on January 15, 2011. 
42  www.cortecosituzionale.it.  
43  This conclusion is not in contradiction with the ruling made by the Court in the Ciola judg-
ment, which affirmed that the manager of a boat company had been denied the exercise of a 
fundamental right enshrined in the Treaty, which produces direct effects, by an order that de-
nied authorization of boat licenses. According to the Court the administrative provisions, as 
for any other State act, were overridden following Austria‟s accession to the EU given that 
Treaty rules must prevail even on administrative measures taken previously; 29 April 1999, C-
224/97. 
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As we know, the Italian government asked the Commission to activate the 
protection provided for in Directive 2001/55/EC on temporary protection in the 
event of a mass influx of displaced persons who are unable to return to their 
country.44 Such protection would have led to the phenomenon being controlled at 
European level and therefore a definitive position on the question of the right to 
free movement within the Schengen area would have emerged, essentially denying 
it.45 Neither the Commission nor the majority of EU governments wanted to 
proceed with such a mechanism, basically for two reasons: the number of people 
who arrived in Italy (between twenty and thirty thousand) cannot be considered a 
mass influx of displaced persons; moreover, these people have not applied for 
international protection and, therefore, should be returned and not accepted, albeit 
on a temporary basis. In fact, temporary protection is conceived as a third kind of 
international protection that is activated to avoid deficiencies in the system for 
receiving and duly considering all requests for protection, and this is the view that 
prevailed in this particular situation. 
The government has, however, decided to grant the people who arrived in Italy 
between January 5 and April 16 with a residence permit on humanitarian grounds 
provided for under Article 20 Legislative Decree no. 286/1998. This document is 
called a temporary residence permit, as in Directive 2001/55/EC even though there 
is neither a formal nor substantial connection to this Directive. The permit in ques-
tion has its legal basis in Italian law, in that space of autonomy that the national 
legislature retains from the constraints imposed by the European Union, whose 
expertise on visas, asylum and immigration is of a competitive nature. Indeed, the 
same European rules expressly provide that States can issue measures for humanita-
rian reasons, attributing the decision as to whether or not these reasons exist to the 
Member States. Leaving aside the provisions of international protection, a direct 
reference is found both in the Schengen Borders Code and in the Returns Di-
rective. 
As for the Schengen Code, Article 5 says entry is permitted to persons who are 
in possession of a passport or other valid travel document, have sufficient means of 
subsistence for the duration of the stay, are not considered a threat to public policy 
and for whom no alert has been issued by other member States for the purposes of 
refusing entry on the same grounds. Entry may be led by the issue of a permit 
allowing free movement throughout the Schengen area for no longer than three 
months per six month-period.46 It is therefore up to States to verify the existence of 
                                                        
44  Council Directive 2001/55/CE of July 20, 2001 on minimum standards for granting tempo-
rary protection in situations of mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a 
balance of efforts among member States in receiving such persons and bearing the burden of 
accepting them.  
45  In fact Article 11 of the Directive states that „A Member state shall take back a person enjoy-
ing temporary protection on its territory, if the said person remains on, or, seeks to enter 
without authorisation onto the territory of another Member State during the period covered 
by the Council Decision referred to in Article 5 Member Sates may, on the basis of a bilateral 
agreement, decide that this Article should not apply‟. 
46  The same right to free movement is recognized to persons in possession of a long-stay visa who 
have not been issued with a residence permit: Regulation no. 265/210 of March 25, 2010 
→ 
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such requirements and issue an appropriate permit. In addition the Member State 
shall notify the Commission of residence permits issued on this basis, so that the 
type of permit issued is instantly recognizable to other Member States, as well as 
stating the conditions supporting their issue.  
However, entry is provided for by way of derogation in Article 5, par. 4, 
subparagraph c, which states that third-country nationals may be authorized by a 
Member State to enter its territory for humanitarian reasons, on grounds of 
national interest or because of international obligations. Similarly, Article 6, par. 4 
of Directive 2008/115/EC provides that „Member States may at any moment grant 
an autonomous residence permit or other authorisation offering a right to stay for 
compassionate, humanitarian or other reasons to a third-country national staying 
illegally on their territory. In that event no return decision shall be issued. [...]‟. 
Both provisions allow Member States a certain margin of discretion in order to 
regulate situations which are not codified and evaluated on a case by case basis. 
The compatibility of Italian measure with the rules throughout the European 
Union depends on the existence of such humanitarian grounds. In their absence, in 
fact, States cannot allow entry into the Schengen area for third-country nationals, 
even when the influx is as large as that seen in recent months. In fact, this influx 
was not considered sufficient at EU level to require the temporary protection 
measure. The suspicion that the government might have chosen this strategy 
because of the difficulty of effecting returns over a short time, rather than on 
humanitarian and compassionate grounds, risks undermining the legitimacy of the 
measure and violating the principle of sincere cooperation. On the other hand, the 
repatriation of such persons would undeniably have been difficult due to the lack of 
cooperation on the part of the Tunisian government. It is no coincidence that the 
decree was issued almost simultaneously with the termination of the agreement 
between the Italian and Tunisian governments concerning returns to that country. 
However, there is another relevant provision at Article 18 of the Returns 
Directive, according to which „in situations where an exceptionally large number of 
to be returned places an unforeseen heavy burden on the capacity of detention 
facilities of a Member State, as long as the exceptional situation persists, decide to 
allow for periods of judicial review longer than those provided for under the third 
subparagraph of Article 15(2) and to take urgent measures in respect of the 
conditions of detention derogating from those set out in Article 16(1) and Article 
17(2). [...]‟. The Directive thus provides an additional tool to regulate situations 
similar to the one that occurred in Italy in January. It is a rigorous and severe 
response, aimed at ensuring that people who have no right to enter and do not 
require international protection are actually expelled. However, as Italy had still not 
implemented the Directive she could not take the exceptional measures on 
detention which are envisaged in it.  
Italy thus found herself in a delicate situation: on one hand, she could not 
repatriate Tunisians because of the lack of cooperation from Tunisian government 
                                                        
which amends the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement and Regulation EC No 
562/2006 as regards movement of persons with a long-stay visa. Official Journal of the European 
Union L 85 of March 31 2010, pp. 1-4. 
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authorities, which had changed radically following the internal revolts, while on the 
other hand she could not use the derogation provided for in the Returns Directive, 
as the latter had not been implemented. Hence, Italy basically settled the affair in a 
way that would be difficult to criticize in terms of human rights, but in breach of 
EU law. 
The time was ripe for reopening the debate on Schengen, border controls and 
how these affected national migration policies. It would be a good idea to compare a 
range of national regulations regarding entry and stay, including family reunifica-
tion, the rigidity of which fosters attempts by third-country nationals to enter the 
Schengen area illegally. Actually the situation highlighted the poor cooperation 
between Member States and should lead to a review of the Schengen rules which 
would allow States to react more strongly against those States that do not strictly 
respect the „spirit of Schengen‟. Quite rightly, the outcome was labeled as a „Race 
Against Solidarity‟.47 Indeed, solidarity was one of the cardinal principles of the 
Union that was heavily compromised after these events, as were the principles of 
sincere cooperation and the prohibition of countermeasures. 
 
                                                        
47  S. Carrera, E. Guild, M. Merlino, J. Parkin, A Race against Solidarity: The Schengen Regime and 
the Franco-Italian Affair, in www.ceps.eu.  
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The Implementation of the Return Directive in Belgium: 
Focus on Suspension of Removal 
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One of the aims of the Commission proposal on common standards and proce-
dures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals was to 
address the situation of persons who are staying illegally but who cannot (as yet) be 
removed.1 The purpose was not only to guarantee that persons would not be re-
moved when fundamental rights are at stake but also to make sure that non-removal 
would not lead to a limbo situation. Due to disagreement in the Council, this ambi-
tion of the Commission was not fully realized.2 The Return Directive therefore ad-
dresses the issue of non-removal in a very summary way, leaving much to the discre-
tion of Member States. This contribution will examine in which way the Return Di-
rective now deals with non-removal and where the differences lie with the original 
Commission proposal. Subsequently, the contribution will describe how Belgium 
deals with non-removal and if the legislation in place is in line with the minimum 
provisions of the Return Directive. Thirdly, the contribution will, after making 
some conclusions, open up some future perspectives.  
1. The Return Directive: Limits to Removal  
The central element of the Return Directive is the obligation it lays upon Member 
States to issue a return decision to any third country national staying illegally on 
their territory (article 6 § 1).3 However the Return Directive also places some limits 
against this obligation.  
First of all, the Directive draws, through article 1 and considerations 22 to 24, a 
general fundamental rights framework in which the issuing and executing of return 
decisions must take place, in particular by recalling obligations and principles under 
the Refugee Conventions, ECHR, the UN Convention on the rights of the child 
and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU. Consequently, according to arti-
                                                        
1  Commission of the European Communities, Proposal for a directive of the European Parlia-
ment and of the Council on common standards and procedures in Member States for return-
ing illegally staying third-country nationals, Brussels, 1 September 2005, COM (2005) 391 fi-
nal, 4.  
2  For more insight into the discussions between the Council and the European Parliament, see 
A. Baldaccini, ‘The return and removal of irregular migrants under EU law: an analysis of the 
Return Directive’, EJML 2009, pp. 1-17 and D. Acosta, ‘The good, the bad and the ugly in EU 
migration law: is the European Parliament becoming bad and ugly?’, EJML 2009, pp. 19-39. 
3  See consideration nr. 9 Preamble: An asylum seeker shall not be regarded as staying illegally 
on the territory of a Member State. 
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cle 5, Member States shall, when implementing the Directive, take due account of 
the best interest of the child,4 family life,5 the state of health of the third-country na-
tional concerned6 and the principle of non-refoulement.  
The Directive does not define the non-refoulement principle. It is generally 
agreed that the prohibition on refoulement prohibits, in broad and general terms, 
the forced or indirect removal of an individual to a country or territory where he 
runs a risk of being subject to serious human rights violations.7 The Directive does 
make specific references in the preamble to obligations under the UN Refugee 
Convention, the ECHR and the EU Charter.  
Article 33 of the UN Refugee Convention prohibits the expulsion or return of a 
refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, member-
ship of a particular social group or political opinion. However, refugees are excluded 
from the benefit of this provision when there are reasonable grounds for regarding 
him as a danger to the security of the country in which he is, or who, having been 
convicted by a final judgment of a particularly serious crime, constitutes a danger to 
the community of that country.  
The European Court of Human Rights has interpreted article 3 ECHR (prohibi-
tion of torture, degrading or inhuman treatment or punishment) in such a way as to 
                                                        
4  Article 3 UNCRC. According to Hathaway and McAdam, an embryonic support for an ex-
panded duty to protect from non-refoulement may be found in the UN Convention of the 
rights of the child, through the application of the ‘best interests’ principle. J.C. Hathaway, 
‘Leveraging asylum’, Tex. Int’L.J. 2009, p. 504 and J. McAdam, Complementary protection in in-
ternational refugee law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007, pp. 173-196. 
5  It is important to note that in the Commission proposal criteria were provided for assessing 
family relationships, in particular the nature and solidity of the third country national’s family 
relationships, the duration of his stay in the Member State and of the existence of family, cul-
tural and social ties with his country of origin, as derived from ECtHR case law on article 8 
ECHR. See supra note 1, 14. The Return Directive makes no mention of ‘private life’ which is 
also protected under article 8 ECHR. 
6  See ECtHR case law regarding seriously ill persons and article 3 ECHR, in particular: ECtHR 
2 May 1997, nr. 146/1996/767/964, D. v. the United Kingdom, par. 53. Because of the excep-
tional circumstances and the critical stage of the fatal illness, the implementation of the re-
moval decision was found to be amount to inhuman treatment and thus in violation of article 
3 ECHR. Furthermore, the expulsion to a country where lack of medical care would have the 
effect of reducing even further life expectancy of an applicant suffering from AIDS also en-
gaged a violation of article 3 ECHR but in only because of the very exceptional circumstances 
and given the compelling humanitarian considerations at stake. (… ‘his removal would expose 
him to a real risk of dying under most distressing circumstances and would thus amount to 
inhuman treatment’). ECtHR 27 May 2008, nr. 26565/05, N. v. the United Kingdom, § 42: 
‘The decision to remove an alien who is suffering from a serious mental or physical illness to a 
country where the facilities for the treatment of that illness are inferior to those available in 
the Contracting State may raise an issue under Article 3, but only in a very exceptional case, 
where the humanitarian grounds against the removal are compelling.’ 
7  K. Wouters, International legal standards for the protection of refoulement, Antwerp: Intersentia 
2009, p. 25. 
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include a prohibition of refoulement.8 Non-refoulement under article 3 ECHR does 
not require a link to a persecution ground and protects more than life and free-
dom.9 The Court has also underlined that article 3, which enshrines one of the 
fundamental values of democratic societies, prohibits in absolute terms torture or 
inhuman or degrading treatment, irrespective of the applicant's conduct. This prin-
ciple is equally valid when issues arise under Article 3 in expulsion cases. Accord-
ingly, the activities of the individual in question, even if undesirable or dangerous, 
cannot be a material consideration.10 The protection afforded by article 3 is thus 
wider than the one provided by article 33 of the UN Refugee Convention.11 The 
Court has also accepted that articles 2 ECHR (right to life) and 1 of Protocol no. 6 
(partial abolition of the death penalty) also contain a prohibition on refoulement, 
although any claim under these articles is commonly examined by the Court under 
article 3 ECHR.  
This particular understanding of the non-refoulement principle has been en-
shrined in article 19, § 2 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Un-
ion12, which prohibits the removal, expulsion or extradition to a State where there is 
a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or 
other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.13 
However, the European Court of Human Rights has further expanded the in-
terpretation of the non-refoulement principle. It has accepted a possibility of prohi-
bition on refoulement under article 6 (right to a fair trial), when there is a risk of 
suffering a flagrant denial of the rights contained therein. With regard to article 9 
(freedom of religion) the Court’s case law seems to suggest that, independently, arti-
cle 9 is unable to offer protection against return, but that where a sufficiently fla-
                                                        
8  ECtHR 7 July 1989, nr. 14038/88, Soering v. United Kingdom; ECtHR 20 March 1991, nr. 
15576/89, Cruz Varas v. Sweden.  
9  For instance, under certain circumstances, knowingly sending a foreign national back to a 
third country where the living conditions have attained the level of severity required to fall 
within the scope of article 3 ECHR (degrading treatment), will lead to a violation of the non-
refoulement principle under article 3 ECHR. See ECtHR 21 January 2011, nr. 30696/09, 
M.S.S. v. Belgium. 264.  
10  ECtHR 27 June 1995, nr. 22414/93, Chahal v. United Kingdom; ECtHR 7 December 1996, nr. 
25964/94, Ahmed v. Austria. The absolute character of article 3 ECHR was again confirmed in 
ECtHR 28 February 2008, nr. 37201/06, Saadi v. Italy, § 138. 
11  P. Boeles, M. den Heijer, G. Lodder en K. Wouters, European Migration Law, Antwerp: Inter-
sentia 2009, p. 291. 
12  OJ C. 30 March 2010, 83/395: ‘No one may be removed, expelled or extradited to a State 
where there is a serious risk that he or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or 
other inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’  
13  According to Battjes article 19, § 2, of the Charter aims to ‘incorporate’ the relevant case law 
of the ECtHR, yet the wording of article 19 suggests a different scope. This article seems nar-
rower, in particular, the prohibition does not encompass other actions than ‘removal, expul-
sion or extradition’ and it requires a serious risk, which, according to Battjes, requires a higher 
degree of foreseeability than the ‘real risk’ criterion of article 3 ECHR. He argues that the 
substantive scope of the prohibition of refoulement under the Charter can unlikely be nar-
rower than the one in the ECHR. For his arguments see H. Battjes, European asylum law and 
international law, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 2006, pp. 114-116. 
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grant violation of article 9 would also involve or amount to treatment in violation of 
article 3, there will be an obligation for State parties to offer protection.14 Wouters 
adds that with respect to some other provisions the Court seems to have left the 
door open for accepting a claim for refoulement protection, but has so far not ac-
cepted such claim. These provisions include articles 5 (prohibition of arbitrary de-
tention) and 8 (right to private and family life – in the sense that this right will be 
respected in the country of return – which is different from the right of protection 
of family life when return will result in the break-up of a family).15 
The United Kingdom’s House of Lords already suggested in 2004 that other ar-
ticles of the ECHR may be engaged under the non-refoulement principle, however a 
higher threshold test will have to be satisfied.16 Den Heijer equally challenged the 
assumption that under the ECHR only articles 2 and 3 are relevant to expulsion 
cases; the prohibition of refoulement can also be applied with regard to other provi-
sions, however a higher threshold (‘flagrant breach’) will indeed be applied by the 
Court which according to Den Heijer is made operational by the distinction (made 
by the Court) between norms representing a fundamental value and norm repre-
senting ‘ordinary’ values. As such, the notion of a ‘fundamental value’ certainly en-
compasses articles 2 and 3, but also norms protected by other provisions, or at least 
certain intrinsic components of those other provisions.17 According to Wouters the 
following provisions under the ECHR contain equally important fundamental val-
ues, have an absolute character and thus may, by analogy, also contain a prohibition 
on refoulement: articles 4 (1) (prohibition of slavery and servitude) and 7 (no pun-
ishment without law), article 4 of Protocol no. 7 (ne bis in idem) and article 1 of pro-
tocol no. 13 (complete abolition of the death penalty). However, Wouters admits, 
the Court has hitherto not accepted this.18  
It will be interesting to see how this growing trend by the Court to read new du-
ties of non-refoulement in the ECHR will influence the application of the Return 
Directive. How will Member States have to interpret the non-refoulement principle? 
Since the Return Directive does not link or limit the non-refoulement principle 
solely and specifically to article 19, § 2 of the Charter, in our view an eventual ex-
panded reading by the Court of the prohibition of refoulement will also have to be 
taken into account when applying the directive.19 
                                                        
14  For an analysis of the relevant case law, see K. Wouters, International legal standards for the pro-
tection of refoulement, supra note 7, pp. 352-353. 
15  For an analysis of the relevant case law, see K. Wouters, International legal standards for the pro-
tection of refoulement, supra note 7, pp. 351-352. 
16  Ullah v. Secretary of State for the Home Dept [2004] 2 AC 323, [2004] UKHL 26, paras. 24_25 
(Lord Bingham), 49-50 (Lord Steyn), 67 (Lord Carswell).  
17  M. den Heijer, ‘Whose rights and which rights? The continuing story of non-refoulement un-
der the European Convention on Human Rights’, EJML 2008, 277-314.  
18  See K. Wouters, International legal standards for the protection of refoulement, supra note 7, p. 358. 
19  Battjes equally remarked that the Charter does not refer to other prohibitions of refoulement 
than article 3 ECHR and pointed to article 53 of the Charter (‘Level of protection’) which 
states: ‘Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human 
rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of application, by 
Union law and international law and by international agreements to which the Union, the 
→ 
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The consequences of taking due account of these principles are clarified further 
by the Directive. Article 9 lists a number of situations in which removal must or 
may be postponed. In two cases, the postponement of removal is obligatory, namely 
when removal would violate the principle of non-refoulement or for as long as a 
suspensory effect is granted during the examination of an appeal against a removal 
decision.20 Removal may be postponed when the specific circumstances of an indi-
vidual case would require so. In particular, Member States shall take into account 
the physical or mental capacity of the third-country national21 as well as technical 
reasons, such as lack of transport capacity or failure of removal due to lack of identi-
fication.22  
However, if removal is postponed, Member States are allowed to place certain 
obligations upon the third-country national in order to avoid the risk of abscond-
ing, for instance submission of document, the obligation to stay at a certain place, 
regular reporting to the authorities or the deposit of an adequate financial guaran-
tee.  
Lastly, with regard to the specific situation of non-accompanied minors, article 
10 § 2 stipulates clearly that removal may only take place once the Member State is 
satisfied that the minor will be returned to a member of the family, a nominated 
guardian or to adequate reception facilities in the State of return.23  
                                                        
Community or all the Member States are party, including the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member States' consti-
tutions.’ H. Battjes, European asylum law and international law, supra note 13, pp. 115-116. 
20  The Commission proposal went further in this regard and distinguished different situations. 
Where Member States are subject to obligations derived from fundamental rights as resulting, 
in particular, from the ECHR, Member States were directly obliged to refrain from issuing a re-
turn decision. In case a return decision was already issued, Member States were to withdraw 
the decision. The proposal made particular reference to obligations arising from the non-re-
foulement principle, right to education and the right to family unity. Member States were fur-
thermore obliged to postpone removal were inability of the third-country national was unable 
to travel or to be transported to the country of return due to his or her physical state or men-
tal capacity; when technical reasons, such as lack of transport capacity or other difficulties, 
make it impossible to enforce the removal in a humane manner and with full respect for the 
third-country national’s fundamental rights and dignity and when there was a lack of assur-
ance that unaccompanied minors can be handed over at the point of departure or upon arri-
val to a family member, an equivalent representative, a guardian of the minor or a competent 
official of the country of return. See supra note 1, 15-16.  
21  See supra note 6.  
22  See infra note 58. 
23  In comparison with the Commission proposal, the Directive has added ‘adequate reception 
facilities’. See in this regard the plans of Norway, Denmark and the United Kingdom to build 
reintegration centres in Kabul, in order to return Afghan non-accompanied minors. See fur-
ther the EU Action Plan on unaccompanied minors, COM (2010) 213/3 adopted by the JHA 
Council on 2 June 2010 which promotes as one of the three possible durable solutions for 
non-accompanied minors, the return and reintegration to the country of origin, with priority 
given to voluntary return, in full respect of the safeguards provided by the Return Directive.  
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When removal is postponed, it is in principle left to the Member States to de-
fine the basic conditions of subsistence for these persons according to national legis-
lation (preamble consideration 12). After all, international human rights treaties, 
including the ECHR, and relevant case law do not specify how non-removable per-
sons should be treated or what their legal status should be.24 Authors have pointed 
out that, in the human rights context, there is a protection gap which is due to the 
application of the non-refoulement principle without providing a corresponding le-
gal status.25 Article 14 nevertheless foresees some safeguards while return is pend-
ing, in particular the maintaining of family unity, the provision of emergency health 
care and essential treatment of illness, the access to basic education for minors and 
the taking into account of the special needs of vulnerable persons. This article is 
phrased very cautiously: Member States shall take the abovementioned principles 
into account as far as possible.26 On the other hand, Member States are obliged to 
provide non-removable persons with a written confirmation, in accordance with na-
tional legislation, that the return decisions will temporarily not be enforced. The ra-
tionale for this is, according to consideration 12 of the preamble, to enable non-
removable persons to demonstrate their specific situation in the event of adminis-
trative controls or checks.  
However, non-removal is not always a temporary phenomenon. In this regard, 
article 6, § 4 opens some perspectives as it allows Member States to decide at any 
moment to grant an autonomous residence permit or author authorization offering 
a right to stay for compassionate, humanitarian or other reasons to third-country 
national staying illegally on their territory.27 According to some, it could be argued 
that article 6 of the Return Directive only leaves Member States with two options: 
either they issue and execute a return decision; or they grant a residence permit. 
Yet, reading closely the used wording, this article does not explicitly require Mem-
ber States to put an end to a limbo situation or to give non-removable persons a 
residence status. Nevertheless, case law of the ECtHR should be taken into account 
                                                        
24  J.C. Hathaway, ‘Leveraging asylum’, Tex. Int’L.J. 2009, p. 503; G.S. Goodwin-Gill and J. 
McAdam, The refugee in international law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007, p. 297. 
25  This is in contrast with the Refugee Convention where refugees are not only protected against 
refoulement but also entitled to civil and socio-economic key rights. J. McAdam, Complemen-
tary protection in international refugee law, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2007, p. 201. See 
also P. Boeles, M. den Heijer, G. Lodder and K. Wouters, European Migration Law, supra note 
11, p. 298: this does not mean that a State is not obliged to ensure some basic rights, at least 
the rights and freedoms of the ECHR to which any individual present on the State’s territory 
is entitled. 
26  In the Commission proposal Member States were required to ensure that the conditions of 
stay of third-country nationals for whom the enforcement of a return decision has been post-
poned or who cannot be removed are not less favourable than those set out in articles 7 to 10, 
15 and 17 to 20 of Directive 2003/9/EC (Reception Directive). See supra note 1, 18.  
27  Originally this paragraph followed a previous paragraph that dealt with situations where 
Member States were directly obliged to refrain from issuing a return decision, in particular in 
situations where non-refoulement, the right to education and right to family unity would be at 
stake.  
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as it sometimes attaches positive obligations to certain fundamental rights, for in-
stance with regard to family life.28  
Finally, it is important to underline that while Member States may decide not to 
apply this Directive to third-country nationals apprehended at the border in con-
nection with irregular crossing, their treatment and level of protection may not be 
less favourable in particular with regard to the principle of non-refoulement and 
postponement of removal as well as with regard to access to emergency health care 
and their possible needs as vulnerable persons (article 4 § 4). 
2. The Belgian Situation: Limits to Removal 
Although Belgium has not yet fully transposed the Return Directive, we will exam-
ine how Belgium deals with non-removal and whether the current rules and legisla-
tion are in line with the relevant provisions of Return Directive as discussed above. 
                                                        
28  See ECtHR 31 January 2006, nr. 50435/99, Rodrigues da Silva and Hoogkamer v. the Netherlands. 
In this case the Court found that Ms Rodrigues da Silva's (a Brazilian national) expulsion 
would have far-reaching consequences on her family life with her young daughter and that it 
was clearly in her daughters’ (a Dutch national) best interests for her mother to stay in the 
Netherlands. The Court therefore considered that the economic well-being of the country did 
not outweigh the applicants' rights under Article 8, despite the fact that the first applicant was 
residing illegally in the Netherlands when the daughter was born. Moreover, it found also that 
the authorities, by attaching such importance to this latter element, might be considered to 
have indulged in excessive formalism. Thus in some case Member States can be found under a 
duty to allow foreign nationals to reside on their territory in order to enable them to maintain 
and develop family life. See D. Thym, ‘Respect for private and family life under article 8 
ECHR in immigration cases: a human right to regularize illegal stay?’, ICLQ 2008, 87-112. 
The ECtHR has also not ruled out the possibility that there may be an obligation of regulari-
sation under article 8 ECHR but emphasizes that article 8 cannot be construed as guarantee-
ing, as such, the right to a particular type of residence permit: ECtHR, 15 January 2007, nr. 
60654/00, Sisojeva and others v. Latvia. On the other hand, the Court has stated that there is 
no obligation under article 3 ECHR to regularise the presence of a foreign national by provid-
ing him with a residence permit: ECtHR 15 September 2005, nr. 10154/04, Bonger v. the 
Netherlands. 
With regard to the right to education, see the independent right to reside for children of EU 
migrant workers: article 12 of Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 of the Council of 15 October 
1968 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community (OJ, English Special Edi-
tion 1968(II), p. 475), as amended by Council Regulation (EEC) No 2434/92 of 27 July 1992 
(OJ 1992 L 245, p. 1), as well as relevant case law with regard to the caretakers of these chil-
dren, in particular: ECJ 17 September 2002, C-413/99, Baumbast and R; ECJ 23 February 
2010, C-480/08, Teixeira and ECJ 23 February 2010, C-310/08, Ibrahim. Could it be that the 
Commission had the same reasoning in mind for children of third-country nationals?  
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A.  Postponement of Removal 
Non-refoulement 
According to the Belgian Aliens Act, when a foreign national does not (any longer) 
fulfil the entry or residence requirements, a return decision will be taken and exe-
cuted. The Belgian Aliens Act does not contain an explicit provision postponing 
removal when the non-refoulement principle is at stake. However, the Aliens Act 
does acknowledge that there can be ‘derogations’ or ‘more favourable provisions’ 
‘defined in an international treaty or in national law’.  
In the Belgian legal order, the non-refoulement principle, as an inherent and ab-
solute obligation under article 3 ECHR,29 has direct effect and applicability30 as well 
as primacy over national law.31 Furthermore, the non-refoulement principle en-
shrined in article 19, § 2 of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Un-
ion, has become, since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, a formal source 
of EU primary law.32 The non-refoulement principle also has direct effect through 
EU law and is directly binding upon the relevant authorities in so far as they are 
implementing Union law, in this case the Return Directive.33 
In sum, article 3 ECHR and article 19, § 2 of the Charter make clear that the 
non-refoulement principle must be taken into full account by the relevant authori-
ties (in Belgium, this refers to the Belgian Aliens Office) when issuing and executing 
return decisions. Nevertheless, in light of ECJ case law,34 we would favour the inser-
tion of an explicit provision postponing removal due to the non-refoulement prin-
ciple in the Belgian Aliens Act, in order for foreign nationals to ascertain their full 
rights and if necessary, rely on them before national courts.35  
One may wonder, since article 3 ECHR gives rise to subsidiary protection ac-
cording to directive 2004/83/EC,36 whether the non-refoulement principle would 
                                                        
29  See supra note 8. 
30  J. Vande Lanotte and Y. Haeck, Handboek EVRM I - Algemene beginselen, Antwerpen: Intersen-
tia, 2005, p. 12; O. de Schutter and S. van Droogehenbroeck, Droit international des droits de 
l’homme devant le juge national, Brussel: Larcier 1999, p. 434. 
31  This principle was established by the Belgian ‘Court de Cassation’: Cass. 27 mei 1971, Arr. 
Cass. 1971, 959. 
32  See article 6 (1) Treaty of the European Union, OJ C. 30 March 2010 , 83/19. 
33  Article 51 (1) Charter of Fundamental Rights, OJ .C. 30 March 2010, 83/402.  
34  ECJ 30 May 1991, C-361/88, Commission ν Germany, par.15 and ECJ 11 August 1995, C-
433/93, Commission v. Germany, par.18: ‘The transposition of a directive into domestic law 
does not necessarily require that its provisions be incorporated formally and verbatim in ex-
press, specific legislation, and that a general legal context may, depending on the content of 
the directive, be adequate for the purpose, provided that it does indeed guarantee the full ap-
plication of the directive in a sufficiently clear and precise manner so that, where the directive 
is intended to create rights for individuals, the persons concerned can ascertain the full extent 
of their rights and, where appropriate, rely on them before the national courts.’ 
35  Referring to the general non-refoulement principle as such, would have the advantage of in-
cluding possibilities of a prohibition of refoulement under other ECHR provisions. 
36  Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum standards for the qualification 
and status of third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who other-
wise need international protection and the content of the protection granted, OJ L 30 Sep-
→ 
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still be a relevant principle to take into account when issuing a return decision? The 
Aliens Act, Belgian case law and practice suggest that article 3 ECHR will still play a 
role in return decisions.  
For instance, in some asylum cases, the Aliens Office will be given advice with 
regard to removal and the non-refoulement principle. The competent Minister can 
refuse an asylum seeker to enter or stay in the territory when serious reasons exist to 
consider him a danger to the public order or national security.37 Consequently, the 
asylum seeker is also refused access to the asylum procedure. In such a case, the 
Minister is obliged to seek the advice of the Commissioner-general for refugees and 
stateless persons with regard to the asylum application and with regard to the ques-
tion as to whether the removal measures taken are in conformity with the Refugee 
Convention or the subsidiary protection. Another case regards the situation where 
the competent Minister can ask the Commissioner-general for refugees and stateless 
persons to revoke the subsidiary protection status already granted when facts appear 
later which show that the foreign national should have been excluded in the first 
place.38 Although the Minister has a right of initiative, the decision making compe-
tence lies solely with the Commissioner-general, which is an independent asylum in-
stance. If this revocation takes place within the first five years of residence after the 
subsidiary protection has been granted, the Minister can take a return decision. 
Therefore the Commissioner-general must include in its revocation decision an ad-
vice on the conformity of possible removal measures with article 3 ECHR. In both 
cases, the advice of the Commissioner-general is not binding. Strangely enough the 
Aliens Act does not foresee such an advice in cases where the exclusion clauses are 
applied during the examination of the asylum application nor in cases where the 
refugee status is revoked because exclusion clauses are applied later on (knowledge 
gained ex post facto). In practice, the Commissioner-general will still include an ad-
vice on removal and article 3 ECHR in the exclusion or revocation decision. Ideally, 
the Aliens Office should take this advice into account when issuing and enforcing a 
return decision. In practice, a possible violation of article 3 ECHR will however not 
deter the Aliens Office from issuing a return decision, it will however not be en-
forced, rather the foreign national will be expected to leave the country voluntar-
ily.39  
                                                        
tember 2004, 304/12. According to articles 2 (e) and 15 (b) a person is eligible for subsidiary 
protection is there are substantial grounds to believe that this person would face a real risk of 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, if returned to his country of ori-
gin. The ECJ held that ‘In that regard, while the fundamental right guaranteed under article 3 
of the ECHR forms part of the general principles of Community law, observance of which is 
ensured by the Court, and while the case-law of the European Court is taken into considera-
tion in interpreting the scope of that right in the Community legal order, it is, however Arti-
cle 15 (b) of the Directive which corresponds, in essence, to Article 3 of the ECHR.’ ECJ 17 
February, C-465-07, Elgafiji v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie, § 28. 
37  Article 52/4 Aliens Act.  
38  Article 49/2, § 4 Aliens Act.  
39  In a judgment of the Aliens Litigation Council, it was stated that the applicant did not show 
sufficiently that he would face a serious and real risk of torture or inhuman or degrading 
→ 
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There are other situations, outside the asylum procedure, where the non-refoule-
ment principle still can be of importance when issuing return decisions. In the Bel-
gian context, exclusions clauses can also be applied during regular migration proce-
dures. For instance, a person who might be in need of protection as a victim of hu-
man trafficking40 or on medical grounds41 can be excluded from this protection if 
he is considered to present a possible danger to the public order or national secu-
rity. In some of these cases, the return of the foreign national to his country of ori-
gin could be in violation of article 3 ECHR.42 This issue might also arise when the 
foreign national applies for a residence permit on medical grounds (it is important 
to note that in the Belgian context residence on medical grounds is seen as a form 
of subsidiary protection based on article 3 ECHR) and his application is considered 
inadmissible due to lack of identification.43 The Constitutional Court has obliged 
the Belgian authorities to interpret the admissibility criterion of proof of identity 
and nationality in a broad way: sufficient proof of identity may not be restricted 
solely to the submission of an identity document.44 Legislation was modified allow-
ing for other means of proof of identity.45 However, the modified legislation does 
not provide for cases where it is impossible for the foreign national to provide the 
necessary proofs of identity. As the application procedure for a residence permit is 
of a formal and written character, it is not allowed to establish the identity of the 
applicant through a hearing. Consequently, the foreign national who does not pos-
sess any legally accepted document will not benefit from a residence status, even if 
he, on the merits of his application, fulfils the necessary criteria.46 He will receive a 
                                                        
treatment or punishment, as the return decision issued did not include a forced return to 
Iraq. RvV, 18 December 2008, nr. 20.701. 
40  Article 61/2, § 3 Aliens Act.  
41  Article 9ter, § 4 Aliens Act. The Aliens Litigation Council has judged that the refusal to issue 
a residence permit on medical grounds because of the application of the exclusion clause is in 
itself not an inhuman or degrading treatment in the sense of article 3 ECHR. RvV 20 August 
2008, nr. 15.078.  
42  With regard to seriously ill persons excluded from the benefit of a residence permit on medi-
cal grounds, the Belgian government has stated that these persons will not be removed if they 
are so ill that their removal would be in violation of article 3 ECHR. Memorie van toelichting, 
Wetsontwerp tot wijziging van de wet van 15 december 1980 betreffende de toegang tot het 
grondgebied, het verblijf, de vestiging en de verwijdering van vreemdelingen, Parl.St. Kamer 
2005-2006, nr. 51-2478/001, 36.  
43  Article 9ter, § 3 Aliens Act.  
44  GwH 26 November 2009, nr. 193/2009, B.5.3.  
45  Article 9ter, § 2 Aliens Act. For instance, through the combination of a birth certificate and 
an attestation of loss of identity document.  
46  However, from case law it appears that this admissibility criterion of proof of identity can be 
‘overruled’ through the application of article 3 ECHR. In the relevant case, identity was not 
proven in a sufficient manner but the court accepted the argument of the applicant stating 
that a return to the country of origin in order to attain the necessary proof of identity, would 
be a violation of article 3 ECHR as the applicant suffered a life threatening disease without 
necessary guarantees to an adequate treatment in the country of origin being present. In short, 
the court accepted the violation of article 3 ECHR as a proof of the impossibility to obtain the 
proof of identity. RvV 6 May 2008, nr. 10.929.  
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refusal decision47 but the Aliens Office will not be able to issue or enforce a return 
decision without examining the merits of the case, in order to prevent a possible 
violation of article 3 ECHR.48 
During suspensory effect 
The Return Directive stipulates that the third-country national shall be afforded an 
effective remedy to appeal against return decisions (article 13). This effective remedy 
includes suspensory effect, meaning that the temporarily suspension of the en-
forcement of a return decision can be granted upon request or that temporary sus-
pension is automatically applicable under national legislation. The Directive makes 
clear that the suspension of the enforcement of the return decision must not only 
take place in law but also in fact: as long as this suspensory effect is granted, removal 
must be postponed (article 9, § 1 (b)). It thus follows the guidelines set out by the 
European Court of Human Rights with regard to article 13 ECHR. 
Against a return decision an appeal of annulment can be introduced at the 
Aliens Litigation Council. This appeal has no suspensory effect and a separate ap-
peal for stay of execution of removal measures must be lodged. Again, this separate 
appeal for stay of execution of removal measures does not automatically suspend the 
removal measures. Only when the removal is stayed by the Aliens Litigation Coun-
cil, will the execution of the measure be suspended. The European Court of Human 
Rights judged that this appeal procedure did not fulfil the requirements of an effec-
tive remedy.49 Accordingly, a return decision will now only be enforced five days af-
ter the return decision has been notified to the foreign national50and the practice of 
lodging an appeal for stay of execution of removal measures in case of extremely ur-
gent necessity has been formalized.51 As such, the foreign national has the possibility 
to introduce an appeal of stay in case of extremely urgent necessity during this pe-
riod of five days. After a following judgment of the European Court of Human 
                                                        
47  According to case law, declaring an application inadmissible without a substantial examina-
tion of the medical grounds presented, is in itself not a violation of article 3 ECHR. RvV 14 
March 2008, nr. 8.810. 
48  This was declared so by the Belgian goverment: Memorie van toelichting, Wetsontwerp tot 
wijziging van de wet van 15 december 1980 betreffende de toegang tot het grondgebied, het 
verblijf, de vestiging en de verwijdering van vreemdelingen, Parl.St. Kamer 2005-2006, nr. 51-
2478/001, 35. It was also confirmed by the Constitutional Court: GwH 26 June 2008, nr. 
95.2008,. B.14 and GwH 20 September 2006, nr. 141.2006, B.7 and repeatedly by case law of 
the Aliens Litigation Council, for instance RvV 19 May 2008, nr. 11.335; RvV 25 July 2008, 
nr. 14.397; RvV 23 September 2008, nr. 16.199; RvV 29 April 2009, nr. 26.673; RvV 26 Feb-
ruary 2010, nr. 37.026 and RvV 19 April 2010, nr. 41.760. However, it is expected that the 
foreign national delivers prima facie evidence of the violation of article 3 ECHR: RvV 26 
April 2010, nr. 42.278. Nevertheless, if the prolongation of the date of execution of the re-
turn decision can be demanded and the foreign national neglects to do so, the return decision 
will not be annulled. RvV 25 February 2008, nr. 7.802, RvV 28 January 2010, nr. 37.710 and 
RvV 26 March 2010, nr. 40.913 
49  ECtHR 5 February 2002, nr. 51564/99, Conka/Belgium. 
50  Article 39/83 Aliens Act.  
51  Art. 39/82 Aliens Act. 
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Rights, the practice in treating such appeals was modified again.52 Consequently, 
when an appeal for stay in extremely urgent necessity has been introduced against 
an imminent removal measure within the period of five days, this appeal will have 
full suspensory effect until the Aliens Litigation Council has pronounced itself. In 
case such appeal is only introduced after the period of five days but an arguable 
claim, containing prima facie evidence of a possible violation of article 3 ECHR, has 
been presented, the appeal also will also have full suspensory effect until the Coun-
cil has pronounced itself. In this way, the Aliens Litigation Council aims to bring its 
appeal procedures in line with article 13 ECHR.  
Unaccompanied minors 
A ministerial circular of 15 September 2005 marks the return of the unaccompa-
nied minor to the country of origin or any other country where the minor has the 
right of residence as a durable solution when there are guarantees of an adequate 
reception and care, according to the needs of the unaccompanied minor, taking 
into account his age and his degree of self reliance. This reception and care must be 
provided by his parents or other caretakers or by government authorities or NGO’s. 
This provision is in substance in conformity with article 10 of the Return Directive, 
but again for reasons of legal certainty and legal protection, we would favour an ex-
plicit provision in the Aliens Act.53 
Other cases  
Belgian rules on immigration also provide for a postponement of removal in other 
cases, in particular where there might be an issue with articles 3 and 8 ECHR or the 
UN Convention on the Rights of Children. 
A suspension of the return decision can be granted based on the right of educa-
tion. Children, younger than 18 years, who are staying illegally on the territory, can 
apply for a postponement of removal in order to finish their school year.54 The cri-
teria and the procedure for this short suspension of removal are described in a cir-
cular letter of 29 April 2003.55 The circular only applies to return decisions which 
have been issued at the beginning of the Easter holidays until the end of the school 
year. This suspension is not right but a favour to be granted on a discretionary basis 
by the Aliens Office and it does not include the delivery of a residence status.56 It 
                                                        
52  ECtHR 21 January 2011, nr. 30696/09, M.S.S./Belgium. 
53  ECJ 11 August 1995, C-433/93, Commission v. Germany, par. 5: Transposing a directive by 
mere administrative practice, which could be altered at any moment, is inadequate. 
54  If the children have a re-examination in August, the suspension can be prolonged until the 
end of the second examination period.  
55  BS 13 June 2003. For instance a recent proof of enrolment in the school is required.  
56  However, there is jurisprudence where Courts of First Instance have judged that in individual 
situations where the child’s right to education will be violated due to a removal order, with-
holding him from following the school courses, it can be in the child’s best interests to annul 
the removal order and grant him a temporary residence permit, based on articles 3 and 28 of 
the UNCRC, or on the basis of art. 2 of the First protocol to the ECHR. See Rb. Brussel 2 
November 2004 (summary proceedings), www.sdj.be; Rb. Brussel 13 May 2005 (summary pro-
ceedings), www.sdj.be; Rb. Brussel 7 December 2004 (summmary proceedings), J.dr.jeun. 2006, 
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however will benefit also the family members of the school attending child, namely 
the parents, cohabitating brother and sisters as well as cohabitating ascendants.  
In certain cases delay of departure or an exceptional prolongation of the relevant 
residence title can be granted on a discretionary basis by the Aliens Office, in par-
ticular when removal from the territory would constitute a violation of respectively 
article 3 ECHR and article 8 ECHR, for instance when a foreign national cannot 
leave the country due to illness and/or treatment thereof or during the last three 
months of pregnancy, or when a foreign national intends to marry another foreign 
national legally residing in Belgium or a Belgian national. The criteria and proce-
dure are further described in a ministerial circular of 26 January 2004, which was 
not officially published.57  
The above described possibilities for postponement of removal seem to be in 
line with the Return Directive: they do meet the necessity of being able to postpone 
removal when the specific circumstances of an individual case require so (see article 
9§ 2) as well as take into account some fundamental principles with regard to family 
life or the best interest of the child (see article 5).  
There are, however, no public rules or guidelines in Belgium with regard to per-
sons who cannot be removed due to administrative or technical reasons. Article 9, § 
2 of the Return Directive does not require Member States to provide for this situa-
tion. Yet, in such situations the removal itself may amount to a violation of article 3 
ECHR within Belgium, in particular the repeated expulsions or repeated attempts 
to expel foreign nationals without any identity or travel papers may engage a viola-
tion under article 3 ECHR. This is especially the case with stateless persons as the 
recognition of a person as stateless in Belgium does not include a right of residence. 
Therefore a stateless person, whether recognized or not, and who is staying illegally 
on the territory can still be issued a return decision. But since stateless persons do 
not have a nationality, they cannot easily be removed to another country. It has 
therefore been judged that repeated efforts to remove a stateless person, although he 
is not admitted in another state nor is able to obtain a durable and legal residence 
in another state, might amount to inhuman or degrading treatment (so-called ‘refu-
gees in orbit’-situation).58 Article 3 ECHR can also be violated if the foreign na-
                                                        
p. 37-38; Rb. Brussel 31 May 2006, T. Vreemd. 2006, 427-428; Rb. Brugge 28 March 2007 
(summary proceedings), T.Vreemd. 2007, p. 212 – this last judgment was however annulled by 
the Court of Appeal of Ghent, which stated that if the continuity of the studies of the chil-
dren was endangered by the removal order, this was only due to the fact that the parents never 
follow up on the first removal order and stayed illegally Belgium. This is a decision that they 
took and which is their own responsibility – Gent 21 June 2007, T. Vreemd. 2007, 280. 
57  For instance, proof is to be delivered in the form of a medical certificate or a public notice of 
the intended marriage. 
58  Commission Human Rights 17 July 1980, nr. 7612/76, Giama v. Belgium: ‘Dans certaines cir-
constances, l’expulsion répetée d’un étranger ne disposant d’aucun titre d’identité et de 
voyage et dont l’état d’origine est inconnu ou refusé la réadmission sur son territoire, pourrait 
soulever un problème au regard de l’article 3 qui prohibite les traitements inhumains ou dé-
gradants’. See also European Commission of Human Rights 14 May 1994, X v. the Nether-
lands. These judgments were used by national courts to oblige, in some cases, the Belgian au-
thorities to grant a temporary right of residence during the judicial procedure for recognition 
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tional whose identity is not established is returned to a country where his admission 
is not guaranteed.59 Unfortunately the Return directive does not address specifically 
situations where the removal itself amounts to a violation of article 3 ECHR within 
the territory of a Member State.  
B.  Safeguards during Postponement of Removal 
As mentioned above, article 14 of the Return Directive urges Member States to pro-
vide certain safeguards to (temporarily) non-removable persons, as far as possible. 
Belgium seems, in theory, to meet these safeguards. The right to family unity is 
respected – families are not to be separated.60 Minors have a constitutional right to 
education and enrolment in a school cannot be refused due to their status of illegal 
stay.61 There is a right of access to emergency health care, which includes preventive 
and curative medical care.62  
It is not clear yet how Belgium will comply with the obligation to provide non-
removable persons with a written confirmation of the fact that the return decision 
will temporarily not be enforced.  
Consideration 12 of the preamble in the Return Directive stipulates that Mem-
ber States should enjoy wide discretion concerning the form and format of the writ-
ten confirmation and should be able to include it in decisions related to return. Ac-
cording to the Belgian authorities a simple prolongation of the date of execution of 
return decision will be sufficient. However, a simple prolongation is not necessarily 
a written confirmation of a person’s non-removable state.  
Admittedly, the Belgian legislation foresees more safeguards for non-removable 
persons, in order to meet the basic conditions of subsistence. In principle, foreign 
nationals in illegal stay do not have a right to public welfare services. However, in 
some situations, some categories of foreign nationals in illegal stay will benefit from 
a limited right to public welfare service, either in the form of material aid in an 
open reception centre or through limited financial aid, based upon the constitu-
                                                        
of statelessness. This jurisprudence based itself upon articles 6, 13 and 3 ECHR and was con-
cerned with the right of the applicant to have an effective access to judicial procedure as well 
as avoiding the applicant ending up in a so-called ‘refugee in orbit’-situation. See for instance: 
Brussels 4 May 1999, Rev. Dr. étr., 1999, p. 243. However, contrary to case law relating to ille-
gal persons applying for recognition of their statelessness, case law regarding recognised state-
less persons staying illegally in Belgium has not been willing to oblige Belgian authorities to 
grant a residence permit. See RvS 20 August 2004, nr. 134.347 and RvS 4 November 2004, 
nr. 136.968. 
59  Commission Human Rights 5 March 1986, nr. 10798/84, Harabi v. the Netherlands. See also 
RvS 23 September 1998, nr. 75.896: the return decision, notified to an illegal stateless person 
was annulled because the Aliens Office was well aware of the impossibility of the stateless per-
son to enter another country. The deprivation of the applicant of a legal residence and the 
impossibility to enter another country amounted to an inhuman and degrading treatment in 
the sense of article 3 ECHR. 
60  Article 22 Belgian Constitution. 
61  Article 24 Belgian Constitution. 
62  Article 57, § 2 of the Law of 8 July 1976 regarding public welfare centres. 
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tional right to a dignified existence.63 These categories of foreign nationals in illegal 
stay also include foreign nationals who cannot be (temporarily) removed. When 
minors in illegal stay, whose removal has been postponed in order to finish their 
school year, are found to be destitute because their parents are not able to provide 
for them, the family as a whole will benefit from a right to material aid in an open 
reception centres.64 Failed asylum seekers will in some cases benefit from a pro-
longed right to material aid in open reception centre,65 in particular when their re-
moval is postponed due to pregnancy in the last three months, medical reasons or 
school attending children. Failed asylum seekers will benefit from a prolonged right 
to material aid in case of an impossibility to return due to circumstances beyond 
their control, for instance when they are stateless or when the authorities of their 
country of origin do not grant them the necessary travel documents. Equally, a pro-
longed right to material aid will be granted in order to maintain family unity, for in-
stance when another family member still enjoys material aid on the basis of an on-
going asylum procedure. Failed asylum seekers who are the parents of a Belgian 
child will continue to benefit from material aid if they have introduced an applica-
tion for residence permit on the basis of article 8 ECHR.  
In most of these cases an explicit request for prolonged material aid has to be 
made; it is not granted automatically. The foreign nationals will have to prove in 
these instances the reasons for their non-removability to the relevant federal author-
ity competent for the provision of material aid. In that sense, it would be useful if 
the written confirmation of non-removability would entail more than just a prolon-
gation of the date of execution of the return decision and also include a motivation. 
Lastly, foreign nationals in illegal stay, who never benefited from material aid, 
should be given financial aid when due to medical reasons it is absolutely impossi-
ble for them to obey a return decision and they are found to be destitute. This prin-
ciple of ‘force majeure medical’ was laid down in a judgment of the Constitutional 
Court but its application in practice has been difficult.66  
Likewise, the Court of Cassation ruled that foreign nationals in illegal stay who 
cannot return to their country of origin due to circumstances beyond their control 
(‘force majeure’), for instance because they are stateless, should benefit from a regu-
lar right to public welfare service. Again here the application of this principle in 
practice is not so straightforward. In both cases, proof of non-removability is re-
quired and also here a more motivated written confirmation of non-removability 
might be useful.  
                                                        
63  Article 23 Belgian Constitution. 
64  Article 60 of the Law of 12 January 1997 regarding the reception of asylum seekers and cer-
tain categories of foreign nationals. 
65  Article 7 of the Law of 12 January 1997 regarding the reception of asylum seekers and certain 
categories of foreign nationals. 
66  GwH 30 June 1999, nr. 80/99. 
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C.  Regularization of Humanitarian Situations 
A written confirmation of non-removability, access to certain safeguards and bene-
fitting from basic conditions of subsistence do not necessarily add up to a durable 
solution for non-removable persons. Some of them will still find themselves in a 
limbo-situation, merely being tolerated without access to further rights. 
To remediate these situations, the Return Directive allows Member States to 
grant a residence permit for compassionate, humanitarian or other reasons (article 
6, § 4). The Return Directive does not further define these reasons and leaves this 
to the discretion of Member States. A useful indication is the fact that in the origi-
nal proposal this provision was linked to a previous provision prohibiting removal 
when the non-refoulement principle, the right to education or the right to family 
unity was at stake.67 As such, a more durable solution for these situations was sug-
gested and provided. 
The Belgian Aliens Act allows the regularization of an illegal stay, on a discre-
tionary basis, if there are ‘exceptional circumstances’ that prevent a foreign national 
from introducing an application for residence in his country of origin.68 The foreign 
national must justify why he is not able to return to his country of origin to intro-
duce the application and also motivate on what grounds he request a residence 
permit. Often, in humanitarian cases, the grounds that withhold a foreign national 
from introducing his application in the country of origin will constitute the same 
grounds on the basis of which he requests a residence permit.  
In the past, the Belgian authorities have, for reasons of legal certainty, regularly 
clarified the concept of ‘exceptional circumstances’ through ministerial instructions. 
A recurrent element of these instructions has been the notion that if ‘a pressing 
humanitarian situation’ was involved in the application for regularization, the re-
moval of the applicant would be in violation of international human rights treaties, 
in particular the UN Convention on the rights of children and the ECHR. A press-
ing humanitarian situation was at some point defined as: a situation of such a press-
ing nature that the person cannot free himself of it, where removal of the person 
would constitute a violation of a fundamental right with direct applicability in Bel-
gium and where further residence in Belgium would be the only solution. This 
would be valid in particular for persons who find themselves in such a personal or 
family situation that their only rescue would be the regularization of their stay.  
By reading these ministerial guidelines, it could be argued that in some instances 
non-removable persons, such as stateless persons, could benefit from a regulariza-
tion of their stay. However, the latest ministerial instructions with regard to hu-
manitarian regularization have been annulled by the Council of State for lack of le-
gal basis, amongst other reasons.69 Thus, the criteria for humanitarian regularization 
are again entirely left open to the discretion of the Aliens Office.  
                                                        
67 See supra note 20. 
68 Article 9bis Aliens Act. 
69 RvS 9 december 2009, nr. 198.769. 
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3. Conclusions and Future Perspectives 
The analysis above reveals that Belgian legislation and practice in general lines are 
correspondence with the relevant provisions of the Return Directive, but there is 
however room for improvement. We have seen that there are still situations, where 
subsidiary protection status or another protection satus is not granted or available, 
that warrant postponement of removal on the basis of the non-refoulement princi-
ple. Although the non-refoulement principle is directly binding upon the Aliens Of-
fice through article 3 ECHR and article 19, § 2 of the Charter and should taken 
fully into account by the Aliens Office when issuing and executing return decisions, 
we would still favour an explicit provision in the Aliens Act regarding non-
refoulement. For the same reasons of legal certainty and legal protection, an explicit 
provision in the Aliens Act should stipulate that unaccompanied minors can only 
be returned if there are sufficient guarantees with regard to reception of the minor 
either by family or nominated guardians or in adequate reception facilities. Ideally, 
the Return Directive and the Aliens Act should make clear that the removal itself 
may not amount to a violation under article 3 ECHR. Repeated but failed efforts to 
remove a foreign national because of administrative or technical reasons hindering 
an effective removal should be avoided. 
The necessary safeguards with regard to education, family unity and emergence 
health care are in place in Belgian legislation and the basic conditions for subsis-
tence are generally met through the provision of limited public welfare service to 
foreign nationals who (temporarily) cannot be removed. However, in order to access 
this limited public welfare service, a proof of non-removability and the reasons for 
it, are needed. In that sense, written confirmation of the fact that a person is (tem-
porarily) not removable should entail more than just a prolongation of the date of 
execution of the return decision. Humanitarian regularization is possible on the ba-
sis of the Aliens Act; however the criteria for humanitarian regularization remain 
undefined and are at the discretion of the Aliens Office. It remains nevertheless the 
only but difficult access to a durable solution for non-removable persons. 
A study of the European Group of National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI) 
pointed out that the issue of non-removable persons is generally treated as a tempo-
rary problem or phenomenon which is not always necessarily the case.70 In a work-
ing document with regard to an integrated approach to protection the Commission 
clarified that the option of a full scale EU harmonization in the further develop-
ment of the Common European asylum system, would entail the recognition of an 
adequate level of protection to persons in need of protection, more in particular 
through the harmonization between Member States of protection statuses granted 
to other categories, like non removable persons.71 In its communication in prepara-
tion of the Stockholm programme, the Commission acknowledged that all too of-
ten repatriation measures cannot be carried out on account of legal or practical ob-
                                                        
70  See http://www.nhri.net. 
71  Commission Staff working document accompanying the Communication regarding a policy 
plan on asylum – an integrated approach to protection across the EU, Impact assessment, 
SEC (2008) 2029/2, p. 29. 
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stacles. In the absence of clear rules, national needs and practices should be studied 
and the possibility of establishing common standards for taking charge of illegal 
immigrants who cannot be deported should be considered.72 However, this sugges-
tion from the Commission was not included in the final Stockholm programme be-
cause of lack of agreement in the Council.  
It is clear that there is a lot of reticence to regulate the position and status of 
non-removable persons, which also seems to be the case in Belgium. This hesitation 
might be resolved if clear distinction is made between different situations of non-
removability. Not every situation of non-removability will require a residence status.  
1.  In some situations the temporary postponement of removal, accompanied by 
necessary safeguards and access to basic conditions of subsistence, could be suffi-
cient, for instance in cases of short illness, pregnancy in the last three months or 
children who are finalizing their school year.  
2.  In situations where removal is not possible due to administrative or technical 
reasons beyond one’s will and where no immediate solution seems to be avail-
able in short time, a temporary residence permit, accompanied by a right to 
work, might constitute a durable solution for foreign nationals in such case.  
3.  Stateless persons should, in our view, benefit from an effective access to a recog-
nition procedure, including a right to remain during the procedure. Once rec-
ognized as stateless, these persons should be granted a residence status. The lack 
of legislation in this regard was criticized in a recent judgment of the Constitu-
tional Court.73 
4.  Finally, there remain situations where a residence status is not granted or not 
available but where the return to the country of origin is not possible due to ar-
ticles 3 and 8 ECHR, the UN Convention on the rights of children or when an-
other fundamental right is at stake. In the Belgian context, the inclusion of the 
notion ‘pressing humanitarian situations’ as an explicit criterion for humanitar-
ian regularization (and as a residual category of protection) in the Aliens Act 
would constitute a necessary basis to envisage a durable solution for foreign na-
tionals in such a situation. Decision-making in issuing a residence permit can 
still take place on a discretionary case by case basis while taking international 
human rights norms into account. 
 
Situations where a foreign national is excluded from a protection status will remain 
problematic. At first sight, such cases seem undeserving of residence status; however 
the Aliens Office will still not be able to forcibly remove them to their country of 
origin due to the non-refoulement principle. If no alternative is found, these per-
sons will remain illegally on the territory, mostly hidden from the eyes of police and 
public order services. Therefore, the principle of proportionality between refusal of 
                                                        
72  Commission of the European Communities, Communication of 10 June 2009 from the 
Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘An area of freedom, security and 
justice serving the citizen’, COM (2009) 262 final, 26.  
73  GwH 17 December 2009, nr. 198/2009. The federal government agreed in March 2008 to in-
stall a recognition procedure for stateless persons where recognition would give right to a 
(temporary) residence permit. However no work has been made of this commitment since.  
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residence and the reasons for exclusion should be carefully examined but it should 
also be considered whether public order and national security could not benefit 
more by issuing a limited and conditional residence permit to these foreign nation-
als, allowing public order services to keep an eye on them.74  
Is it necessary that such a regulation takes place at EU level, as the Commission 
wishes? Practice and legislation with regard to non-removable persons is at first sight 
widely divergent in Member States.75 It seems difficult to find a common ground 
from which to start and there does not appear to be much willingness to discuss 
new legislation on this topic. It could be a bit ambitious to seek agreement on new 
protection statuses when the application of refugee status and subsidiary protection 
statuses, as defined in Directive 2004/83/EC, is still characterized by wide diver-
gences in the Member States. A useful first step might be the further discussion and 
agreement on well defined situations where postponement or even prohibition of 
removal should be applied. For the moment, the most feasible option seems to be to 
work on improving national legislation with regard to non-removable persons. The 
transposition of the Return Directive might be a first incentive to do so.  
 
 
 
 
                                                        
74  See ECJ 9 November 2010, C-57/09 and C-101/09, Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. B and D: 
Member States may grant a right of asylum under their national law to a person who is ex-
cluded from refugee status pursuant to Article 12(2) of the Directive 2004/83/EC, provided 
that this kind of protection does not entail a risk of confusion with refugee status within the 
meaning of the directive. 
75  See European Migration Network, Synthesis Report on the different national practices concerning 
granting of non-EU harmonized protection statuses, December 2010, available at http://www.emn. 
intrasoft-intl.com. 
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The Implementation of the Returns Directive in Germany 
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The negotiations on the Returns Directive at EU level have been very controversial 
in Germany. The proposal for the Directive presented by the Commission in 2005 
was classified by the German Government as too liberal. The German Ministry of 
the Interior, but also German members of the European Parliament, requested nu-
merous changes, which often have been incorporated in the text of the Directive in 
the next rounds of negotiations. According to the German model, in particular the 
possible duration of the detention has been extended to up to 18 months. This very 
long detention period was criticized by human rights organisations as disproportio-
nate and highly problematic. It also met with fierce criticism because no legal aid for 
detainees was foreseen in the Directive. The Directive provides only a discretion 
standard in the valid version.  
From the perspective of PRO ASYL, it is regrettable that the Returns Directive 
in many areas has not introduced better standards to improve the legal situation of 
immigrants who are going to be returned to their countries of origin or third coun-
tries. Instead, Germany was successful in exporting some very restrictive legal provi-
sions of the German Residence Act at the EU level. Nevertheless, the Directive with 
various legal standards goes beyond the German legislation. The law needs to be 
modified.  
A first draft law on the implementation of the Returns Directive was already 
presented in September 2010. However, the legislative process was at a standstill in 
the following months. As a result Germany failed to transpose the Returns Directive 
timely. The period for transposition of the Directive on 24.12.2010 expired without 
Germany fulfilling the obligations to implement the EU law. The Ministry of the 
Interior mid December 2011 issued interim guidelines for the direct application of 
the Directive. In April 2011 the draft law implementing the Directive was intro-
duced in the legislative process. The enactment of the new law is expected in sum-
mer 2011.  
Despite the inadequate European standards the Government intends to under-
mine the minimum standards of the Returns Directive by transposing the Directive 
partly incorrectly and partly not at all, although this is not in line with European 
Union law. While Directives leave Member States some scope how to transpose the 
aims of the Directive into national law, the minimum standards that are included in 
the Directive may not be selectively taken up or simply left outside. The content of 
the Directive and especially the individual rights that can be derived from a Direc-
tive have to be implemented into national law. The German implementing law does 
not meet this obligation.  
In order to transpose the Returns Directive the German Residence Act (Aufent-
haltsgsetz) has to be amended. The most important legal amendments, that are fore-
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seen in the draft law, and that are not meeting the legal obligations of the Returns 
Directive, are shown in the following. 
Entry Bans  
The entry ban (section 11 of the Residence Act), which is issued against expelled 
or deported third-country nationals, has to be regulated anew in accordance with 
the Returns Directive. So far entry bans were unlimited in time and only limited, if 
there was a formal application from the third-country national. Under the new law 
the entry ban has to be limited in time on request – to a maximum of five years.  
The draft of the new law comprises an improvement compared to the previous 
legal situation because the time limit is mandatory and provided with an explicit 
maximum time limit. However, in order to transpose article 11 of the Returns Di-
rective this is not sufficient. Therefore, the ‘length of the entry ban shall be deter-
mined with due regard to all relevant circumstances of the individual case and shall 
not in principle exceed five years’. The requirement of an application is not con-
tained in article 11. So, if the amendment of the German Residence Act maintains 
the requirement of an application in order to limit the entry ban in time – this is 
not in line with the Directive. Under the Directive, the time limit has to be carried 
out automatically. Furthermore the obligation to an individual assessment (‘with 
due regard to all relevant circumstances of the individual case’) is missing in the 
drafted implementation.  
Moreover, the requirements of article 11 paragraph 3 of the Returns Directive 
are not implemented, which the authorities have to clarify in their own motion, if 
the entry ban has to be withdrawn or suspended. This is the case, if the person con-
cerned can prove that he or she has left the territory of a Member State in full com-
pliance with a return decision. Furthermore no entry ban shall be imposed against 
victims of trafficking (as far as there is no exception).  
Where the Directive exceptionally allows a longer time limit than five years for 
the entry ban (article 11 of the Returns Directive), the implementation is incorrect. 
The length of the entry ban may exceed five years under the Directive, if the third 
country national represents a serious threat to public policy, public security or na-
tional security. The draft law provides exceeding the five-year period as an addition-
al possibility, if the third-country national ‘has been expelled on grounds of a crimi-
nal conviction’. Thus, cases are included, where the third country national was ex-
pelled on the basis of several convictions because of smaller trivial offences. In these 
cases, an entry ban for a longer time period than five years is disproportionate and 
not compatible with the Directive.  
The draft law is poorly implementing article 11 of the Returns Directive and is 
thus illegal under European Union law.  
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Monitoring during Deportation 
Article 8, paragraph 6 of the Returns Directive stipulates a monitoring system for 
deportations: ‘Member States shall provide for an effective forced-return monitoring 
system’.  
The German Government – as it is apparent in May 2011 – does not intend to 
implement this requirement at all. The draft law does not provide a monitoring sys-
tem. However, such a monitoring system would be urgently needed to control the 
respect for fundamental and human rights in deportations. Civil society actors cur-
rently still try to convince the Government to introduce such a monitoring system. 
So far, the Government is not willing to introduce such an independent monitoring 
system.  
In the light of the deaths which occurred in the past during deportations from 
Germany, this is hard to understand. In addition, there are successful and estab-
lished model projects in Germany at several airports (Frankfurt, Düsseldorf, Ham-
burg). Agencies have been established, which are composed of non-governmental 
and State actors. Irregularities and incidents are discussed. These forums can make 
suggestions for a better observation of the human rights and dignity of the third 
country nationals. In addition, there are independent non-governmental observers, 
who are present during the deportation (at least up to the boarding of the aircraft).  
Protection of Unaccompanied Minors during Deportation 
Article 10, paragraph 1 of the Returns Directive is not going to be implemented 
concretely. Under this Article, prior to the issuance of the return decision for unac-
companied minors, support is granted by the appropriate authorities. The appropri-
ate authorities cannot be the authorities that are competent for the enforcement of 
return decisions. The welfare of the child has to be duly taken into account. These 
requirements are not implemented in the draft law. 
Family Unity for Persons with Toleration Status 
Article 14, paragraph 1a of the Returns Directive contains some legal minimum 
standards during periods for which removal has been postponed. For Germany this 
is relevant for third-country nationals, who do not have a residence permit but only 
a toleration status (‘Duldung’). This ‘Duldung’ is not a right to stay, but a time-limited 
suspension of deportation – so removal has been postponed. Under Article 14 
Member States shall ensure as far as possible – amongst others – family unity with 
family members present in the territory of the Member state.  
The family unity is not guaranteed for persons with a toleration status under the 
German law and practice. Often the different family members are living in different 
federal States and municipalities and they are not allowed to move from one place 
to another. In many cases the separation of the family is determined, because one 
family member is put under detention, while the other family members are living in 
a shared accommodation. The principle of family unity is also not respected, if one 
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part of a family is deported while the rest of the family stays in Germany. This sepa-
ration of families has to be stopped by providing binding legal standards, under 
which family unity is guaranteed.  
The German draft implementation provides an exception from the so called ‘Re-
sidenzpflicht’ (= being forced to live in a certain State (Land) or even in a specific 
town; even travelling is not allowed.) 
The new exception from the ‘Residenzpflicht’ allows family members to move to 
where the other family member lives. But the authorities have discretion, so in prac-
tice it remains difficult to enforce the right to family unity. 
Detention as a Last Resort to Families with Children 
Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Returns Directive is incompletely implemented. The 
Directive provides that unaccompanied minors and families with minors shall only 
be detained as a measure of last resort and only for the shortest period of time poss-
ible. However, the German draft law regulates in discrepancy to that: unaccompa-
nied minors and families with minors may only be detained in special exceptions 
and only for the shortest period of time possible.  
The implementation of the EU requirements is not precise. The exceptional na-
ture of detention is not as clearly expressed in the German implementing law as in 
the wording of the Directive.  
Conditions of Detention 
The draft law regulates in section 62a of the Residence Act, that the detention has 
to be executed in specialised detention facilities or, if they do not exist, it also may 
be executed in regular prisons.  
The draft law is not in line with article 16, paragraph 1 of the Returns Directive. 
The Directive may derogate from the implementation in special detention facilities 
only, where ‘a Member State cannot provide accommodation in a specialised deten-
tion facility’. For Germany, this means that the implementation in prisons is al-
lowed only if there are no special facilities nationwide.  
The scheme of the draft law missed this European approach, because it gives the 
authorisation to each of the ‘Länder’ (States), responsible for the implementation, to 
provide either special facilities or prisons. This is contrary to the wording of the Di-
rective and thus not in line with European Union law.  
Access of NGOs to Places of Detention 
According to the draft law, staff of relief organisations may get a permission to visit 
third country nationals in detention facilities. An application is required. The au-
thorities decide discretionary. In contrast, article 16, paragraph 4 of the Returns Di-
rective contains an entitlement to visit the detainees. It states: ‘Relevant and compe-
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tent national, international and non-governmental organisations and bodies shall 
have the possibility to visit detention facilities.’ 
 Only in a second step the Directive allows that such visits may be subject to au-
thorities. The purpose of this is that visits can be better planned and organized by 
the authorities. Contrary to the Directive, the draft law provides no entitlement, but 
a discretionary system: it ‘may be permitted’. In addition, the need of an application 
is requested. The discrepancy between entitlement and discretion decision is signifi-
cant, since only entitlements lead to an effective enforcement of the right to visit the 
detention facilities.  
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The Implementation of the Returns Directive in France 
 
 
Marie-Laure Basilien-Gainche and Serge Slama 
Introduction 
France is one of the 20 Member States1 that have received a letter of formal notice 
sent by the Commission, because they have not had notified on 27 January 2011 
measures fully transposing the Directive on common standards and procedures in 
Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals 2008/115/EC 
(hereafter the Returns Directive), and one of the 14 Member States2 that have not 
complied with such an obligation of transposition before the 24th of December 
2010 fixed by the Directive (Article 20) meanwhile this paper is written down. Yet 
the implementation of the European text is at the core of the French political 
agenda during this spring 2011. 
The former French Minister for Immigration, Integration and National Identity, 
Eric Besson, presented on 31 March 2010 to the National Assembly a draft of the 
Immigration, Integration and Nationality Act that is supposed to be composed of 
measures transposing three Directives: not only the Directive 2008/115/EC, which 
is the focus of this report, but also the Council Directive 2009/50/EC of 25 May 
2009 on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the 
purposes of highly qualified employment and Directive 2009/52/EC of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council of 18 June 2009 providing for minimum stan-
dards on sanctions and measures against employers of illegally staying third-country 
nationals. 
In the following steps of the procedure, the draft was supported by Brice Horte-
feux, the Minister of Home Affairs in charge from 2009 to 2011 (who had been the 
French Minister for Immigration, Integration, and Identity from 2007 to 2009), as a 
result of the suppression of the Minister for Immigration, Integration, and Identity 
on 13 November 2010. The bill has been adopted in first reading by the National 
Assembly on 12 October 2010, then by the Senate on 10 February 2011. As the po-
                                                        
1  Belgium, Bulgaria, Germany, Denmark, Greece, France, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Lux-
embourg, Hungary, Malta, Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Finland, Swe-
den. 
2  Since 27 January 2011, the Commission has received some more notifications, so much so 
that there are on 12 April 2011 12 Member States that notified a full transposition (Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Malta, Norway, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, Switzer-
land, Hungary), and 5 that notified a partial transposition (Belgium, Lithuania, Latvia, Swe-
den, Netherlands). Therefore 12 Member States remain that have not yet notified any meas-
ure implementing the Returns Directive: Austria, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Is-
land, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Liechtenstein. For the state of im-
plementation of the Returns Directive, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. 
do?uri=CELEX:72008L0115:EN:NOT. 
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sitions of the two assemblies were differing, a second reading was needed. As this 
second phase of examination of the draft bill started, a new Interior Minister was 
nominated on 27 February 2011. After being for years (from 2007 to 2011) Secre-
tary General of the Presidency of the French Republic, Claude Guéant has become 
member of the French government. Thus the text has been examined by the Na-
tional Assembly on 15 March 2011, then by the Senate on 12 and 13 April 2011.3 
To put an end to this ‘navette’ (literally meaning ‘shuttle’, the French term 
‘navette’ designates the back-and-forth process of a bill between the two assemblies) 
that has to conduct to the adoption of the text in identical terms by the two assem-
blies, the conciliatory procedure introduced by Article 15 § 2 and § 3 of the 1958 
Constitution has been used: a joint committee was established, that was composed 
of seven members and seven alternates from each assembly, and that had to seek an 
agreement proposing where possible a joint text on the provisions still under discus-
sion. On 4 May 2011, this joint committee reached a compromise between the di-
vergent positions of the two assemblies. So a new reading by both assemblies oc-
curred: the National Assembly on 10 May 2011 and the Senate on 11 May 2011 
adopted such a text.  
Nevertheless, the implementation of the Returns Directive will not rapidly be 
achieved in France, so much so that the European Commission could possibly in-
troduce an infringement procedure against this Member State that will certainly be 
more than 6 months late. The delay should increase insofar as, after the law passed, 
some decrees – required for a proper implementation of the Directive – have to be 
adopted and published. That is why the lawyers have been invited to invoke before 
French courts the provisions of the Returns Directive as long as the European norm 
will not be fully integrated into the French legal order.4 
Let us indeed make clear why as an EU norm, the Returns Directive can be in-
voked directly or indirectly against return measures, detention decisions, removal 
orders. The French Council of State, in its 30 October 2009 Emmanuelle Perreux 
case,5 held that the unconditional and precise provisions of a Directive could be di-
rectly invoked. This opens the possibility to invoke the Return Directive provisions 
in the absence of national legal measure ensuring the implementation of the Euro-
pean text in national legal order (invocability of inclusion); it also confirms the pos-
sibility of invoking the objectives of a Directive to repel or trump a general national 
norm that breaches the text (invocability of exclusion). 
And even after the project is finally adopted, the direct effect of the Directive 
provisions could still be invoked, since the recently adopted French legislation is far 
from guaranteeing the objectives, principles and provisions of the Returns Direc-
                                                        
3  In order to have a precise idea of the legislative procedure we are talking about here, it is use-
ful to look at the presentations that are available on the website of the two French Assemblies: 
the one of the National Assembly (http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/dossiers/immigra-
tion_integration_nationalite.asp); the one of the Senate (http://www.senat.fr/dossier-
legislatif/pjl10-027.html). 
4  http://combatsdroitshomme.blog.lemonde.fr/2010/12/26/.  
5  CE, Ass., 30 octobre 2009, n°298348, Mme Perreux, Revue Française de Droit administratif, 
2009, 1125, Conclusion de Mathias Guyomar (avaiblable at http://bruxelles.blogs.libera-
tion.fr/Perreux-Guyomar.pdf). 
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tive. Because the invocation of the direct effect of the Returns Directive has already 
proved to be successful before the French judicial and administrative judges, one 
can now have some doubts on the capacity of the French Interior Minister to fulfil 
the quantitative objectives stated by President Nicolas Sarkozy: 30,000 removals per 
year, number that does not take into account the cases of the Roma from Bulgaria 
and Romania who are – it is useless to remind you – European citizens. 
In order to give a comprehensive and critical approach of the way France has 
considered the transposition of the Returns Directive, we think that it is necessary 
to examine the text the two French assemblies adopted, putting into the light the 
main tensions that have arisen and the key problems that remain. Thus, we propose 
to focus our attention on five topics of the French law that, on our opinion, deserve 
a specific analysis: 
1. the limitation of the scope of the text; 
2. the organization of removal decisions and entry bans; 
3. the importance of the detention measures; 
4. the restriction of the procedural guarantees and legal safeguards; 
5. the incomplete reinforced protection granted to vulnerable people. 
1. The Limitation of the Scope of the Returns Directive 
The French act supposed to achieve the implementation of the Returns Directive 
deals with all the Third Country Nationals (TCN) illegally staying on the French 
territory. Nevertheless, the text takes a narrow view of the scope of the directive. 
First of all, the French act considers that the returns and the removals that are 
decided by a court as a criminal sanction fall outside the scope or the directive. The 
consequences of such a limitation are of some importance. Indeed, more than 
2,000 TCNs are sentenced to prison every year in France for illegal entry and stay, 
which are traditionally criminalized in the country.6 And it must be underlined here 
that the French government did not present any measure, in order to modify the 
bill taking into account the decision the Court of Justice of the European Union 
handled down the 28 April 2011 in the Hussein El Dridi case.7 
In such a decision, the Court considers that the Member States may not put 
outside the scope of the Returns Directive the TCNs sentenced to prison on the 
sole ground that they stay illegally on their territory; moreover, the Court asserts 
that the Member States may not, in order to remedy the failure of coercive measures 
adopted in order to effect a forced removal, provide for a custodial sentence on the 
sole ground that TCNs stay illegally on their territory after an order to leave the na-
tional territory was notified to him and the period granted has expired. And it has 
to be underlined that the ECJ called the Member States to give full effect to the EU 
law, to refuse to apply the national provisions contrary the objectives of the Returns 
                                                        
6  Comité interministériel de contrôle de l’immigration, Les orientations de la politique de 
l’immigration et de l’intégration, 7e rapport, March 2011, http://lesrapports.ladocumenta-
tionfrancaise.fr/BRP/114000189/0000.pdf 
7  ECJ, 28 April 2011, C-61/11 PPU, Hussein El Dridi. 
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Directive, and to take into account the principle of the retroactive application of the 
more lenient penalty. Referring to such a decision, the judge of the detention and 
of the liberties of Nimes was the first French judge to decide on 5 May 2011 to an-
nul a procedure that organize the detention of an illegally staying TCN, and the 
Court of Appeal of Nimes approved such a decision on 6 May 2011.8  
Second, transfers practiced under the Dublin II Regulation procedure are out-
side the scope of the French bill. It has to be noticed that the issue of the applica-
tion of the Returns Directive to Dublin transfers has not even been discussed by 
French MPs, while it is a key issue in many other Member States of the European 
Union (10 000 TCNs every year). 
Thirdly, and this must be underlined, the French law does not cover the TCNs 
who are facing a refusal to enter into French territory and who are maintained in 
‘waiting zone for people in proceedings’ (‘Zone d’Attente pour Personnes en Instance ZAPI’), 
following Article L. 213-1 CESEDA). These so-called ‘waiting zones’ have been cre-
ated in France during the 1990s, for instance in the international airports (like the 
Roissy-Charles de Gaulle Airport9), and in some international rail stations (for in-
stance in Modena after the Fréjus tunnel or in the Paris Est rail station). 
The asylum seekers and undocumented migrants are placed in these waiting 
zones, where neither French national law nor EU law apply as far as they are con-
sidered to be some extra territorial areas. The procedure the migrants have to go 
through is the following: first, they have to obtain the authorization to enter the 
French territory in order to present an asylum application; then the OFPRA (Office 
Français de Protection des Réfugiés et des Apatrides10) examines such a demand, and 
handles down a position that is sent to the Interior Minister, who has the final say. 
Even though such a procedure is not considered as a priority one, 90% of the appli-
cations are studied in less than 96 hours,  thus before a judicial judge is called on to 
decide whether the applicant has to be kept in the waiting zone; most of these deci-
sion conclude to an inadmissibility of the demand to enter the national territory. 
Whereas the French authorities, after their condemnation in the Gebremedhin case11, 
have finally created a procedure allowing challenging the refusal to enter and to ob-
tain a stay of the removal while the claim is pending, the annulments of the refusal 
                                                        
8  TGI Nîmes JLD, 5 May 2011, n°11/00912; CA Nîmes, 6 May 2011, n°11/00186. These two 
decisions can be seen at the following url : http://libertes.blog.lemonde.fr/2011/05/05/sans-
papiers-premiere-application-de-la-decision-de-la-cour-de-justice-de-lunion-europeenne/; 
http://libertes.blog.lemonde.fr/2011/05/07/sans-papiers-decisive-confirmation-en-appel/ 
9  Chowra Makaremi, On technologies of control of foreigners. Border Detention in Europe, Challenge 
Project final conference ‘The Changing Landscape of European Security’, Bruxelles, 18 and 
19 May 2009, available at http://www.libertysecurity.org/IMG/pdf_Deliverable_291_-
_Technologies_of_control_of_foreiners.pdf; Human Rights Watch, Protection insuffisante des 
mineurs étrangers isolés à l’aéroport de Roissy Charles de Gaulle, 29 October 2009, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/fr/reports/2009/10/29/perdus-en-zone-d-attente-0. 
10  http://www.ofpra.gouv.fr/ 
11  ECtHR, 26 April 2007, n°25389/05, Gebremedhin v. France. In such a case, the European 
Court of Human Rights indicated to the concerned State, pursuant to Rule 39 of the Rules of 
Court (interim measures), that it was desirable not to remove an illegally staying third country 
national before the meeting of the appropriate Chamber. 
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are quite rare. So the right of asylum, despite being part of international law and 
French constitutional law, appears quite mistreated. 
That is why we have to put the stress on the fact that the French Government 
has taken advantage of the Returns Directive transposition to support the extension 
of such waiting zones, by proposing the creation of ad hoc waiting zones (Article 6 of 
the French text). These ones specifically could be created for groups of 10 TCNs (no 
matter they are illegally staying or not on the French territory), who would be pre-
sent in a zone of 10 km2. Of course, EU law allows its Member States to conceive 
and apply exceptional mechanisms, in order to face exceptional situations of mas-
sive influx of migrants. However we raise doubts on the fact that the creation of 
what NGOs call ‘rucksack waiting zones’ comply with the Returns Directive provi-
sions. Yet, the Senate has imposed that such ad hoc waiting zones can be established 
only near border crossing-points. Nevertheless, the creation of ad hoc waiting zones is 
not specified as exceptional in the French law studied here. So we can understand 
why some members of the Senate have introduced an amendment to limit the use 
of such ad hoc waiting zones for a maximum period of 26 days. Hopefully, such a 
provision has been adopted. Nevertheless, we can wonder whether such a limitation 
will be sufficient to be considered as a straight material and juridical condition that 
can prevent all the abuses.  
2. The Organization of the Removal Measures and Entry Bans 
Every year in France, 45,000 Arrêtés Préfectoraux de Reconduite à la Frontière (one of 
the most common types of removal orders in French law, hereafter APRF) are is-
sued against illegally staying TCNs. These ones are immediately placed in detention, 
so much so that more than 40 000 detention measures are adopted each year. Some 
13 000 APRF are carried out each year, and among 12,000 are challenged before 
the administrative judge. Yet Article L.511-1 II CESEDA (Code de l’Entrée et du 
Séjour des Etrangers et du Droit d’Asile) does not grant the period of voluntary depar-
ture Article 7 of the Returns Directive imposes. The French government seem to 
consider the period for voluntary departure as a mechanism that could undermine 
the efficacy of the returns procedures and the removal orders. Let us recall that Ar-
ticle 15 of the 1998 Act n°98-34912 introduced the possibility for the authorities to 
notify a return decision by post mail; but the seven days period make such decisions 
quite difficult even impossible to implement. In practice, less than 1% of the TCNs 
who were subject of such return procedures were removed. Currently, only one 
French procedure grants to the concerned illegally staying TCNs a period for volun-
tary departure (a one month period): the Obligations de Quitter le Territoire Français 
(hereafter OQTF) that were created in 2006 to go with refusals of resident per-
mits.13 
                                                        
12  Loi n°98-349 du 11 mai 1998 relative à l’entrée et au séjour des étrangers en France et au 
droit d’asile. 
13  Loi n°2006-911 du 24 juillet 2006 relative à l’immigration et à l’intégration whose Article 50 
modified Article L.511-1 CESEDA. 
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Article 7 § 1 of the Returns Directive states that a return decision must allow for 
a possible voluntary departure within a period of between 7 and 30 days. And Arti-
cle 8 § 2 requires Member States to remove a person once the period for voluntary 
departure has expired. As France has not yet completed the transposition of the Re-
turns Directive and has not modified its national legislation, French judges, either 
judicial or administrative, annulled APRF for not granting to the concerned TCNs 
a period for voluntary departure. They have grounded their decisions on the direct 
effect of Article 7 § 1 of the Returns Directive,14 some considering its inclusion in-
vocability (possibility to invoke precise and unconditional provisions of a Directive 
against a decision),15 others its exclusion invocability (possibility to invoke the obli-
gation of the national authorities to not apply national rules that are not in con-
formity with the Directive provisions, in this case Article L. 511-1 II CESEDA).16 
To put an end to the confusion that has appeared after the 24th December 2010, 
the Council of State answered the question the Montreuil administrative Court 
asked him (under French law, a preliminary ruling procedure allows lower adminis-
trative courts to ask the Council of State for advice on difficult legal issues). In its 
position handled down on 21 March 2011,17 the French supreme administrative 
court has concluded to the inclusion invocability of Articles 7 and 8 of the Returns 
Directive, referring to the decision of the ECJ in the Ursula Becker case.18 If such a 
position the Council of State can seem rather constructive for the relations between 
French law and EU law, some elements of the Council’s reasoning are quite aston-
ishing. Indeed, the judgment recognizes the ability of national authorities to adopt 
and implement return procedures and removal orders as far as they recognize a pe-
riod for voluntary departure to the concerned TCN. By such a reasoning, the 
French supreme administrative court let us think that there is an up down vertical 
effect of the Directive, which can be considered in contradiction with the position 
of the ECJ.19 
Yet, Article 23 of the here studied French bill (which modifies Article L.511-1 
CESEDA) grants a 30 days period for voluntary departure, which can once be re-
curred. But following the text, it is possible to suppress the benefit of this 30 days 
period in various circumstances. The Returns Directive itself admits some excep-
tions: Member States can refrain from permitting voluntary departure or can grant a 
period shorter than seven days, if there is a risk of absconding, if an application for 
legal stay has been dismissed as manifestly unfounded or fraudulent, or if there is a 
risk to public policy, public security or public health. 
                                                        
14  CE, Ass., 30 October 2009, n°298348, Mme Perreux. 
15  TA Paris, 10 January 2011, n°1100170/8; TA Lille, 12 January 2011, n°1100125; TA Rouen, 
20 January 2011, Mme Tie Z. X., n°1100087; TA Lille 19 January 2011, n°110269; TA Lyon, 
JRF, 26 January 2011, n°1100341; TA Nimes, 17 January 2011, n°1100128; TA Melun 3 Feb-
ruary 2011, n°11000615/9. 
16  TA Toulouse, JRF, 2 February 2011, n°1100417; TA Marseille, 24 February 2011, 
n°1101063. 
17  CE, avis, 21 March 2011, n°345978 & 346612, MM. Jia et Thirio. 
18  ECJ, 19 January 1982, 8/81, Ursula Becker. 
19  ECJ, 5 April 1979, 148/78, Ratti; ECJ, 26 February 1986, 152/84, Marshall. 
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It must be underlined nevertheless that the French text considers that six differ-
ent situations are constitutive of such a risk of absconding: the TCN did not make 
the application that is needed in order to obtain a resident permit on the national 
territory; the TCN did stay on the French territory beyond the period of validity of 
his/ her visa or beyond the three months period since his/her entering France, 
without asking for a legal stay permit; the TCN failed to abide by a removal order; 
the TCN falsified his identity, travel, or residence, documents; the TCN does not 
present sufficient guarantees of representation, in particular because he/she is not 
in possession of identity documents. In other words, the definition of the risk of ab-
sconding exception is very extensive. This could have some negative consequences: 
the period for voluntary departure might become exceptional, and the right to asy-
lum might turn out to be even more difficult to benefit from. 
The entry ban as stated in the Returns Directive generated debate in the French 
assemblies, as the deputies and the senators were opposed to the automaticity of the 
mechanism. Indeed, Article 11 provides that an entry ban must be issued where a re-
turn decision has been issued without a period for voluntary departure being 
granted or where an obligation for return has not been complied with. In all the 
other situations, the entry ban may be issued. 
Though, the French legislator has decided to consider the entry ban only as a 
possibility, no as an obligation. The National Assembly during the second reading 
accepted to come back to the text as it was drawn up by the government, following 
so the Senate position. Article 23 of the text therefore states that the national au-
thorities may issue an entry ban of two or three years according to the considered 
situation, which must be motivated regarding the individual situation of the consid-
ered person and which will be annulled if the migrant asks it for when it has been 
linked to an OQTF with a period for voluntary departure. 
3.  The Importance of the Detention Measures 
Since the beginning of the 1980’s, detention measures have been a central element 
of the French immigration system: more than 30,000 placements in detention cen-
tres are decided each year. That is why the compliance of this system with the EU 
logic is debatable, insofar as the Returns Directive clearly states that the detention is 
a means that can be used only after other measures failed. According to Article 15 
of the returns Directive, persons subject of return procedures ‘may only’ be kept in 
detention, ‘in order to prepare the return and/or carry out the removal process, in particular 
when: (a) there is a risk of absconding; or (b) the third-country national concerned avoids or 
hampers the preparation of return or the removal process’. In other words, the Returns 
Directive considers the detention as the exception, and the other available means as 
the standard. 
Of course, other mechanisms than detention exist in French law (mostly house 
arrest) but these mechanisms are exceptionally used and considered secondary. In 
practice, less than 7% of the TCNs, who are subject of return procedures or/and 
removal orders, are not put and kept in detention centres. It appears from the 
French project and the parliamentary debates that the current logic is confirmed, 
despite the opposite approach of the Returns Directive. Detention does and will 
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remain the standard measure to be applied in almost all the cases in France, as the 
long list of Article L-551-1 CESEDA puts it up. 
Moreover, the French law (Articles 30 and 41 of the text) modifies the length of 
detention measures. The duration of detention can reach a maximum of 45 days 
(currently 32 days). The added-value of this provision is arguable, considering the 
fact that 84.5% of removal orders are implemented in the first 17 days (with a peak 
in the second day of detention). Therefore, both the necessity and legitimacy of the 
lengthening of the detention period can be discussed, meanwhile Article 15 of the 
Returns Directive clearly states that ‘Any detention shall be for as short a period as possi-
ble and only maintained as long as removal arrangements are in progress and executed with 
due diligence’. 
In its decision Kadzoev handled down in November 200920 the Grand Chamber 
of the Court of Luxembourg has interpreted for the first time the Returns Directive, 
and has insisted on the fact that the detention is only justified by the preparation 
and the execution of the return procedure. Thus, to the absolute limit of 18 months 
which is the maximum duration of the detention according to Article 15 paragraphs 
5 and 6 of the Returns Directive, the ECJ adds a relative one. The retention must 
cease ‘when it appears that there is not any more reasonable prospect for distance for consid-
erations of a legal or different nature’ (Article 15 § 4 of the Returns Directive). Conse-
quently, when there is no ‘reasonable prospect of removal’ or when the conditions for 
detention no longer exist, the person concerned must be released immediately. 
Yet, the French draft does not seem to respect such a logic. Besides, on 19 Janu-
ary 2011, the Laws Standing Committee of the Senate adopted an amendment that 
modifies Article L. 552-7 CESEDA. Henceforth, it is allowed maintaining in deten-
tion during 18 months the TCNs who are convicted for behaviours related to ter-
rorist activities – even if they entirely served their sentence in prison. For some 
NGOs, this provision can be seen as an intrumentalisation of the Returns Directive. 
Fearing the emergence of a sort of ‘French Guantanamo’, most of them consider 
the provision thus inacceptable because it creates a double punishment. 
Additionally, the question arises of the illegally staying TCNs who have been de-
tained but who cannot be removed. They are maintained in a limbo situation, and 
it is plausible that the Returns Directive as implemented in France will increase the 
number of persons in this case. Let us indeed recall that 80,000 returns decisions 
are adopted each year, among which only 15,000 are implemented. The system is 
thus creating more than 65,000 un-removable TCNs who frequently become irregu-
lar. These TCNs are particularly targeted by Article 33 of the French law, which 
generalizes the house arrest mechanism for the TCNs the removal is postponed. Yet 
the conformity of such a provision with Article 9 § 3 of the Returns Directive can 
be asked. 
                                                        
20  ECJ, 30 November 2009, C-357/09, Said Shamilovich Kadzoev. 
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4. The Restriction of the Legal Safeguards and Procedural Guarantees 
As far as the ambition of the French government currently in charge has been to in-
crease the efficiency of its management of the migratory flows, some elements must 
be noticed that are detailed in the project. For instance, in 2009, some 96,109 ille-
gally staying TCNs were called in, but only 20% of the removal orders and return 
decisions were implemented (12.23% of the 40,191 OQTF, and 28.47% of the 
40,116 APRF). Yet, some 26% of such cases result from the intervention of the ju-
dicial judge, who refuses the concerned TCN will be maintained in detention be-
cause of the procedures irregularities. Thus the judicial judge makes the removal 
orders and the return decisions more difficult to implement. In such a perspective, 
we can look at the French draft with a critical eye. 
The way the French legislator has intended to transpose the Returns Directive 
provisions regarding the TCNs’ right to information deserve particular attention. 
Surprisingly, the French government claims that the Returns Directive provisions fit 
the reform recently carried out, whereby the French Government has created a pub-
lic market for the juridical assistance granted to the TCNs placed in detention cen-
tres. Yet, some French civil judges seem to have a different opinion. Since the be-
ginning of 2011, the direct effect of Article 16 § 5 of the Returns Directive has been 
sometimes successfully invoked before the French judicial judges.21 When these 
ones have decided to apply Article 16 directly, they mostly make a reference to the 
lack of information and assistance about procedural rules offered to TCNs in deten-
tion centres. Actually, such decisions can be understood: in each detention centre, 
only one NGO is allowed to intervene in order to inform and assist the concerned 
TCNs, insofar as founded doubt exists on the quality of the information and the as-
sistance such TCNs can benefit from. 
Nonetheless, that appears rather insufficient to calm down the anxiety that can 
arise reading the French law. Indeed, some of its provisions state that the notifica-
tion to the concerned TCNs of their rights will be postponed in case of special cir-
cumstances linked to massive influx of migrants (Article 7 about the ad hoc waiting 
zones and Article 38 about the TCNs in detention centres), so much so that we can 
wonder whether the effective remedy really exists since the period to introduce an 
action before the judge starts with the notification of the removal orders or the re-
turn decisions (Article 34). 
Furthermore, the French draft extends the period before the concerned TCN 
placed in detention is presented to a judicial authority (Article 30). The Govern-
ment and the National Assembly have agreed to modify the 48 hours period to 
reach a five days period, although the Senate had maintained a two days period dur-
ing the first reading and had finally accepted a four days period during the second 
reading. Such a modification of Article L. 552-7 CESEDA generates an evident 
limitation of the rights of the concerned TCNs. Is this provision in conformity with 
Article 15 § 2 (a) of the Returns Directive, which states that ‘When detention has been 
ordered by administrative authorities, Member States shall [..] either provide for a speedy judi-
                                                        
21  http://combatsdroitshomme.blog.lemonde.fr/les-suites-du-noel-des-sans-papiers-invocabilite-
de-la-directive-retour-du-16-decembre-2008-depuis-le-24-decembre-2010/. 
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cial review of the lawfulness of detention to be decided on as speedily as possible from the be-
ginning of detention’? Is this Article 30 of the French bill in conformity with Article 5 
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights in its Medvedyev 
II decision?22 The answer appears to be obviously negative. 
Additionally, the French draft seems incompatible with Article 6 § 1 of the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, if we refer to the four decisions the French supreme judicial court handled 
down on 15 April 2011: after the European Court of Human Rights decision on 23 
November 2010,23 the Plenary Assembly of the Cour de Cassation (the French judi-
cial supreme court) has indeed stated that this provision imposes the presence of an 
attorney from the very beginning of the detention custody.24 Moreover, the confor-
mity of this provision with the French Constitutional Council jurisprudence is 
doubtful, as far as is has already been held that a period of 48 hours is in conformity 
with the constitution, but a period of seven days is not.25 What would the Constitu-
tional Council think of a period of four days? 
As far as the judicial judge will have only 24 hours to handle down his decision 
(Article 37 of the French draft) and will have a quite restricted margin of apprecia-
tion that is limited to the substantial irregularities the police made in taking the 
TCNs for questioning or in placing them in detention centres (Article 39 of the 
French draft), a marginalization of the judicial authorities appears that must be de-
nounced. Indeed, we can easily think that the removal orders will be often imple-
mented before the judicial judge intervention, if the administrative judge has recog-
nized the legality of such return decisions. 
Yet an administrative control of the detention is established by the French text: 
a specific action can be introduced in the 48 hours period that begins with the noti-
fication of the removal order to the concerned TCN, before the administrative 
judge that will have 72 hours to handle down his sentence. Nevertheless, such ad-
ministrative actions are problematic, as far as we can have some doubts on the fact 
that they constitute the effective remedies the Returns Directive imposes (Articles 9 
§ 1 and 13 § 1).  
Let us recall the statement Jean-Paul Costa held on 11 February 2011.26 The 
President of the European Court of Human Rights was dealing with the request for 
interim measures (Rule 39 of the Rules of Court). He then strongly invited the 
Member States to ‘provide national remedies with suspensive effect which operate effectively 
and fairly, in accordance with the Court’s case-law and provide a proper and timely examina-
tion of the issue of risk’. However, the French system does not admit that a suspensive 
                                                        
22  ECtHR, Grand Chamber, 29 March 2010, n°3394/03, Medvedyev et al v. France. 
23  ECtHR , 5e sect., 23 November 2010, n°37104/06, Moulin v. France. 
24  Cass, AP, 15 April 2011, P 10- 17.049, F 10-30.313, J 10-30.316 & D 10-30.242. 
25  Decision n°79-109 DC du 9 January 1980. 
26  http://www.humanrightseurope.org/2011/02/rule-39-echr-immigration-appeals-rise-by-4000-
per-cent/. We can make also a reference to different decisions of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights: ECtHR, 25 March 1999, n°31197/96, Latridis v. Greece; ECtHR, 5 February, 
n°51564/99, Conka v. Belgium; ECtHR, 26 April 2007, n°25389/05, Gebremedhin v. France. 
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effect is recognized to the remedies before the administrative judge against a deten-
tion decision and a readmission according to Dublin II regulation, as well as to the 
appeals (Article 34 of the French law). 
Other provisions would also need to be underscored and analysed: Article 24 
makes it possible to organize judicial hearings inside the detention centres; Article 
75 ter admits the use of videoconferences for  hearing the appeals before the Na-
tional Commission on the Right to Asylum (Commission Nationale du Droit d’Asile); 
Article 74 bis limits the legal aid that might be available in all the cases to guarantee 
‘the necessary legal assistance and or representation… free on charge’ (Article 13 § 4 of the 
Returns Directive). So we can wonder whether all these provisions of the French 
draft are in conformity with Article 47 of the Charter of the Fundamental Rights of 
the EU.27 
Some other provisions of the Returns Directive (for instance Article 12) are not 
transposed in the French draft, and will surely be implemented in the decrees to be 
adopted in the months (or years) to come. 
5. The Incomplete Reinforced Protection granted to Vulnerable People 
The situation of the minors, whether unaccompanied or with their family, has to be 
examined. The Returns Directive, in Article 17, sets out detailed rules to limit the 
detention of minors and families: ‘Unaccompanied minors and families with minors shall 
only be detained as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time’ 
(§1); ‘the minors in detention shall have the possibility to engage in leisure activities’ and 
‘access to education’ (§3); ‘unaccompanied minors shall as far as possible be provided 
with accommodation in institutions provided with personnel and facilities which 
take into account the needs of persons of their age’ (§4). Because ‘the best interests of 
the child shall be a primary consideration in the context of the detention of minors pending 
removal’ (§5). Yet ‘the best interest of the child’ does not seem to be really considered in 
the French draft, as far as there is no specific provision that would with their specif-
ic situations and needs. 
The victims of trafficking in human beings are among the vulnerable people Ar-
ticle 11 § 3 of the Returns Directive deals with. Referring to Council Directive 
2004/81/EC of 29 April 2004 on the residence permit issued to third-country na-
tionals who are victims of trafficking in human beings or who have been the subject 
of an action to facilitate illegal immigration, who cooperate with the competent au-
thorities, this provision states that such victims ‘shall not be subject of an entry ban’, 
unless an obligation to return has not been complied with, or unless an exception 
                                                        
27  Article 47 - Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial: ‘Everyone whose rights and free-
doms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy be-
fore a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article. Everyone is en-
titled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, de-
fended and represented. Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient re-
sources in so far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice’. 
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on grounds of public policy, public security or national security can be invoked. 
Such provision is not transposed by the French law. That is why the protection of 
the victims of trafficking in human beings might deserve further consideration. 
Even if the directive does not address the situation of persons with a serious 
health condition, we have to draw the attention on Article 17 ter of the French law, 
which has been introduced by the Acts Committee of the National Assembly during 
the first reading, tends to reduce the possibility to grant a resident permit to a mi-
grant with important pathologies. The idea was to overpass a jurisprudence of the 
administrative judge that has been considered too generous.28 But the Senate, dur-
ing the first reading and also during the second one, has expressed its opposition to 
such a restriction. Nevertheless, the Joint Committee adopted a text, asserting that 
the resident permit would be granted to the sick TCN with a heavy pathology, only 
if the treatment does not exist in his/her country of origin. This is an important re-
striction of the rights of the sick people to be medically treated, restriction that has 
been unsuccessfully criticized by many international and non-governmental organi-
sations. 
Conclusion 
In many aspects, the Returns Directive has been considered deceptive, as it lays 
down minimalist standards for the protection of TCNs in the European Union. 
This being said, we can expect the so-called ‘Directive of the shame’ to become a ‘Di-
rective of the hope’. Because the direct effect of this European norm appears to pro-
vide new tools to defend the illegally staying migrants rights before French courts 
until it will be transposed, and even after such transposition as far as some provi-
sions of the French text do not seem in conformity with it. Remember that, as we 
can observe for many EC social policy Directives, the Council states that ‘the imple-
mentation of this Directive should not be used in itself as a reason to justify the adoption of 
provisions less favorable to persons to whom it applies’.29 As such provisions have some 
binding effect,30 the conformity of the French law with the EU norm must be ques-
tioned. Although such a statement proves to be weak as the Italian government ex-
tended the detention of illegally staying TCNs to the 18-month maximum period 
set out in the Returns Directive, the interpretation the ECJ has given of the Direc-
tive proves to be rather constructive. 
                                                        
28  CE, Sect., 7 April 2010, n°301640, Ministre de l’Intérieur c. M. Jabnoun & n°316625, Ministre de 
l’Immigration c/ Mme Diallo épouse Bialy. La Semaine juridique, ‘Administration et collectivité’, 
2010, n°29, 2238, commentaires de Serge Slama et Benjamin Demagny, Conclusions Mathias 
Guyomar (available at http://combatsdroitshomme.blog.lemonde.fr/2010/04/20). 
29  Council of the EU, Council document of 16 May 2008, Note from the Presidency, 8812/08, 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/servlet/driver?lang=EN&ssf=DATE_DOCUMENT+DES
C&fc=REGAISEN&srm=25&md=400&typ=Simple&cmsid=638&ff_COTE_DOCUMENT
=8812%2F08&ff_TITRE=&ff_FT_TEXT=&ff_SOUS_COTE_MATIERE=&dd_DATE_RE
UNION=&rc=1&nr=1&page=Detail 
30  ECJ, 22 November 2005, C-144/04, Mangold v. Helm. 
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Nonetheless, the French law, which tends to maintain the overall logic of the 
French current system and the quantitative objectives that have been established, 
shelters some provisions that clearly breach EU law. In particular, the return and 
removal of the Roma from Bulgaria and Rumania are organized by the text. New of-
fences are created, as the abuse of the right to stay and the abuse in the occupation 
of a private or public piece of land (Article 25 of the French draft). These provisions 
are an obvious violation of the non-discrimination principle the treaties assert (Arti-
cle 18 TFUE). 
The context of the examination of the French law that is supposed to transpose 
the Returns Directive has been rather peculiar. The French Interior Minister cur-
rently in charge, Claude Guéant, multiplied declarations that stated his ambition to 
limit illegal and legal immigration; meanwhile the flow of African refugees fleeing 
Libya and landing in Italy was intensifying. As the idea the European Commission 
had considered of granting temporary protection to the Tunisian migrants failed to 
obtain a majority in the Council,31 Italy announced it would deliver temporary resi-
dence permit for humanitarian protection to more than 20 000 Tunisian migrants. 
So Claude Guéant affirmed on 7 April 2011 that France would block the Tunisian 
migrants coming from Italy with such temporary permits, asserting that these ones 
did not allow the concerned TCNs to move freely around the Schengen zone. 
These events shed light on the fact that the system of burden-sharing between 
Member States for the reception of asylum seekers and migrants keeps is limited 
and deficient. Such nationalist tendencies the Member States develop to give the 
priority to their own security concerns have also some negative consequences for the 
migrants. Although the French government since the election of President Nicolas 
Sarkozy has been focused on the struggle against illegal immigration, the French In-
terior Minister said on the same 7 April 2011 he intended to reduce legal immigra-
tion, by limiting the number of work visas granted each year (20 000 per year), the 
number of visas which permit immigrant families to reunite (15 000 per year), and 
the numbers of persons obtaining the international protection and being thus rec-
ognized as refugee (10 000 per year).32 Thus, we will have to pay further attention to 
the text adopted by the legislative authorities and to the way it is enforced by admin-
istrative authorities, keeping in mind that – as astonishing as it can be – the Returns 
Directive and the EU law seem to offer a protection of last resort for the migrants’ 
rights. 
 
 
                                                        
31  The idea of the EU Commission was to activate the provisions of the Council Directive 
2001/55/EC of 20 July 2001 on minimum standards for giving temporary protection in the 
event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts 
between Member States in Receiving such Persons and Bearing the Consequences Thereof. 
32  According to the statistics published by the French Interior Minister, in 2009, 175,416 per-
manent resident status were delivered, 75,712 for family reunification reasons, 50,656 for 
students, 24,391 for workers, and 10,921 for asylum.  
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The article introduces the main changes which were brought to the Czech legisla-
tion in connection with transposition of the Returns Directive.1 It is still too early 
to evaluate the real impact of the Returns Directive (hereinafter ‘Directive’) on the 
position of foreigners or on the practice of the state authorities in state practice,2 so 
it is mostly the changes of the legislation which are described here.   
The Czech Republic transposed the Returns Directive literally few days after the 
transposition date,3 which is stipulated in Art. 20 of the Directive. The provisions of 
the Directive were integrated into provisions of the Act on Residence of Foreigners 
(hereinafter „FORA’),4 the main migration norm of the Czech Republic, which 
regulates entry, residence and departure of foreigners.  
The draft law which transposed the Directive was publicly debated mainly within 
the civil society, which reflected mainly the proposed prolongation of detention of 
foreigners – third country nationals. But the law also brought interesting develop-
ments into the Czech migration law, e.g. alternatives to detention, or limits for 
court decisions in certain matters connected to this issue. This article focuses on 
some of the most interesting new developments in the Czech laws which were 
brought by the Directive. It may not go deep enough to analyse the compliance of 
the Czech law with the Directive, but rather seeks to give an overview of the sub-
stance of the Directive in the Czech context. 
Who may be Returned?  
There are persons who may either voluntary return or be involuntary returned. 
Some of them are third country nationals who stay on the territory of the Czech 
Republic (hereinafter ‘CR’) illegally within the meaning of the Art. 3 (2) of the Di-
rective. Those are especially foreigners who either came to the CR without a (neces-
sary) visa or a residence permit or stays in the CR without a (necessary) visa or a 
                                                        
1  Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council.  
2  The article reflects the law as it is on March 31, 2011.  
3  Act No. 427/2010 Coll., which changes the Foreigner´s Residence Act, issued in the Collec-
tion of Laws on December 30, 2010, in force since January 1, 2011. 
4  Act No. 326/1999 Coll., Act on Residence of Foreigners, available at http://portal.gov.cz/ 
wps/portal/_s.155/701?number1=326%2F1999&number2=&name=&text= (Czech only, ac-
cessed on 11. 04. 2011). 
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residence permit, e.g. resides without a legal basis for his/her stay, inter alia his/her 
visa or residence permit expired or was not prolonged.5  
When entering or residing illegally, foreigners may be issued either an order to 
leave (a type of a visa which obliges a person to leave in precisely limited time term) 
or return decision by the alien´s police (hereinafter ‘police’). The law is not precise 
whether there is hierarchy in those decisions; it rather seems that a person must be 
issued a return decision in any case, when a situation which is presumed by the Di-
rective happens.6 The return decision is always accompanied with the ban on entry. 
In practice it may happen that a person would be just taken into custody for maxi-
mum of 24/48 hours for identification7 and then issued of an order to leave, but it 
is not clear whether it is a right procedure, the law is contradictory here. Neverthe-
less the law allows for it.8  
The police issues a return decision in situations that are precisely formulated in 
the FORA.9 If the police fears that a person will not leave the territory, and then, to 
secure his/her return, a person may be placed into a detention centre. When we 
look to the statistics, we find that for example in the year 2009 approximately one 
third of those, who were found as staying illegally in the CR, were placed into a de-
tention centre.10 There are two detention centres in the Czech Republic, Bělá pod 
Bezdězem and Poštorná.11  
Less Coercive Measures than Detention 
The amendment which transposed the Directive into the migration law brought 
some new concepts. An interesting provision of FORA brought ‘specific measures 
for return’ to the Czech legislation, in other words alternatives to stay in detention 
centres were introduced. They correspond to the purpose of Art. 15 (1) of the Di-
rective. There are two of those less coercive measures: the first one is a reporting to po-
lice, the second one is a financial guarantee.12 When a reporting to police is applied, a 
                                                        
5  The Czech Republic decided not to apply the provisions on persons who are subject to return 
as criminal law sanction (Art. 2(2) of the Directive). 
6  See Sec. 119 FORA. 
7  The law applies to Czech citizens similarly; see Sec.  27 of the Act on Police of the Czech Re-
public, Act. No. 273/2008 Coll., on Police of the Czech Republic, available at (Czech only, 
accessed on 03. 04. 2011). http://portal.gov.cz/wps/portal/_s.155/701?number1=&num-
ber2=&name=z%C3%A1kon+o+policii&text. 
8  See Sec. 50 FORA. 
9  See Sec. 119 FORA. The Czech legislation uses different terms than the Directive, this deci-
sion is called decision on expulsion.   
10  There are no statistics yet for the year 2010. More information can be found in the Report on 
Migration for 2009, issued by Ministry of Interior of the Czech Republic, available at 
www.mvcr.cz/.../zpravy-o-situaci-v-oblasti-migrace-a-integrace-cizincu-na-uzemi-ceske-republiky-v-
roce-2009-pdf.aspx (Czech only, accessed on 18. 03. 2011), on p. 3, 4 and 106-108. 
11  For more information see the webpage of the Refugee Facilities Administration, 
http://www.suz.cz/downloads/documents/Information_in_English.pdf (basic information in 
English, accessed on 18. 03. 2011). 
12 See Art. 123b and 123c of FORA. 
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foreigner must register a place of residence, remain at this address, report any 
change to police immediately, and present him/herself regularly at the police (the 
police itself schedules the notifications). A financial guarantee is provided either by 
the foreigner him/herself or by a Czech citizen or a person with a long term or 
permanent residence type of stay. The amount should be high enough to cover the 
costs of person’s removal. The bail is refunded upon the arrival of the foreigner to 
his/her destination, or when his/her stay in the CR is legalized.  
These measures are used in cases, when police reasonably assumes that a for-
eigner would not leave the CR during the time term given to him/her voluntary. 
When deciding on those measures, the police must take into account e.g. the risk of 
escape of the foreigner or his/her private and family life. The decision on less coer-
cive measures should be taken together with the decision on return (the decision on 
less coercive measures is usually a part of the decision on return); according to the 
information of the Office of Public Defender of Rights and several NGOs, the 
courts, to which a foreigner may appeal against the decision on return, cancelled 
decisions where the police did not consider the less coercive measures.13 According 
to the Office of Public Defender of Rights the police has not been using the alterna-
tive measures very much in practice yet.14  
Detention15 
A detention should be used only as a matter of last resort; the law explicitly stipu-
lates that it may be used only if the less coercive measures would not suffice their 
purpose. A decision on detention is issued as individual one and may be appealed 
against.  
The police may detain a foreigner older than 15 years of age, so even children be-
tween 15 and 18 may appear in detention.16 To secure that a detention is only an 
exceptional measure (1. debatable possibility of issue of order to leave, 2. applica-
tion of less coercive measure, 3. detention) the law stipulates two conditions for the 
possibility of placing a person into detention:  
-  (at least) the start of return procedure or a decision on return in the individual case, 
so it is clearly not enough if a person is an irregular immigrant per se and there is 
no return procedure going on at the same time,  
- and proportionality of this measure, which means that a person may be detained 
only if there is e.g. a risk that a foreigner might endanger state security, signifi-
                                                        
13  See Sec. 123b (5) FORA; the NGO source is ASIM (Association for Legal Aspects of Immigra-
tion, www.asimos.cz); source: a phone interview with its lawyer. 
14  Source: interview with a representative of the Public Defender of Rights on 13. 04. 2011. 
15  See Sec. 124 and following FORA. 
16  Children younger than 15 may be placed into detention as ‘housed foreigners’. They are in 
fact not issued a decision on detention, but their parents were given such a decision and the 
children stay with them because there is no other person who can care for them, see Sec. 140 
and 141 FORA. The position of minors and unaccompanied minors is not analysed in details 
in this article. 
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cantly disturb public policy, or obstruct or hinder enforcement of a return deci-
sion.    
 
The maximum length of detention was newly prolonged which makes it one of the 
worth impacts of the Directive on the Czech laws. A person may have spent 180 
days in detention the most previously (90 days in case of a minor under 18), which 
was changed to 545 days now (the regulation for minors is still in place, the same 
time terms applies to families with children).17 The law regulates the possibility of 
prolongation over 180 days strictly: it may be done so only if a person obstructs en-
forcement of a return decision or he/she present false data about his/her identity 
and it is clear that the execution of return decision is possible during the detention 
at the same time. There are two main consequences of the fear: a first one is a posi-
tion of people ‘in limbo’, a second one is the effectiveness of procedural guarantees. 
Besides this, there are also problems with the interpretation of the concept of public 
policy in practice. In the following I will look at them more closely.  
A Position of People ‘In Limbo’ 
There are some foreigners who are nonreturnable, e.g. because the state of which 
they claim to be nationals does not want to identify them as its nationals and there-
fore does not want to issue a passport to them – and therefore the Czech Republic 
has no place where to return such foreigners. Such persons may literally spend their 
whole life in detention, if there is no other possibility for them. The Czech law con-
tains provisions which are aimed at such cases already for many years; there is a pos-
sibility to issue an exceptional leave to remain visa when there are obstacles to removal 
which are not dependent on the will of a foreigner.18 It is not only the situation of 
people in limbo at which this provision aims, but it may also be the lack of neces-
sary documentation or the lack of transport connection to foreigners’ country which 
is not dependent on his/her will.19  
The exceptional leave to remain visa may be granted for the necessary period of 
time with a term of up to one year. If the situation remains the same a foreigner is 
issued an exceptional leave to remain residence permit for the period of up to two 
years with a possibility of prolongation.20 If a foreigner is granted this type of visa, 
he/she is per definitionem no longer an illegal migrant. The treatment of persons in 
                                                        
17  The average length of the detention was 62.8 days in 2009; see the Report on Migration for 
2009, op. cit. But we should be aware that the change to maximum length of stay to 545 days 
was implemented in the beginning of 2011, so there is no competent estimation of future 
changes possible. 
18  See Sec. 33 of FORA. 
19  This interpretation of the FORA is supported by an explanatory report which was prepared 
for one of the changes of this provision. See Explanatory report of the draft law No. 204, 
available at http://www.psp.cz/sqw/historie.sqw?o=3&T=204 (Czech only, accessed 18. 3. 
2011), which explicitly refers to the lack of transfer possibility as a possible reason for issue of 
this visa. 
20  See Sec. 43 and 44 of FORA. 
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limbo is more favourable comparing to the standards set forth in Article 14 of the 
Directive. They have access to labour market and they receive a work permit in a 
simplified procedure;21 children may attend schools.22 
There are at the same time serious problems in practice with the application of 
these nicely looking provisions. Firstly, there are still cases of people in limbo in de-
tention centres, several NGO mention detention of foreigners in cases where there 
is no real perspective of removal.23 Secondly, the ability of those foreigners to take 
care of themselves, of their life, is not always high and a social aid is needed but may 
not always help because it may not be always welcomed by those to whom is offered.  
Then there are people whose return is temporarily not possible, e.g. because of the 
situation in their home countries from the human rights point of view. Such for-
eigners may apply for international protection (i.e. asylum within the limits of the 
Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees or subsidiary protection or 
also for constitutional asylum), there is a time term stipulated for the possibility to 
apply for the protection while a person is detained, which is seven days from the 
moment when a foreigner was informed about such a possibility.24 A return deci-
sion may not be enforced during the international protection procedure (but it is 
possible when a person is sentenced of a criminal offence of expulsion and in such a 
case it is the criminal court which decides on the possible danger for a foreigner in 
the country to which he/she shall be returned even if a foreigner had asked for in-
ternational protection during the criminal proceedings).  
There is also an obligation of the police to request the Ministry of Interior for 
opinion whether the foreigner’s departure is possible from the view of human rights 
obligations of the Czech Republic.25 This opinion is asked during the return deci-
sion making process and it is binding for the respective police decision. This is also 
the moment when persons in limbo might be identified. The binding opinion of 
the ministry is not asked when the police decides on return at borders upon the 
condition that a foreigner explicitly states that his/her return is possible. This pro-
cedure applies also at the airport. A specific type of procedure26 may appear there in 
some cases and as such may show serious deficiencies. This special procedure may 
                                                        
21  See Sec. 97(e)  of the Employment Act, Act No. 435/2004 Coll., Employment Act], available 
at http://portal.gov.cz/wps/portal/_s.155/701?number1=435%2F2004&number2=&name= 
&text= (Czech only, accessed on 11. 03. 2011). 
22  See Sec. 20(2)(a) Act on School Education, Act No. 561/2004 Coll., Act on School Educa-
tion], available at http://portal.gov.cz/wps/portal/_s.155/701?number1=561%2F2004& 
number2 =&name= &text= (Czech only, accessed on 11. 03. 2011). 
23  The NGOs ASIM, source: a phone interview with its lawyer) or OPU (Organization for Aid to 
Refugees, www.opu.cz, source: a phone interview with its lawyer). 
24  See Sec. 3b(1) of Asylum Act, Act No. 325/1999 Coll., on Asylum], available at 
http://portal.gov.cz/wps/portal/_s.155/701?number1=325%2F1999&number2=&name=&t
ext= (Czech only, accessed on 11. 03. 2011). 
25  See Sec. 120a and Sec. 179 FORA. 
26  Special procedural provisions apply. See Sec. 150 of the Administrative Act; Act. No. 
500/2004 Coll., Administrative Act, available at http://portal.gov.cz/wps/portal/_s.155 
/701?number1=&number2=&name=spr%C3%A1vn%C3%AD+%C5%99%C3%A1d&text
= (Czech only, accessed on 2. 04.2011). 
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proceed only with the consent of a foreigner. But the Czech laws do not ensure free 
legal aid during the administrative proceedings, so a person acts on behalf on him/ 
herself and it may thus happen that the consent of a foreigner may not be really in-
formed. 
Procedural Standards 
A third country national who does not or does not longer fulfil the conditions for 
entry, stay or residence in the CR is issued either an order to leave, which is simply 
a short time given to leave the country, or a decision on return. When the police is-
sues a decision on return, it must always stipulate a term for which a person may 
not come back to the CR/EU (ban on entry). Illegal entry (unless the crossing of 
borders is violent) or stay itself does not constitute a criminal offence;27 it is viewed 
as an administrative offence and a term of a ban on entry is substantiated by its se-
riousness. The ban on entry may be issued for a period of up to three, five or ten 
years.28 There is a term to leave the country given in the return decision. A person 
may appeal against a decision on return to a court and a suspensory effect to the 
appeal is guaranteed.   
As was already mentioned above, a foreigner may be detained if there are several 
conditions fulfilled (e.g. danger to public policy). The decision on detention, as it 
intervenes to the rights of persons very much, may of course be appealed. There al-
ready was a judicial review in administrative procedure possible before the transpo-
sition of the Directive.29 But there was a real problem with the length of the judicial 
review – even if there was an obligation to give priority to cases of detention –, and 
it made the effectiveness of it rather debatable and theoretical.30 The change of the 
FORA which was brought by the law transposing the Directive made the possibility 
to appeal for a foreigner much more effective. Courts were given very strict terms 
                                                        
27  The Criminal Code punishes only the conduct pursuant to the 2002/90/EC Directive which 
is aimed at assisting persons (so the organizing of, enabling and assisting a person to the illegal 
crossing of the state border and organizing of, enabling and assisting a person to the transit 
across the territory of the CR is punishable as well as assistance to a person to stay illegally on 
the territory of the CR for a financial gain, privilege or other benefit (Sec. 340 and 341 of the 
Criminal Code). Instigation, participation and attempts to commit crimes are punishable with 
the same punishment. Act. No. 40/2009 Coll., Criminal Code (available at http://portal. 
gov.cz/wps/portal/_s.155/701/.cmd/ad/.c/313/.ce/10821/.p/8411/_s.155/701?PC_8411_l
i=40&PC_8411_name=trestní%20zákon&PC_8411_ps=10&#10821 (Czech only, accessed 
on 2. 04.2011). 
28  See Sec. 119 FORA. 
29  See Sec. 200o-200u of the Civil Procedural Code; Act No. 99/1963 Coll., Civil Procedural 
Code, available at http://portal.gov.cz/wps/portal/_s.155/701?number1=&number2=& 
name=ob%C4%8Dansk%C3%BD+soudn%C3%AD+%C5%99%C3%A1d&text= (Czech 
only, accessed on 2. 04.2011). 
30  According to the information of NGOs, before the change in 2010 the judicial review of deci-
sion on detention often took more time then the detention lasted, i.e. the judicial review 
lasted for more than 180 days, which was the maximum period of detention at that time. 
Source: interview with NGO ASIM and OPU lawyers in 2009 and 2011. 
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for dealing with the appeal. They must decide within seven days from the day when 
the documents were delivered.31 There were also terms given to the police; it must 
deliver necessary documents to a court within five days. If a court finds out that the 
decision on detention is dismissed, its decision (the court decision) must be deliv-
ered to the foreigner within 24 hours. This change seems to give a foreigner real 
guarantee of his freedom of movement, but it is too early to evaluate its real impact 
and effectiveness since it is applied only three months. There is also an ex officio re-
view done by police regularly to confirm the continuing existence of the reasons for 
detention throughout the entire period of detention.32  
The interpretation of the concept of public policy may cause problems in prac-
tice. As may be seen from above, the police, ministry and courts apply this term 
regularly and in situations which have serious impact on foreigner´s rights. The 
public policy notion is counted as abstract concept of law in the Czech legislation, 
i.e. the concept itself is not defined by the law and gives the authority which applies 
it large discretion in the decision making process. The term must nevertheless be 
applied ‘in conformity with the EU law’.33 According to the Office of Public De-
fender of Rights (hereinafter ‘Ombudsman’), problems with application of the pub-
lic policy notion appeared in the practice of police,34 and several complaints against 
decisions of state authorities appeared already at courts. Even Supreme Administra-
tive Court gave already several judgments, but the judgments differed in interpreta-
tion of this notion. For these reasons forwarded one of its senates one of the cases 
on public policy to the extended bench of judges.35 The judgment of the extended 
bench should follow within a few months. The cases which appeared at the Su-
preme Administrative Court were mostly connected to the issue of spouses of Czech 
nationals. But there is a need for a general guidance for interpretation of this no-
tion and the judgment may have impact on the interpretation of this notion even in 
the situations relevant in terms of the Directive. 
The Role of Public Defender of Rights 
The Directive requests states to provide for an effective forced-return monitoring 
system. This supervision competence was in the CR given to the Public Defender of 
Rights. A mandated official of the Office of Ombudsman monitors detention of 
foreigners and also the enforcement of e.g. return decisions (even decisions on 
                                                        
31  See Sec. 172(3-5) FORA. 
32  See Sec. 126 FORA. 
33  The necessity of ‘euroconformal’ interpretation of the public policy notion was already stipu-
lated by the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of August 13, 2008, No. 5 As 
51/2009–68. 
34  The judgments of police are not available publicly, but the ombudsman has access to those 
that are complained against before its institution. Source: interview with a representative of 
the Public Defender of Rights on 13. 04. 2011. 
35  See Judgment of Supreme Administrative Court No. 3 As 4/2010–129 of May 5, 2010. 
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criminal expulsion).36 Although the Ombudsman is not in a position of an appeal 
body, it is still entitled to act in many ways. It may even ask for reparation measures 
for an individual person, it may initiate measures against inactivity or disciplinary 
proceedings.37  
The Ombudsman is informed about all enforcements of return decisions and 
also gets copies of all relevant decisions issued by police (decisions on return, on de-
tention etc.).38 This seems to be very good and effective part of the monitoring sys-
tem, because the Ombudsman sees the practice not only from its practical experi-
ence but also from the decisions through which he may recognize which measures 
the police took etc.  
What will the Law be like in Future? 
The law seems to give many opportunities for looking for good practices in the 
Czech law now and also in the future. But the practice – the implementation of the 
Directive – is the main factor by which we measure real impact of the provisions of 
the Directive on real people. It is still early to evaluate it. Let’s hope, that the provi-
sions of the law will be implemented rightly and in favour of those, whose position 
they should secure. 
 
 
                                                        
36  See Sec. 1(6) of the Act on Public Defender of Rights; Act No. 349/1999, on Public Defender 
of Rights, available at http://portal.gov.cz/wps/portal/_s.155/701?number1=&number2 
=&name=z%C3%A1kon+o+ve%C5%99ejn%C3%A9m+ochr%C3%A1nci+pr%C3%A1v&t
ext= (Czech only, accessed on 3. 04.2011). 
37  See Sec. 21a and 15-16 of the Act on Public Defender of Rights. 
38  See Sec. 178d FORA. 
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Comments on the Returns Directive 
 
 
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
Introduction 
The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) published the report 
‘Detention of third-country nationals in return procedures’ in November 2010.1 
The FRA examines legislation and practice in light of existing international and 
European standards. The report is the result of a project on the rights of irregular 
immigrants in voluntary and involuntary return procedures included in the 2009 
Work Programme of the Agency. The report was drafted by the FRA on the basis of 
information on national legislation and practice which was collected from national 
legal experts.  
The report focuses on particular provisions of the Return Directive; namely Ar-
ticle 15 on the detention of third-country nationals who are the subjects of return 
procedures. The FRA tries to deconstruct the various elements of the right to liberty 
and the prohibition of arbitrary detention. For each of these elements an overview 
of applicable international law standards, as well as state practice in the EU-27, is 
presented in the report. The aim is to facilitate an objective discussion on these is-
sues. 
Looking at deprivation of liberty of irregular migrants pending return, the report 
examines six broad issues: the grounds for detention; the principles of necessity and 
proportionality; maximum length of detention; procedural safeguards to prevent ar-
bitrary detention; alternatives to detention; and detention of children. 
It is important to note that detention of asylum seekers is not covered by the re-
port. Rather, the report focuses on pre-removal detention to facilitate removal of 
third-country nationals who find themselves already in the territory of the European 
Union. Neither does the report cover the conditions in facilities used for pre-
removal detention, except where these are directly linked to the question of whether 
detention is arbitrary or not.  
The Agency’s thematic situation report ‘Coping with a fundamental rights emer-
gency – The situation of persons crossing the Greek land border in an irregular 
manner’, published in March 2011, includes research on the conditions in Greek 
detention facilities near the Turkish land border.2 Regarding children, the report 
                                                        
1  The report is available on the FRA website: http://www.fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attach-
ments/FRA-report-detention-december-2010_EN.pdf. 
2  FRA, Coping with a fundamental rights emergency – The situation of persons crossing the Greek land 
border in an irregular manner, Vienna, March 2011, available at: http://www.fra.europa.eu/ 
fraWebsite/attachments/Greek-border-situation-report2011_EN.pdf.  
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complements the research recently undertaken by the FRA on separated, asylum-
seeking children in European Union Member States, the comparative report of 
which was published in November 2010.3  
The report should be seen against the background of work by the FRA in the 
context of the Contact Committee of the Return Directive, to which the Agency has 
been invited to participate in meetings by the European Commission. Member 
States were required to transpose the Return Directive by the end of 2010. With its 
engagement with the Contact Committee and through its report, the FRA hopes to 
be of assistance to Member States in dealing with the fundamental rights challenges 
raised by the complexity of the subject. 
This paper consists of two parts. The first reproduces the opinions by the FRA 
relating to detention of third-country nationals in return procedures, as set forth in 
the full report. The second part deals with alternatives to detention, a tool which 
has been largely neglected in many European countries in the past.  
1.  Opinions 
The FRA has formulated a set of opinions covering the six areas included in its re-
port concerning ‘Detention of third-country nationals in return procedures’. These 
are herewith reproduced.  
Exhaustive list of grounds 
Grounds for pre-removal detention must be exhaustively listed in national legisla-
tion and defined in a clear manner. The simple fact of being an irregular migrant 
should never be considered as a sufficient ground for detention. 
European Union Member States should ensure that grounds for detention es-
tablished at a national level do not extend beyond the exhaustive list of legitimate 
grounds foreseen in Article 5.1 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). Deprivation of liberty based on crime prevention, public health considera-
tions or vagrancy should be governed by the same rules, regardless of the legal status 
the person concerned has in the host country. These grounds should therefore not 
be regulated by aliens or immigration laws but by other pieces of legislation. Other-
wise, there is a risk that this will lead to the application of different standards based 
on the legal status of the person in the country. 
Necessity and Proportionality 
Any instance of mandatory detention for irregular migrants should be abolished as 
it would be in contradiction with the requirement to examine whether less coercive 
                                                        
3  FRA, Separated, asylum-seeking children in European Union Member States – Comparative report, 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, November 2010, available at: 
http://www.fra.europa.eu/fraWebsite/attachments/FRA-fullreport-sep-asylum-conference-
2010_EN.pdf. 
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measures can be applied in the specific case or whether detention is necessary in the 
first place. 
To avoid situations that may be in conflict with the requirements of Article 5.1 
ECHR as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), as well as 
with Article 15.1 of the Return Directive, EU Member States should consider in-
cluding in domestic law the need to initiate and carry out the return and removal 
process with due diligence in order for the deprivation of liberty to be lawful.  
Pre-removal detention is not lawful in the absence of realistic prospects for re-
moval. It would normally be up to the administration and the courts to decide 
when this is the case. In order to prevent prolonged detention, legislators may, 
however, consider introducing presumptions against pre-removal detention for de 
facto stateless persons, where it is evident from past experience that the country of 
nationality will refuse any cooperation in establishing the citizenship and issuing re-
lated travel documents. 
EU Member States are encouraged, when reviewing their aliens or immigration 
laws, to establish mechanisms to avoid situations of legal limbo by acknowledging 
the presence in the country of persons who are not removable and ensuring that 
they enjoy applicable fundamental rights. Furthermore, it would be important to 
start a reflection at European level to identify ways to put an end to protracted 
situations of legal limbo. Such reflection should not have the effect of rewarding 
lack of collaboration, but create legal certainty and respect fundamental rights.  
Pre-removal detention should essentially only be resorted to if there is a risk of 
absconding or of other serious interference with the return or removal process, such 
as interference with evidence or destruction of documents. EU Member States may 
consider making this explicit when reviewing their national legislation. 
The FRA welcomes domestic law provisions existing in some EU Member States 
that require the authorities to take into account the individual characteristics of the 
person concerned when deciding if a person should be detained, and encourages 
others to follow this example. Such provisions can help to ensure that particular 
caution is taken before depriving the liberty of particularly vulnerable persons or 
persons with specific needs and that alternatives to detention are duly considered. 
Maximum Length of Detention 
The FRA encourages EU Member States not to extend the maximum periods of de-
tention beyond six months. Where – in line with the Return Directive – such a pos-
sibility is introduced or maintained, national legislation should include strict safe-
guards to ensure that such a possibility is only used in extremely exceptional cases. 
A delay in obtaining necessary documentation should not justify an extension of 
deprivation of liberty, if it is clear from the outset that the third country concerned 
will not collaborate or where there are no reasonable expectations that the necessary 
documents will be issued in time as in such cases, detention would not anymore 
pursue the legitimate objective of facilitating the removal. 
The six-month and very exceptionally 18-month period set forth in the Return 
Directive has to be seen as a ceiling. Given the interference that detention has on 
personal dignity, it is of utmost importance to regulate in national legislation that 
detention shall be ordered or maintained only for as long as it is strictly necessary to 
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ensure successful removal. National legislation should be drafted in a manner so as 
to ensure that the individual circumstances of the person concerned are evaluated 
in each case, thus making the systematic application of the maximum time limit for 
detention unlawful.  
Automatic periodic judicial reviews are an important safeguard to ensure that 
detention is kept as short as possible. Reviews should be carried out by a court at 
regular intervals, preferably not less than once a month. 
Procedural Guarantees 
Given the challenges to implement Article 5.2 ECHR in practice, it may be advis-
able to specify expressly in national legislation that the reason for detention as con-
tained in the detention order and the procedure to access judicial review be trans-
lated in a language the detainee understands. The reasons should also be given to 
him/her in written form as well as read out with the help of an interpreter, if neces-
sary.  
The right to judicial review of the detention order must be effectively available 
in all cases. This can best be achieved by requiring a judge to endorse each deten-
tion order, as many EU Member States already do. Moreover, measures to alleviate 
practical barriers restricting access to judicial review procedure should be put in 
place, including as regards information, language assistance, and the simplification 
of procedural requirements. Courts or tribunals reviewing the detention order must 
have the power and be adequately equipped to examine the lawfulness of detention. 
Reasonable deadlines should also be introduced to avoid protracted review proceed-
ings without undermining their fairness.  
In light of the variety of obstacles that irregular migrants need to overcome to 
access legal assistance, EU Member States are encouraged when reviewing their 
aliens or immigration laws to enter into a dialogue with civil society organisations as 
well as bar associations in order to find pragmatic legislative and practical solutions 
to the obstacles encountered which are non-discriminatory and remain in compli-
ance with international obligations. Furthermore, detailed comparative research on 
whether legal assistance is accessible in practice should be undertaken covering all 
European Union countries. 
Information on asylum should be readily available in detention facilities. EU 
Member States should allow non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and those 
who provide legal advice access to detention facilities and the possibility to provide 
counselling. Where immediate release upon submission of a request for interna-
tional protection is not envisaged, the applicant should be released as soon as the 
claim is neither considered inadmissible nor abusive or manifestly unfounded.  
Alternatives to Detention 
EU Member States, who have not yet done so, are encouraged to set out in national 
legislation rules dealing with alternatives to detention, without disproportionately 
restricting other fundamental rights. Innovative forms of alternatives, which include 
counselling the individual on the immigration outcome should be explored wher-
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ever possible. By contrast, given the restrictions on fundamental rights derived from 
electronic tagging, such an alternative should normally be avoided. 
Detention should not be resorted to when less intrusive measures are sufficient 
to achieve the legitimate objective pursued. To ensure that less coercive measures 
are applied in practice, EU Member States are encouraged to set out in national leg-
islation rules dealing with alternatives to detention. Such rules should require that 
the authorities examine in each individual case whether the objective of securing 
the removal can be achieved through less coercive measures before issuing a deten-
tion order, and provide reasons if this is not the case. 
Detention of Children 
EU Member States are encouraged to include in their national legislation a strong 
presumption against detention and in favour of alternatives to detention for fami-
lies with children, giving a primary consideration to the best interests of the child. 
Children should not be deprived of their liberty if they cannot be held in facilities 
that can cater for their specific needs. Safeguards should also be considered to en-
sure that when children are deprived of their liberty, detention is not unduly pro-
longed. These could include lower maximum time limits or more frequent reviews.  
When determining whether families with children should be detained with their 
parents or primary caregiver, paramount importance has to be given to the child’s 
best interests and alternatives to detention actively considered. Where, exception-
ally, alternatives are not sufficient and it is considered necessary to detain the par-
ent(s), children should only be detained with their parents, if -- after a careful as-
sessment of all individual circumstances and having given due weight to the views of 
the child in accordance with his/her age and maturity -- keeping the child with them 
is considered to be in the child’s best interests. This should be clarified in national 
legislation. 
Several EU Member States currently prohibit the detention of separated and/or 
unaccompanied children, whereas others allow it only in very exceptional circum-
stances. This is a good practice that should be maintained and followed by other 
states, also in light of the provision at Article 4.3 of the Return Directive which al-
lows adopting or maintaining more favourable provisions. It is namely difficult to 
imagine a case in which the detention of a separated or unaccompanied child sim-
ply for securing his or her removal would comply with the requirements of the 
Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC). 
Under no circumstances should separated children be deprived of their liberty if 
it is not possible to ensure that they are kept in appropriate facilities where separate 
accommodation from adults can be guaranteed. 
Where legislation exceptionally allows for the deprivation of liberty of a sepa-
rated child, domestic law should require appointing immediately a legal representa-
tive at no cost, unless the child already has one, in addition to an independent 
guardian.  
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2. Alternatives to Detention 
Alternatives include a wide array of measures, most of which imply restrictions on 
freedom of movement. Although many countries provide for the possibility of im-
posing alternatives to detention, this is often done only exceptionally and primarily 
for particularly vulnerable groups. 
Compared to deprivation of liberty, alternatives are less intrusive. Nevertheless, 
alternatives to detention imply restrictions of fundamental rights, including free-
dom of movement and in some cases the right to privacy. Any restrictions to these 
rights must be in conformity with human rights law.  
Part I examines the types of alternatives to detention that are foreseen in various 
European countries, whereas the Part II reviews considerations of proportionality 
relating to the duty to examine the viability of alternatives before resorting to deten-
tion. 
2.1 Alternatives found in National Legislation 
Council of Europe, Twenty Guidelines on Forced Return 
Guideline 6.1 
A person may only be deprived of his/her liberty, with a view to ensuring that a 
removal order will be executed, if […] the authorities of the host state have con-
cluded that compliance with the removal order cannot be ensured as effectively 
by resorting to non-custodial measures such as supervision systems, the require-
ment to report regularly to the authorities, bail or other guarantee systems. 
 
Existence of alternatives to detention in national law, EU27(Source: Fra 2010) 
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About two thirds of the European Union countries provide for the possibility to 
impose alternatives to detention, either before resorting to detention or when re-
viewing if the time of detention should be prolonged (see Figure above). 
Different types of alternatives have been developed which may also be applied in 
combination. They can be grouped in the following clusters. 
Obligation to Surrender Passport or Travel Documents 
This possibility is foreseen in the national legislation of a few countries.4 It may be 
imposed alone or together with other alternatives, such as for instance the duty to 
stay in a particular location or area. It is a soft measure which essentially serves to 
ensure that valid identity and travel documents are not lost or destroyed during the 
time required to prepare the return and removal process or that the person con-
cerned travels. 
Residence Restrictions5 
This includes the duty to stay at a particular address or the obligation to reside in a 
specific geographical area of the country, often combined with regular reporting re-
quirements. Designated places can be open or semi-open facilities run by the gov-
ernment or NGOs, hotels or hostels as well as private addresses provided by the per-
son concerned. The regime imposed can vary, but usually persons have to stay at the 
designated location at certain times and absences may normally only be allowed if 
good reason is given.  
Release on Bail and Provision of Sureties by Third Parties 
In the context of criminal law it is not uncommon to allow for the release of a de-
tained person upon pledges of money which will be forfeited if the person does not 
report to the authorities. In pre-removal proceedings, release based on financial 
guarantees is not frequently used,6 in part also because it is assumed that many for-
eigners in removal proceedings would not have the necessary means. It is therefore 
not surprising that in the UK (Scotland), where normally a bail bond between 
£2000-£5000 would be required, the authorities are allowed to accept a symbolic 
amount, for instance of £ 5.7 The authorities may also request sureties from people 
                                                        
4  See Denmark, Aliens Act at Section 34.1; Finland, Aliens Act at 119.1; France, CESEDA at 
Article 552-4; Ireland, 2003 Immigration Act at 5.4(c). 
5  See Austria, Section 77.3 Aliens Police Act; Germany, Section 61.1 Residence Act; Denmark, 
Section 34.1 Aliens Act; Estonia, Section 10.1-2 of the OLPEA; France, Article L 552-4 and L 
552-5 CESEDA; Hungary, Section 62 TCN Act; Ireland, Section 14 (1) a)-b) Immigration Act 
2004 and Section 5(4) Immigration Act 2003; Netherlands, Article 57 Aliens Act; Poland, Ar-
ticle 90.1(3) Act on Aliens; Portugal, Act 23/2007 Art 142.1; Slovenia Art 56 Aliens Act; UK, 
1971 Immigration Act, Schedule 3, paragraph 2(5). 
6  France, CESEDA at Article 552-4 (combined with the need to stay at a designated place); UK, 
Operational Enforcement Manual 2008, at 55.20. 
7   See UK, Operational Enforcement Manual 2008 at 57.6. 
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who are willing to stand in for the applicant. The UK is one of the few countries 
where this is foreseen, but sureties can only be requested ‘if that will have the con-
sequence that a person who might not otherwise be granted his liberty will be 
granted it’.8 
Regular Reporting Requirements to the Authorities 
The obligation to report at regular intervals to the police or immigration authorities 
is one of the more recurrent forms of alternatives found in national legislation.9 
Reporting duties may be imposed as an additional requirement to the duty to reside 
in a specified area or location.  
Release to Case Worker Support  
Based on the experience in reception centres for asylum seekers, in the late ’90s 
Sweden introduced caseworkers with the task of informing detainees of their rights 
and ensuring these were upheld and their well-being catered for. Based on an indi-
vidual assessment, the case worker recommends placement options to the authori-
ties and advises them on the need to detain and when to apply alternatives. The ap-
proach consists in involving the individual throughout the process and preparing 
him/her for all possible immigration outcomes. If refused asylum or the right to 
stay, the person is supported to make his/her own departure arrangements with 
dignity.  
In late 2008, the Belgian authorities introduced an innovative form of alterna-
tive, whereby families with children were no longer placed in detention facilities, 
but in open housing and provided with a coach. The role of the coach is to prepare 
the family for the return. This pilot project draws from the successful experience in 
Australia, where immigrants were released in community care (see Textbox 2). Ab-
sconding rates have remained relatively low at about 20%.10 The difference with 
other forms of alternatives consists in the integrated approach which includes indi-
vidualised counselling. Differently, from the Swedish and Australian experiences, 
the Belgian pilot focuses primarily on promoting return rather than exploring all 
                                                        
8   UK, Operational Enforcement Manual 2008 at 57.6. These should not be routinely required, 
as the persons concerned may not have relatives or friends in the country. 
9   See, for example, Austria, Aliens Police Act, Section 77.3, Bulgaria, Law on Foreigners at 
44.5; Germany, Residence Act at Section 61.1; Denmark, Aliens Act at Article 34.1; Finland, 
Aliens Act at Article 118; France, CESEDA at Article 552-4; Ireland, 2003 Immigration Act at 
5.4.(b) and 2004 Immigration Act at 14.1(b); Lithuania Aliens Act at 115.1; Malta, Immigra-
tion Act at 25A.13; Poland Act on Aliens at 90.1 at 3; Portugal 23/2007 Act at 142; Slovenia, 
Aliens Act at 59.2 and 59.3 where duty to reside at a particular location can be combined with 
reporting requirements.  
10  See a short version of the report at: http://www.vluchtelingenwerk.be/bestanden/2009-12-02-
AN-ALTERNATIVE-TO-DETENTION-OF-FAMILIES-WITH-CHILDREN.pdf (in English) 
and the full report at http://www.vluchtelingenwerk.be/bestanden/publicaties/2009-12-02-
Nota-evaluatie-terugkeerwoningen.pdf (in Dutch). 
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possible immigration outcomes, although recently the role of the coacher has been 
expanded.11  
Electronic Monitoring  
Electronic monitoring or tagging is primarily applied in the context of criminal law. 
Its use as a surrogate for immigration detention is limited. Electronic monitoring is 
probably the most intrusive among the various forms of alternatives to detention, as 
it substantially interferes with a person’s right to privacy, restricts freedom of 
movement and can deprive people of dignity. It can also lead to discrimination, as 
persons wearing an electronic device can be associated with criminals.12 Electronic 
monitoring as an alternative to immigration detention has been primarily used in 
North America. In the US, ankle bracelets fitted with a global positioning device 
were frequently used in the past. For the first 30 days after release immigrants had 
to wear the bracelets and were subject to intensive supervision, including frequent 
face-to-face meetings, telephone calls, unannounced home visits and curfews. A re-
cent revision of the system has reduced the use of electronic monitoring.13  
In the European Union, there is limited use of electronic monitoring for immi-
gration purposes. Only three EU Member States provide for the use of electronic 
devices as an alternative for pre-removal detention, Denmark, Portugal and the UK. 
In Denmark, the authorities are obliged to resort to electronic tagging in cases of 
repeated disrespect of the duty to reside at a particular place.14 Given the interfer-
ence with the right to privacy, the use of electronic monitoring must be accompa-
nied by the necessary safeguards. In Denmark, the tagging can only last for one 
month and the foreigner can request a judicial review of this measure. 
                                                        
11  See Royal Decree of 22 April 2010, Arrêté royal modifiant l’arrêté royal du 14 mai 2009 
fixant le régime et les règles de fonctionnement applicables aux lieux d'hébergement au sens 
de l’article 74/8,  § 2, de la loi du 15 décembre 1980 sur l'accès au territoire, le séjour, l'éta-
blissement et l'éloignement des étrangers. 
12  See the statement by an asylum seekers interviewed by UNHCR in the US, US initiative of-
fers asylum-seekers an alternative to detention, 25 November 2009 available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&docid=4b0d643a6&query=baltimore. 
13  In the autumn of 2009, US Immigration and Customs Enforcement awarded a contract for a 
new program, called Intensive Supervision Appearance Program II or ‘ISAP II’, which has re-
placed previous programs on alternatives to detention. ISAP II maintains the case manage-
ment and community referral components of the previous program but does not include as 
onerous reporting and supervision requirements in that it does not require the use of ankle 
bracelets until a participant has a final order of removal and removal is actually reasonably 
foreseeable.  Also, contrary to the first ISAP program, in ISAP II supervision becomes more 
intensive in later phases once removal is ordered. For a brief overview on alternatives to detention 
in the US, see the webpage of the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement at: http://www. 
ice.gov/pi/news/factsheets/alternativestodetention.htm (dated 23 October 2009). For a detailed de-
scription of the Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (ISAP) II, see the tender docu-
ments ‘Statement of work, Part I’ and ‘Statement of work, Part II’ available online at  the US 
Federal Business Opportunities Website : https://www.fbo.gov/index?tab=documents 
&tabmode=form&subtab=core&tabid=54bf2246732a754a20787d9e4d031acf .  
14  See Danish Aliens Act at 34a.1. 
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The table below provides an overview of the type of alternatives existing in 
European Member States. In the countries that are not listed in the table, the FRA 
did not find any evidence in legislation or policy about the possibility to make use 
of alternatives; this, however, does not exclude alternatives may be applied on a pi-
lot basis or in exceptional circumstances. 
Statistics on the use of alternatives could only be collected from a limited num-
ber of countries. In France, according to a survey carried out in May 2007, alterna-
tives to detention were used in 7.2% of the cases.15 In Austria, alternatives are used 
more frequently, particularly for families and children.16 In 2008, alternatives were 
used for approximately 25% of those potentially subject to pre-removal detention, 
which includes irregular migrants and asylum seekers. In 2009, the rate has in-
creased to around 30%.17 In 24 out of 28 regional directorates of the Bulgarian 
Ministry of Interior, alternatives were applied to 198 foreigners between 1 January–
26 November 2010. In the Netherlands, the Council for the Administration of 
Criminal Justice and Protection of Juveniles in their Advice on Detention of Aliens 
highlighted that even though detention of foreign nationals is officially a measure of 
last resort, alternatives are used rarely and the government is not actively looking for 
alternatives.18  
Although not comprehensive, this information suggests that alternatives are not 
frequently used. One of the main policy reasons for favouring a deprivation of lib-
erty over the use of alternatives to detention is fear of absconding. There is however 
a notable scarcity of data on absconding rates of individuals to whom alternatives 
were applied.  
 
 
                                                        
15  The figure is 7.2% for May 2007, according to a survey of the French Ministry of Justice; see 
Ministry of Justice (2008), Le contentieux judiciaire des étrangers, Enquête statistique sur les déci-
sions prononcées du 1er au 31 mai 2007 par les juges des libertés et de la détention et les 
cours d’appel statuant sur des demandes de prolongation du maintien en rétention ou en 
zone d’attente, January 2008, p. 33. 
16  See Austria, Ministry of Interior (Fremdenwesen), Expert discussion with the Minster of the In-
terior Maria Fekter on 10 June 2009, p. 114, available in German online at: http://www. 
bmi.gv.at/cms/BMI/aus_dem_inneren/files/Fremdenwesen.pdf. 
17  In 2008, alternatives were used for 1,809 persons, whereas detention was applied to 5,398 in-
dividuals. In 2009, alternatives were resorted to for 1,877 persons and pre-removal detention 
to 5,991 persons. See the official Ministry of Interior statistics, available for 2008 online at: 
http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/BMI_Niederlassung/statistiken/files/Fremde_Jahresstatistik_200
8.pdf; and for 2009 at: http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/BMI_Niederlassung/statistiken/files/ 
Fremde_Jahresstatistik_2009.pdf. 
18  Advies Vreemdelingenbewaring by the Raad voor Strafrechtstoepassing en Jeugdbescherming, 
16 June 2008, available online at: http://www.rsj.nl/advies/adviezen/index.aspx. 
COMMENTS ON THE RETURNS DIRECTIVE 
147 
Table 1: Types of alternatives applied by EU Member States 
 
Duty to 
surrender 
documents 
Residence 
restrictions 
Bail / 
sureties 
Regular 
reporting 
Release 
to case 
worker 
Electronic 
monitoring 
Austria19  x  x   
Belgium20     x  
Bulgaria21    x   
Germany22  x  x   
Denmark23 x x x x  x 
Estonia24  x  x   
Finland25 x  x x   
France26 x x x x   
Hungary27  x     
Ireland28 x x  x   
Lithuania29    x   
Malta30    x   
Netherlands31  x  x   
Poland32  x  x   
Portugal33  x  x  x 
Slovenia34 x   x   
Sweden 35  x  x   
UK36  x x x  x 
Source: FRA, 2010 
                                                        
19  Section 77.1 and 77.3 Aliens Police Act. 
20  Arrêté royal fixant le régime et les règles de fonctionnement applicables aux lieux d’héber-
gement au sens de l’article 74/8, § 1er, de la loi du 15 décembre 1980 sur l’accès au territoire, 
le séjour, établissement et l’éloignement des étrangers, 14 May 2009. 
21  Article 44.5 Law on Foreigners. 
22  Germany, Residence Act at Section 61.1.  
23  Danish Aliens Act at Section 34.1 and Section 34.a.1.  
24  Estonia, OLPEA, at 10.1 – 2.  
25  Finnish Aliens Act, at Articles 118, 119 and 120. 
26  Article L 552-4 & L 552-5 CESEDA.  
27  Hungarian TCN Act, at Section 62. 
28  Section 14(1), Immigration Act 2004 and section 5(4) Immigration Act 2003.  
29  Aliens Act, Section 115.2. 
30  Immigration Act at Article 25(A)(13). 
31  Aliens Act at Article 57. 
32  Act on Aliens, Article 90.1(3). 
33  Law 23/2007, Article 142.1. 
34  Aliens Act, Article 56 (regarding restrictions of movement) and Article 59 on more lenient 
measures. 
35  Aliens Act, Chapter 10, Section 8. 
36  UK 1971 Immigration Act Schedule 3, paragraph 2(5) Operational Enforcement Manual 
2008, Chapter 55.20, Immigration and Asylum (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 at 
Section 36. 
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Statistics from two pilot projects relating to alternatives to detention suggest that 
alternatives do not necessarily increase the absconding rate and can lead to in-
creased voluntary return. In Belgium, 79% of the families who were put in the 
housing units as part of a recent pilot project which combined placement in desig-
nated accommodation with individual coaching, have remained in contact with the 
authorities37. Similarly, recent experiences with community placement combined 
with individual case management in Australia had an absconding rate of 6%, 
whereas 67% of those not granted the right to stay departed voluntarily.38 
2.2 Duty to Examine Alternatives before Detaining 
Return Directive 
Recital 16 
Detention is justified only to prepare the return or carry out the removal process 
and if the application of less coercive measures would not be sufficient. 
 
In interpreting the prohibition of arbitrary detention contained in Article 9.1 
ICCPR the Human Rights Committee observed that deprivation of liberty cannot 
be considered as necessary, if the possibility to apply invasive means to achieve the 
same ends does not exist.39 The Council of Europe Twenty Guidelines on Forced 
Return indicate at Guideline 6.1 that detention should only be resorted to after the 
authorities have concluded that compliance with the removal order cannot be en-
sured as effectively by resorting to non-custodial measures.  
Building on this Guideline, the Return Directive stipulates at Article 15.1 that 
deprivation of liberty may be ordered ‘unless other sufficient but less coercive meas-
ures can be applied effectively in a specific case’. Read in conjunction with Recital 
16 (quoted in the above box), Article 15.1 establishes a duty to examine in each in-
dividual case whether alternatives to detention would suffice before resorting to 
deprivation of liberty.  
This is an area where the standard set forth in the Return Directive is higher 
compared to what takes place currently in practice. Except for those countries which 
require an individualised test to verify if the deprivation of liberty is proportional to 
the removal objective, the requirement to review alternatives first, before resorting 
to detention, is not that common and mainly concerns categories of persons 
deemed to be particularly vulnerable, such as, for instance, children.  
                                                        
37  See http://www.vluchtelingenwerk.be/bestanden/2009-12-02-AN-ALTERNATIVE-TO-DE-
TENTION-OF-FAMILIES-WITH-CHILDREN.pdf, p. 2. 
38  Department for Immigration and Citizenship, Final Activity Report, October 2008, pp. 11-12; 
Department for Immigration and Citizenship, CCP Report, March 2009, at p. 2. Department 
for Immigration and Citizenship, Submission to the Joint Commission on Migration Inquiry 
in Immigration Detention Sub 129c, Q41, October 2008. See also http://www.aph.gov.au/ 
senate/committee/legcon_ctte/estimates/add_0809/diac/38.pdf. 
39  UN Human Rights Committee, Communication No. 900/1999, C v. Australia, at 8.2. 
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As the following examples illustrate, the duty to examine alternatives first can ei-
ther be based in law or, more frequently derive from case law. In Austria, the ad-
ministration is obliged to apply more lenient measures in all cases where depriva-
tion of liberty is not necessary to achieve the purpose. The reasons why these meas-
ures could not be applied have to be stated in the detention decision.40 Similar du-
ties to examine the viability of alternatives before detaining can be found in Ger-
many,41 Denmark,42 the Netherlands,43 and Slovenia.44 In the UK, there is in prin-
ciple a presumption against detention, which means that, where possible, alterna-
tives should be applied.45 Foreigners have a right to apply for bail46 and must be in-
formed of this right.47  
In conclusion, detention can become arbitrary if the purpose for which it was 
ordered can also be achieved by applying less restrictive measures, such as regular 
reporting to the police or residence restrictions. Although many countries provide 
for the possibility of imposing alternatives to detention, this is often done only ex-
ceptionally and primarily for particularly vulnerable groups. At the same time, some 
good practices that combine release with individual counselling by case workers are 
emerging. 
 
 
                                                        
40  See, for example, the following judgements by the Austrian Higher Administrative Court: 30 
August 2007, 2007/21/0043; 17 March 2009, 2007/21/0542; 25 March 2010, 
2009/21/0276, available online at: http://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Vwgh. 
41  See the evaluation of the immigration legislation by the German Ministry of Interior, Bericht 
zur Evaluierung des Gesetzes zur Steuerung und Begrenzung der Zuwanderung und zur Rege-
lung des Aufenthalts und der Integration von Unionsbürgern und Ausländern (Zuwan-
derungsgesetz), July 2006, p. 160: „Insbesondere wird zu prüfen sein, ob anstelle von Abschie-
bungshaft mildere Maßnahmen […] angeordnet werden können’. The report is available in 
German online at: http://www.bmi.bund.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/151396/publica-
tionFile/14810/evaluierungsbericht_zum_zuwanderungsgesetz.pdf. 
42  While the Aliens Act foresees a duty to examine alternatives before resorting to detention un-
der Section 36.1, no obligation to that effect appear to exist when ordering detention under 
Section 36.5 of the Aliens Act, i.e. when it is required to prevent absconding of aliens who 
committed certain types of criminal offences or aliens who entered Denmark in an irregular 
manner. 
43  See Council of State, decision of 23 June 2006, Case No. 200603830/1, JV 2006/323 as well 
as Vreemdelingencirculaire 2000, A6/1. 
44  Slovenia, Constitutional Court U-I-297/95, 28.10. 1998. 
45  UKBA, Operational Enforcement Manual, Ch. 55.1, available at:  http://www.ukba.homeof-
fice.gov.uk/policyandlaw/guidance/enforcement/. It is a Common Law presumption, now re-
inforced by the Human Rights Act 1998, but is not otherwise reflected in Statute or Immigra-
tion Rules. 
46  1971 Act, Schedule 2, paragraphs 22 and 29 and 1999 Act, Section 54. 
47  Unlike criminal cases, there is no automatic bail hearing however. The Bail Circly at 
http://www.ctbi.org.uk/CHA/94 brings together lawyers and others ready to support release 
on bail. 
 
DIRECTIVE 2008/115/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL
of 16 December 2008
on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country
nationals
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European
Community, and in particular Article 63(3)(b) thereof,
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,
Acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in
Article 251 of the Treaty (1),
Whereas:
(1) The Tampere European Council of 15 and 16 October
1999 established a coherent approach in the field of
immigration and asylum, dealing together with the
creation of a common asylum system, a legal immi­
gration policy and the fight against illegal immigration.
(2) The Brussels European Council of 4 and 5 November
2004 called for the establishment of an effective
removal and repatriation policy, based on common
standards, for persons to be returned in a humane
manner and with full respect for their fundamental
rights and dignity.
(3) On 4 May 2005 the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe adopted ‘Twenty guidelines on
forced return’.
(4) Clear, transparent and fair rules need to be fixed to
provide for an effective return policy as a necessary
element of a well managed migration policy.
(5) This Directive should establish a horizontal set of rules,
applicable to all third-country nationals who do not or
who no longer fulfil the conditions for entry, stay or
residence in a Member State.
(6) Member States should ensure that the ending of illegal
stay of third-country nationals is carried out through a
fair and transparent procedure. According to general
principles of EU law, decisions taken under this
Directive should be adopted on a case-by-case basis
and based on objective criteria, implying that consider­
ation should go beyond the mere fact of an illegal stay.
When using standard forms for decisions related to
return, namely return decisions and, if issued, entry-ban
decisions and decisions on removal, Member States
should respect that principle and fully comply with all
applicable provisions of this Directive.
(7) The need for Community and bilateral readmission
agreements with third countries to facilitate the return
process is underlined. International cooperation with
countries of origin at all stages of the return process is
a prerequisite to achieving sustainable return.
(8) It is recognised that it is legitimate for Member States to
return illegally staying third-country nationals, provided
that fair and efficient asylum systems are in place which
fully respect the principle of non-refoulement.
(9) In accordance with Council Directive 2005/85/EC of
1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures
in Member States for granting and withdrawing refugee
status (2), a third-country national who has applied for
asylum in a Member State should not be regarded as
staying illegally on the territory of that Member State
until a negative decision on the application, or a
decision ending his or her right of stay as asylum
seeker has entered into force.
(10) Where there are no reasons to believe that this would
undermine the purpose of a return procedure, voluntary
return should be preferred over forced return and a
period for voluntary departure should be granted. An
extension of the period for voluntary departure should
be provided for when considered necessary because of
the specific circumstances of an individual case. In
order to promote voluntary return, Member States
should provide for enhanced return assistance and coun­
selling and make best use of the relevant funding possi­
bilities offered under the European Return Fund.
(11) A common minimum set of legal safeguards on decisions
related to return should be established to guarantee
effective protection of the interests of the individuals
concerned. The necessary legal aid should be made
available to those who lack sufficient resources.
Member States should provide in their national legis­
lation for which cases legal aid is to be considered
necessary.
ENL 348/98 Official Journal of the European Union 24.12.2008
(1) Opinion of the European Parliament of 18 June 2008 (not yet
published in the Official Journal) and Council Decision of
9 December 2008. (2) OJ L 326, 13.12.2005, p. 13.
(12) The situation of third-country nationals who are staying
illegally but who cannot yet be removed should be
addressed. Their basic conditions of subsistence should
be defined according to national legislation. In order to
be able to demonstrate their specific situation in the
event of administrative controls or checks, such
persons should be provided with written confirmation
of their situation. Member States should enjoy wide
discretion concerning the form and format of the
written confirmation and should also be able to include
it in decisions related to return adopted under this
Directive.
(13) The use of coercive measures should be expressly subject
to the principles of proportionality and effectiveness with
regard to the means used and objectives pursued.
Minimum safeguards for the conduct of forced return
should be established, taking into account Council
Decision 2004/573/EC of 29 April 2004 on the organ­
isation of joint flights for removals from the territory of
two or more Member States, of third-country nationals
who are subjects of individual removal orders (1).
Member States should be able to rely on various possi­
bilities to monitor forced return.
(14) The effects of national return measures should be given a
European dimension by establishing an entry ban prohi­
biting entry into and stay on the territory of all the
Member States. The length of the entry ban should be
determined with due regard to all relevant circumstances
of an individual case and should not normally exceed five
years. In this context, particular account should be taken
of the fact that the third-country national concerned has
already been the subject of more than one return
decision or removal order or has entered the territory
of a Member State during an entry ban.
(15) It should be for the Member States to decide whether or
not the review of decisions related to return implies the
power for the reviewing authority or body to substitute
its own decision related to the return for the earlier
decision.
(16) The use of detention for the purpose of removal should
be limited and subject to the principle of proportionality
with regard to the means used and objectives pursued.
Detention is justified only to prepare the return or carry
out the removal process and if the application of less
coercive measures would not be sufficient.
(17) Third-country nationals in detention should be treated in
a humane and dignified manner with respect for their
fundamental rights and in compliance with international
and national law. Without prejudice to the initial appre­
hension by law-enforcement authorities, regulated by
national legislation, detention should, as a rule, take
place in specialised detention facilities.
(18) Member States should have rapid access to information
on entry bans issued by other Member States. This infor­
mation sharing should take place in accordance with
Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006
on the establishment, operation and use of the second
generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) (2).
(19) Cooperation between the institutions involved at all
levels in the return process and the exchange and
promotion of best practices should accompany the im­
plementation of this Directive and provide European
added value.
(20) Since the objective of this Directive, namely to establish
common rules concerning return, removal, use of
coercive measures, detention and entry bans, cannot be
sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can
therefore, by reason of its scale and effects, be better
achieved at Community level, the Community may
adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty. In
accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set
out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond
what is necessary to achieve that objective.
(21) Member States should implement this Directive without
discrimination on the basis of sex, race, colour, ethnic or
social origin, genetic features, language, religion or belief,
political or any other opinions, membership of a national
minority, property, birth, disability, age or sexual orien­
tation.
(22) In line with the 1989 United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child, the ‘best interests of the child’ should
be a primary consideration of Member States when im­
plementing this Directive. In line with the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, respect for family life should
be a primary consideration of Member States when im­
plementing this Directive.
(23) Application of this Directive is without prejudice to the
obligations resulting from the Geneva Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 1951, as
amended by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967.
(24) This Directive respects the fundamental rights and
observes the principles recognised in particular by the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.
EN24.12.2008 Official Journal of the European Union L 348/99
(1) OJ L 261, 6.8.2004, p. 28. (2) OJ L 381, 28.12.2006, p. 4.
(25) In accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on
the position of Denmark annexed to the Treaty on
European Union and the Treaty establishing the
European Community, Denmark is not taking part in
the adoption of this Directive and is not bound by it
or subject to its application. Given that this Directive
builds — to the extent that it applies to third-country
nationals who do not fulfil or who no longer fulfil the
conditions of entry in accordance with the Schengen
Borders Code (1) — upon the Schengen acquis under
the provisions of Title IV of Part Three of the Treaty
establishing the European Community, Denmark shall,
in accordance with Article 5 of the said Protocol,
decide, within a period of six months after the
adoption of this Directive, whether it will implement it
in its national law.
(26) To the extent that it applies to third-country nationals
who do not fulfil or who no longer fulfil the conditions
of entry in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code,
this Directive constitutes a development of provisions of
the Schengen acquis in which the United Kingdom does
not take part, in accordance with Council Decision
2000/365/EC of 29 May 2000 concerning the request
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland to take part in some of the provisions of the
Schengen acquis (2); moreover, in accordance with
Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on the position of the
United Kingdom and Ireland annexed to the Treaty on
European Union and to the Treaty establishing the
European Community, and without prejudice to
Article 4 of the said Protocol, the United Kingdom is
not taking part in the adoption of this Directive and is
therefore not bound by it in its entirety or subject to its
application.
(27) To the extent that it applies to third-country nationals
who do not fulfil or who no longer fulfil the conditions
of entry in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code,
this Directive constitutes a development of provisions of
the Schengen acquis in which Ireland does not take part,
in accordance with Council Decision 2002/192/EC of
28 February 2002 concerning Ireland’s request to take
part in some of the provisions of the Schengen acquis (3);
moreover, in accordance with Articles 1 and 2 of the
Protocol on the position of the United Kingdom and
Ireland annexed to the Treaty on European Union and
to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and
without prejudice to Article 4 of the said Protocol,
Ireland is not taking part in the adoption of this
Directive and is therefore not bound by it in its
entirety or subject to its application.
(28) As regards Iceland and Norway, this Directive constitutes
— to the extent that it applies to third-country nationals
who do not fulfil or who no longer fulfil the conditions
of entry in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code
— a development of provisions of the Schengen acquis
within the meaning of the Agreement concluded by the
Council of the European Union and the Republic of
Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the
association of those two States with the implementation,
application and development of the Schengen acquis,
which fall within the area referred to in Article 1,
point C, of Council Decision 1999/437/EC (4) on
certain arrangements for the application of that
Agreement.
(29) As regards Switzerland, this Directive constitutes — to
the extent that it applies to third-country nationals who
do not fulfil or who no longer fulfil the conditions of
entry in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code —
a development of provisions of the Schengen acquis
within the meaning of the Agreement between the
European Union, the European Community and the
Swiss Confederation on the Swiss Confederation’s asso­
ciation with the implementation, application and devel­
opment of the Schengen acquis, which fall within the
area referred to in Article 1, point C, of Decision
1999/437/EC read in conjunction with Article 3 of
Council Decision 2008/146/EC (5) on the conclusion,
on behalf of the European Community, of that
Agreement.
(30) As regards Liechtenstein, this Directive constitutes — to
the extent that it applies to third-country nationals who
do not fulfil or who no longer fulfil the conditions of
entry in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code —
a development of provisions of the Schengen acquis
within the meaning of the Protocol between the
European Union, the European Community, the Swiss
Confederation and the Principality of Liechtenstein on
the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the
Agreement between the European Union, the European
Community and the Swiss Confederation on the Swiss
Confederation’s association with the implementation,
application and development of the Schengen acquis,
which fall within the area referred to in Article 1,
point C, of Decision 1999/437/EC read in conjunction
with Article 3 of Council Decision 2008/261/EC (6) on
the signature, on behalf of the European Community,
and on the provisional application of, certain provisions
of that Protocol,
HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE:
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 1
Subject matter
This Directive sets out common standards and procedures to be
applied in Member States for returning illegally staying third-
country nationals, in accordance with fundamental rights as
general principles of Community law as well as international
law, including refugee protection and human rights obligations.
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(1) Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 15 March 2006 establishing a Community Code on
the rules governing the movement of persons across borders
(Schengen Borders Code) (OJ L 105, 13.4.2006, p. 1).
(2) OJ L 131, 1.6.2000, p. 43.
(3) OJ L 64, 7.3.2002, p. 20.
(4) OJ L 176, 10.7.1999, p. 31.
(5) OJ L 53, 27.2.2008, p. 1.
(6) OJ L 83, 26.3.2008, p. 3.
Article 2
Scope
1. This Directive applies to third-country nationals staying
illegally on the territory of a Member State.
2. Member States may decide not to apply this Directive to
third-country nationals who:
(a) are subject to a refusal of entry in accordance with
Article 13 of the Schengen Borders Code, or who are appre­
hended or intercepted by the competent authorities in
connection with the irregular crossing by land, sea or air
of the external border of a Member State and who have not
subsequently obtained an authorisation or a right to stay in
that Member State;
(b) are subject to return as a criminal law sanction or as a
consequence of a criminal law sanction, according to
national law, or who are the subject of extradition
procedures.
3. This Directive shall not apply to persons enjoying the
Community right of free movement as defined in Article 2(5)
of the Schengen Borders Code.
Article 3
Definitions
For the purpose of this Directive the following definitions shall
apply:
1. ‘third-country national’ means any person who is not a
citizen of the Union within the meaning of Article 17(1)
of the Treaty and who is not a person enjoying the
Community right of free movement, as defined in
Article 2(5) of the Schengen Borders Code;
2. ‘illegal stay’ means the presence on the territory of a Member
State, of a third-country national who does not fulfil, or no
longer fulfils the conditions of entry as set out in Article 5 of
the Schengen Borders Code or other conditions for entry,
stay or residence in that Member State;
3. ‘return’ means the process of a third-country national going
back — whether in voluntary compliance with an obligation
to return, or enforced — to:
— his or her country of origin, or
— a country of transit in accordance with Community or
bilateral readmission agreements or other arrangements,
or
— another third country, to which the third-country
national concerned voluntarily decides to return and in
which he or she will be accepted;
4. ‘return decision’ means an administrative or judicial decision
or act, stating or declaring the stay of a third-country
national to be illegal and imposing or stating an obligation
to return;
5. ‘removal’ means the enforcement of the obligation to return,
namely the physical transportation out of the Member State;
6. ‘entry ban’ means an administrative or judicial decision or
act prohibiting entry into and stay on the territory of the
Member States for a specified period, accompanying a return
decision;
7. ‘risk of absconding’ means the existence of reasons in an
individual case which are based on objective criteria
defined by law to believe that a third-country national
who is the subject of return procedures may abscond;
8. ‘voluntary departure’ means compliance with the obligation
to return within the time-limit fixed for that purpose in the
return decision;
9. ‘vulnerable persons’ means minors, unaccompanied minors,
disabled people, elderly people, pregnant women, single
parents with minor children and persons who have been
subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psycho­
logical, physical or sexual violence.
Article 4
More favourable provisions
1. This Directive shall be without prejudice to more
favourable provisions of:
(a) bilateral or multilateral agreements between the Community
or the Community and its Member States and one or more
third countries;
(b) bilateral or multilateral agreements between one or more
Member States and one or more third countries.
2. This Directive shall be without prejudice to any provision
which may be more favourable for the third-country national,
laid down in the Community acquis relating to immigration and
asylum.
3. This Directive shall be without prejudice to the right of
the Member States to adopt or maintain provisions that are
more favourable to persons to whom it applies provided that
such provisions are compatible with this Directive.
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4. With regard to third-country nationals excluded from the
scope of this Directive in accordance with Article 2(2)(a),
Member States shall:
(a) ensure that their treatment and level of protection are no
less favourable than as set out in Article 8(4) and (5)
(limitations on use of coercive measures), Article 9(2)(a)
(postponement of removal), Article 14(1) (b) and (d)
(emergency health care and taking into account needs of
vulnerable persons), and Articles 16 and 17 (detention
conditions) and
(b) respect the principle of non-refoulement.
Article 5
Non-refoulement, best interests of the child, family life and
state of health
When implementing this Directive, Member States shall take
due account of:
(a) the best interests of the child;
(b) family life;
(c) the state of health of the third-country national concerned,
and respect the principle of non-refoulement.
CHAPTER II
TERMINATION OF ILLEGAL STAY
Article 6
Return decision
1. Member States shall issue a return decision to any third-
country national staying illegally on their territory, without
prejudice to the exceptions referred to in paragraphs 2 to 5.
2. Third-country nationals staying illegally on the territory of
a Member State and holding a valid residence permit or other
authorisation offering a right to stay issued by another Member
State shall be required to go to the territory of that other
Member State immediately. In the event of non-compliance
by the third-country national concerned with this requirement,
or where the third-country national’s immediate departure is
required for reasons of public policy or national security,
paragraph 1 shall apply.
3. Member States may refrain from issuing a return decision
to a third-country national staying illegally on their territory if
the third-country national concerned is taken back by another
Member State under bilateral agreements or arrangements
existing on the date of entry into force of this Directive. In
such a case the Member State which has taken back the
third-country national concerned shall apply paragraph 1.
4. Member States may at any moment decide to grant an
autonomous residence permit or other authorisation offering a
right to stay for compassionate, humanitarian or other reasons
to a third-country national staying illegally on their territory. In
that event no return decision shall be issued. Where a return
decision has already been issued, it shall be withdrawn or
suspended for the duration of validity of the residence permit
or other authorisation offering a right to stay.
5. If a third-country national staying illegally on the territory
of a Member State is the subject of a pending procedure for
renewing his or her residence permit or other authorisation
offering a right to stay, that Member State shall consider
refraining from issuing a return decision, until the pending
procedure is finished, without prejudice to paragraph 6.
6. This Directive shall not prevent Member States from
adopting a decision on the ending of a legal stay together
with a return decision and/or a decision on a removal and/or
entry ban in a single administrative or judicial decision or act as
provided for in their national legislation, without prejudice to
the procedural safeguards available under Chapter III and under
other relevant provisions of Community and national law.
Article 7
Voluntary departure
1. A return decision shall provide for an appropriate period
for voluntary departure of between seven and thirty days,
without prejudice to the exceptions referred to in paragraphs
2 and 4. Member States may provide in their national legis­
lation that such a period shall be granted only following an
application by the third-country national concerned. In such a
case, Member States shall inform the third-country nationals
concerned of the possibility of submitting such an application.
The time period provided for in the first subparagraph shall not
exclude the possibility for the third-country nationals concerned
to leave earlier.
2. Member States shall, where necessary, extend the period
for voluntary departure by an appropriate period, taking into
account the specific circumstances of the individual case, such
as the length of stay, the existence of children attending school
and the existence of other family and social links.
3. Certain obligations aimed at avoiding the risk of
absconding, such as regular reporting to the authorities,
deposit of an adequate financial guarantee, submission of
documents or the obligation to stay at a certain place may be
imposed for the duration of the period for voluntary departure.
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4. If there is a risk of absconding, or if an application for a
legal stay has been dismissed as manifestly unfounded or frau­
dulent, or if the person concerned poses a risk to public policy,
public security or national security, Member States may refrain
from granting a period for voluntary departure, or may grant a
period shorter than seven days.
Article 8
Removal
1. Member States shall take all necessary measures to enforce
the return decision if no period for voluntary departure has
been granted in accordance with Article 7(4) or if the obligation
to return has not been complied with within the period for
voluntary departure granted in accordance with Article 7.
2. If a Member State has granted a period for voluntary
departure in accordance with Article 7, the return decision
may be enforced only after the period has expired, unless a
risk as referred to in Article 7(4) arises during that period.
3. Member States may adopt a separate administrative or
judicial decision or act ordering the removal.
4. Where Member States use — as a last resort — coercive
measures to carry out the removal of a third-country national
who resists removal, such measures shall be proportionate and
shall not exceed reasonable force. They shall be implemented as
provided for in national legislation in accordance with funda­
mental rights and with due respect for the dignity and physical
integrity of the third-country national concerned.
5. In carrying out removals by air, Member States shall take
into account the Common Guidelines on security provisions for
joint removals by air annexed to Decision 2004/573/EC.
6. Member States shall provide for an effective forced-return
monitoring system.
Article 9
Postponement of removal
1. Member States shall postpone removal:
(a) when it would violate the principle of non-refoulement, or
(b) for as long as a suspensory effect is granted in accordance
with Article 13(2).
2. Member States may postpone removal for an appropriate
period taking into account the specific circumstances of the
individual case. Member States shall in particular take into
account:
(a) the third-country national’s physical state or mental
capacity;
(b) technical reasons, such as lack of transport capacity, or
failure of the removal due to lack of identification.
3. If a removal is postponed as provided for in paragraphs 1
and 2, the obligations set out in Article 7(3) may be imposed
on the third-country national concerned.
Article 10
Return and removal of unaccompanied minors
1. Before deciding to issue a return decision in respect of an
unaccompanied minor, assistance by appropriate bodies other
than the authorities enforcing return shall be granted with due
consideration being given to the best interests of the child.
2. Before removing an unaccompanied minor from the
territory of a Member State, the authorities of that Member
State shall be satisfied that he or she will be returned to a
member of his or her family, a nominated guardian or
adequate reception facilities in the State of return.
Article 11
Entry ban
1. Return decisions shall be accompanied by an entry ban:
(a) if no period for voluntary departure has been granted, or
(b) if the obligation to return has not been complied with.
In other cases return decisions may be accompanied by an entry
ban.
2. The length of the entry ban shall be determined with due
regard to all relevant circumstances of the individual case and
shall not in principle exceed five years. It may however exceed
five years if the third-country national represents a serious
threat to public policy, public security or national security.
3. Member States shall consider withdrawing or suspending
an entry ban where a third-country national who is the subject
of an entry ban issued in accordance with paragraph 1, second
subparagraph, can demonstrate that he or she has left the
territory of a Member State in full compliance with a return
decision.
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Victims of trafficking in human beings who have been granted a
residence permit pursuant to Council Directive 2004/81/EC of
29 April 2004 on the residence permit issued to third-country
nationals who are victims of trafficking in human beings or
who have been the subject of an action to facilitate illegal
immigration, who cooperate with the competent authorities (1)
shall not be subject of an entry ban without prejudice to
paragraph 1, first subparagraph, point (b), and provided that
the third-country national concerned does not represent a
threat to public policy, public security or national security.
Member States may refrain from issuing, withdraw or suspend
an entry ban in individual cases for humanitarian reasons.
Member States may withdraw or suspend an entry ban in indi­
vidual cases or certain categories of cases for other reasons.
4. Where a Member State is considering issuing a residence
permit or other authorisation offering a right to stay to a third-
country national who is the subject of an entry ban issued by
another Member State, it shall first consult the Member State
having issued the entry ban and shall take account of its
interests in accordance with Article 25 of the Convention im­
plementing the Schengen Agreement (2).
5. Paragraphs 1 to 4 shall apply without prejudice to the
right to international protection, as defined in Article 2(a) of
Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum
standards for the qualification and status of third country
nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who
otherwise need international protection and the content of the
protection granted (3), in the Member States.
CHAPTER III
PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS
Article 12
Form
1. Return decisions and, if issued, entry-ban decisions and
decisions on removal shall be issued in writing and give
reasons in fact and in law as well as information about
available legal remedies.
The information on reasons in fact may be limited where
national law allows for the right to information to be restricted,
in particular in order to safeguard national security, defence,
public security and for the prevention, investigation, detection
and prosecution of criminal offences.
2. Member States shall provide, upon request, a written or
oral translation of the main elements of decisions related to
return, as referred to in paragraph 1, including information
on the available legal remedies in a language the third-country
national understands or may reasonably be presumed to
understand.
3. Member States may decide not to apply paragraph 2 to
third country nationals who have illegally entered the territory
of a Member State and who have not subsequently obtained an
authorisation or a right to stay in that Member State.
In such cases decisions related to return, as referred to in
paragraph 1, shall be given by means of a standard form as
set out under national legislation.
Member States shall make available generalised information
sheets explaining the main elements of the standard form in
at least five of those languages which are most frequently used
or understood by illegal migrants entering the Member State
concerned.
Article 13
Remedies
1. The third-country national concerned shall be afforded an
effective remedy to appeal against or seek review of decisions
related to return, as referred to in Article 12(1), before a
competent judicial or administrative authority or a competent
body composed of members who are impartial and who enjoy
safeguards of independence.
2. The authority or body mentioned in paragraph 1 shall
have the power to review decisions related to return, as
referred to in Article 12(1), including the possibility of
temporarily suspending their enforcement, unless a temporary
suspension is already applicable under national legislation.
3. The third-country national concerned shall have the possi­
bility to obtain legal advice, representation and, where
necessary, linguistic assistance.
4. Member States shall ensure that the necessary legal
assistance and/or representation is granted on request free of
charge in accordance with relevant national legislation or rules
regarding legal aid, and may provide that such free legal
assistance and/or representation is subject to conditions as set
out in Article 15(3) to (6) of Directive 2005/85/EC.
Article 14
Safeguards pending return
1. Member States shall, with the exception of the situation
covered in Articles 16 and 17, ensure that the following prin­
ciples are taken into account as far as possible in relation to
third-country nationals during the period for voluntary
departure granted in accordance with Article 7 and during
periods for which removal has been postponed in accordance
with Article 9:
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(a) family unity with family members present in their territory
is maintained;
(b) emergency health care and essential treatment of illness are
provided;
(c) minors are granted access to the basic education system
subject to the length of their stay;
(d) special needs of vulnerable persons are taken into account.
2. Member States shall provide the persons referred to in
paragraph 1 with a written confirmation in accordance with
national legislation that the period for voluntary departure has
been extended in accordance with Article 7(2) or that the return
decision will temporarily not be enforced.
CHAPTER IV
DETENTION FOR THE PURPOSE OF REMOVAL
Article 15
Detention
1. Unless other sufficient but less coercive measures can be
applied effectively in a specific case, Member States may only
keep in detention a third-country national who is the subject of
return procedures in order to prepare the return and/or carry
out the removal process, in particular when:
(a) there is a risk of absconding or
(b) the third-country national concerned avoids or hampers the
preparation of return or the removal process.
Any detention shall be for as short a period as possible and
only maintained as long as removal arrangements are in
progress and executed with due diligence.
2. Detention shall be ordered by administrative or judicial
authorities.
Detention shall be ordered in writing with reasons being given
in fact and in law.
When detention has been ordered by administrative authorities,
Member States shall:
(a) either provide for a speedy judicial review of the lawfulness
of detention to be decided on as speedily as possible from
the beginning of detention;
(b) or grant the third-country national concerned the right to
take proceedings by means of which the lawfulness of
detention shall be subject to a speedy judicial review to
be decided on as speedily as possible after the launch of
the relevant proceedings. In such a case Member States shall
immediately inform the third-country national concerned
about the possibility of taking such proceedings.
The third-country national concerned shall be released immedi­
ately if the detention is not lawful.
3. In every case, detention shall be reviewed at reasonable
intervals of time either on application by the third-country
national concerned or ex officio. In the case of prolonged
detention periods, reviews shall be subject to the supervision
of a judicial authority.
4. When it appears that a reasonable prospect of removal no
longer exists for legal or other considerations or the conditions
laid down in paragraph 1 no longer exist, detention ceases to be
justified and the person concerned shall be released immedi­
ately.
5. Detention shall be maintained for as long a period as the
conditions laid down in paragraph 1 are fulfilled and it is
necessary to ensure successful removal. Each Member State
shall set a limited period of detention, which may not exceed
six months.
6. Member States may not extend the period referred to in
paragraph 5 except for a limited period not exceeding a further
twelve months in accordance with national law in cases where
regardless of all their reasonable efforts the removal operation is
likely to last longer owing to:
(a) a lack of cooperation by the third-country national
concerned, or
(b) delays in obtaining the necessary documentation from third
countries.
Article 16
Conditions of detention
1. Detention shall take place as a rule in specialised detention
facilities. Where a Member State cannot provide accommo­
dation in a specialised detention facility and is obliged to
resort to prison accommodation, the third-country nationals
in detention shall be kept separated from ordinary prisoners.
2. Third-country nationals in detention shall be allowed —
on request — to establish in due time contact with legal repre­
sentatives, family members and competent consular authorities.
3. Particular attention shall be paid to the situation of
vulnerable persons. Emergency health care and essential
treatment of illness shall be provided.
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4. Relevant and competent national, international and non-
governmental organisations and bodies shall have the possibility
to visit detention facilities, as referred to in paragraph 1, to the
extent that they are being used for detaining third-country
nationals in accordance with this Chapter. Such visits may be
subject to authorisation.
5. Third-country nationals kept in detention shall be system­
atically provided with information which explains the rules
applied in the facility and sets out their rights and obligations.
Such information shall include information on their entitlement
under national law to contact the organisations and bodies
referred to in paragraph 4.
Article 17
Detention of minors and families
1. Unaccompanied minors and families with minors shall
only be detained as a measure of last resort and for the
shortest appropriate period of time.
2. Families detained pending removal shall be provided with
separate accommodation guaranteeing adequate privacy.
3. Minors in detention shall have the possibility to engage in
leisure activities, including play and recreational activities appro­
priate to their age, and shall have, depending on the length of
their stay, access to education.
4. Unaccompanied minors shall as far as possible be
provided with accommodation in institutions provided with
personnel and facilities which take into account the needs of
persons of their age.
5. The best interests of the child shall be a primary consider­
ation in the context of the detention of minors pending
removal.
Article 18
Emergency situations
1. In situations where an exceptionally large number of
third-country nationals to be returned places an unforeseen
heavy burden on the capacity of the detention facilities of a
Member State or on its administrative or judicial staff, such a
Member State may, as long as the exceptional situation persists,
decide to allow for periods for judicial review longer than those
provided for under the third subparagraph of Article 15(2) and
to take urgent measures in respect of the conditions of
detention derogating from those set out in Articles 16(1) and
17(2).
2. When resorting to such exceptional measures, the Member
State concerned shall inform the Commission. It shall also
inform the Commission as soon as the reasons for applying
these exceptional measures have ceased to exist.
3. Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted as allowing
Member States to derogate from their general obligation to
take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular,
to ensure fulfilment of their obligations under this Directive.
CHAPTER V
FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 19
Reporting
The Commission shall report every three years to the European
Parliament and the Council on the application of this Directive
in the Member States and, if appropriate, propose amendments.
The Commission shall report for the first time by 24 December
2013 and focus on that occasion in particular on the appli­
cation of Article 11, Article 13(4) and Article 15 in Member
States. In relation to Article 13(4) the Commission shall assess
in particular the additional financial and administrative impact
in Member States.
Article 20
Transposition
1. Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations
and administrative provisions necessary to comply with this
Directive by 24 December 2010. In relation to Article 13(4),
Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and
administrative provisions necessary to comply with this
Directive by 24 December 2011. They shall forthwith commu­
nicate to the Commission the text of those measures.
When Member States adopt those measures, they shall contain a
reference to this Directive or be accompanied by such a
reference on the occasion of their official publication. Member
States shall determine how such reference is to be made.
2. Member States shall communicate to the Commission the
text of the main provisions of national law which they adopt in
the field covered by this Directive.
Article 21
Relationship with the Schengen Convention
This Directive replaces the provisions of Articles 23 and 24 of
the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement.
Article 22
Entry into force
This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day
following that of its publication in the Official Journal of the
European Union.
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Article 23
Addressees
This Directive is addressed to the Member States in accordance with the Treaty establishing the European
Community.
Done at Strasbourg, 16 December 2008.
For the European Parliament
The President
H.-G. PÖTTERING
For the Council
The President
B. LE MAIRE
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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (First Chamber) 
28 April 2011(*) 
(Area of freedom, security and justice – Directive 2008/115/EC – Return 
of illegally staying third-country nationals – Articles 15 and 16 – National 
legislation providing for a prison sentence for illegally staying third-
country nationals in the event of refusal to obey an order to leave the 
territory of a Member State – Compatibility) 
In Case C-61/11 PPU, 
REFERENCE for a preliminary ruling under Article 267 TFEU from the Corte 
d’appello di Trento (Italy), made by decision of 2 February 2011, received 
at the Court on 10 February 2011, in the criminal proceedings against 
Hassen El Dridi alias Soufi Karim, 
THE COURT (First Chamber), 
composed of A. Tizzano, President of the Chamber, J.-J. Kasel, M. Ilešič 
(Rapporteur), E. Levits and M. Safjan, Judges, 
Advocate General: J. Mazák, 
Registrar: A. Impellizzeri, Administrator, 
having regard to the request by the national court of 2 February 2011, 
received at the Court on 10 February 2011 and supplemented on 11 
February 2011, that the reference for a preliminary ruling be dealt with 
under an urgent procedure, in accordance with Article 104b of the Court’s 
Rules of Procedure, 
having regard to the decision of 17 February 2011 of the First Chamber 
granting that request, 
having regard to the written procedure and further to the hearing on 30 
March 2011, 
after considering the observations submitted on behalf of: 
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– Mr El Dridi, by M. Pisani and L. Masera, avvocati, 
– the Italian Government, by G. Palmieri, acting as Agent, and by L. 
D’Ascia, avvocato dello Stato, 
– the European Commission, by M. Condou-Durande and L. Prete, acting 
as Agents, 
after hearing the Advocate General, 
gives the following 
Judgment 
1  This reference for a preliminary ruling concerns the interpretation of 
Articles 15 and 16 of Directive 2008/115/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 on common 
standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally 
staying third-country nationals (OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98). 
2  The reference has been made in proceedings brought against Mr El 
Dridi, who was sentenced to one year’s imprisonment for the offence 
of having stayed illegally on Italian territory without valid grounds, 
contrary to a removal order made against him by the Questore di 
Udine (chief of police, Udine). 
 
Legal context 
European Union legislation 
3  Recitals 2, 6, 13, 16 and 17 in the preamble to Directive 2008/115 
state: 
‘(2) The Brussels European Council of 4 and 5 November 2004 called 
for the establishment of an effective removal and repatriation 
policy, based on common standards, for persons to be returned 
in a humane manner and with full respect for their fundamental 
rights and dignity. 
… 
(6) Member States should ensure that the ending of illegal stay of 
third-country nationals is carried out through a fair and 
transparent procedure. … 
… 
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(13) The use of coercive measures should be expressly subject to the 
principles of proportionality and effectiveness with regard to the 
means used and objectives pursued. … 
… 
(16) The use of detention for the purpose of removal should be 
limited and subject to the principle of proportionality with regard 
to the means used and objectives pursued. Detention is justified 
only to prepare the return or carry out the removal process and 
if the application of less coercive measures would not be 
sufficient. 
(17) Third-country nationals in detention should be treated in a 
humane and dignified manner with respect for their fundamental 
rights and in compliance with international and national law. 
Without prejudice to the initial apprehension by law-enforcement 
authorities, regulated by national legislation, detention should, 
as a rule, take place in specialised detention facilities. 
4  Article 1 of Directive 2008/115, entitled ‘subject-matter’, provides: 
‘This Directive sets out common standards and procedures to be 
applied in Member States for returning illegally staying third-country 
nationals, in accordance with fundamental rights as general principles 
of Community law as well as international law, including refugee 
protection and human rights obligations.’ 
5  Article 2(1) and (2) of that directive provides: 
‘1. This Directive applies to third-country nationals staying illegally on 
the territory of a Member State. 
2. Member States may decide not to apply this Directive to third-
country nationals who: 
… 
 
(b) are subject to return as a criminal law sanction or as a 
consequence of a criminal law sanction, according to national 
law, or who are the subject of extradition procedures.’ 
6  Article 3(4) of Directive 2008/115 defines the term ‘return decision’, 
for the purposes of that directive, as ‘an administrative or judicial 
decision or act, stating or declaring the stay of a third-country 
national to be illegal and imposing or stating an obligation to return’. 
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7  Article 4(3) of that directive states: 
‘This Directive shall be without prejudice to the right of the Member 
States to adopt or maintain provisions that are more favourable to 
persons to whom it applies provided that such provisions are 
compatible with this Directive.’ 
8  According to Article 6(1) of the same directive, ‘Member States shall 
issue a return decision to any third-country national staying illegally 
on their territory, without prejudice to the exceptions referred to in 
paragraphs 2 to 5’. 
9  Article 7 of Directive 2008/115, entitled ‘voluntary departure’, is 
worded as follows: 
‘1. A return decision shall provide for an appropriate period for 
voluntary departure of between seven and thirty days, without 
prejudice to the exceptions referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4. 
Member States may provide in their national legislation that such a 
period shall be granted only following an application by the third-
country national concerned. In such a case, Member States shall 
inform the third-country nationals concerned of the possibility of 
submitting such an application. 
… 
3. Certain obligations aimed at avoiding the risk of absconding, such 
as regular reporting to the authorities, deposit of an adequate 
financial guarantee, submission of documents or the obligation to 
stay at a certain place may be imposed for the duration of the period 
for voluntary departure. 
4. If there is a risk of absconding, or if an application for a legal stay 
has been dismissed as manifestly unfounded or fraudulent, or if the 
person concerned poses a risk to public policy, public security or 
national security, Member States may refrain from granting a period 
for voluntary departure, or may grant a period shorter than seven 
days.’ 
 
10  Article 8(1) and (4) of that directive provides: 
‘1. Member States shall take all necessary measures to enforce the 
return decision if no period for voluntary departure has been granted 
in accordance with Article 7(4) or if the obligation to return has not 
been complied with within the period for voluntary departure granted 
in accordance with Article 7. 
… 
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4. Where Member States use — as a last resort — coercive measures 
to carry out the removal of a third-country national who resists 
removal, such measures shall be proportionate and shall not exceed 
reasonable force. They shall be implemented as provided for in 
national legislation in accordance with fundamental rights and with 
due respect for the dignity and physical integrity of the third-country 
national concerned.’ 
11  Article 15 of that same directive, under Chapter IV thereof, relating to 
detention for the purpose of removal, reads as follows: 
‘1. Unless other sufficient but less coercive measures can be applied 
effectively in a specific case, Member States may only keep in 
detention a third-country national who is the subject of return 
procedures in order to prepare the return and/or carry out the 
removal process, in particular when: 
(a)  there is a risk of absconding or 
(b)  the third-country national concerned avoids or hampers the 
preparation of return or the removal process. 
Any detention shall be for as short a period as possible and only 
maintained as long as removal arrangements are in progress and 
executed with due diligence. 
… 
3. In every case, detention shall be reviewed at reasonable intervals 
of time either on application by the third-country national concerned 
or ex officio. In the case of prolonged detention periods, reviews shall 
be subject to the supervision of a judicial authority. 
4. When it appears that a reasonable prospect of removal no longer 
exists for legal or other considerations or the conditions laid down in 
paragraph 1 no longer exist, detention ceases to be justified and the 
person concerned shall be released immediately. 
5. Detention shall be maintained for as long a period as the 
conditions laid down in paragraph 1 are fulfilled and it is necessary to 
ensure successful removal. Each Member State shall set a limited 
period of detention, which may not exceed six months. 
6. Member States may not extend the period referred to in paragraph 
5 except for a limited period not exceeding a further twelve months in 
accordance with national law in cases where regardless of all their 
reasonable efforts the removal operation is likely to last longer owing 
to: 
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(a)  a lack of cooperation by the third-country national concerned, 
or 
(b)  delays in obtaining the necessary documentation from third 
countries.’ 
12  Article 16 of Directive 2008/115, entitled ‘conditions of detention’, 
provides in paragraph 1: 
‘Detention shall take place as a rule in specialised detention facilities. 
Where a Member State cannot provide accommodation in a specialised 
detention facility and is obliged to resort to prison accommodation, the 
third-country nationals in detention shall be kept separated from 
ordinary prisoners.’ 
13  According to Article 18 of Directive 2008/115, entitled ‘emergency 
situations’: 
‘1. In situations where an exceptionally large number of third-country 
nationals to be returned places an unforeseen heavy burden on the 
capacity of the detention facilities of a Member State or on its 
administrative or judicial staff, such a Member State may, as long as 
the exceptional situation persists, decide … to take urgent measures in 
respect of the conditions of detention derogating from those set out in 
[Article] 16(1) … . 
2. When resorting to such exceptional measures, the Member State 
concerned shall inform the Commission. It shall also inform the 
Commission as soon as the reasons for applying these exceptional 
measures have ceased to exist. 
3. Nothing in this Article shall be interpreted as allowing Member 
States to derogate from their general obligation to take all appropriate 
measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of their 
obligations under this Directive.’ 
14  According to the first subparagraph of Article 20(1) of Directive 
2008/115, Member States were to bring into force the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions necessary to comply 
therewith, with the exception of Article 13(4), by 24 December 2010. 
15  Pursuant to Article 22 thereof, that directive entered into force on 13 
January 2009. 
National legislation 
16  Article 13(2) and (4) of Legislative Decree No 286/1998 of 25 July 
1998  consolidating the  provisions regulating immigration and the 
rules relating to  the status of foreign national  (Ordinary Supplement  
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to GURI No 191 of 18 August 1998), as amended by Law No 94 of 15 
July 2009 on public security (Ordinary Supplement to GURI No 170 of 
24 July 2009) (‘Legislative Decree No 286/1998’), provides: 
‘2. The expulsion shall be ordered by the prefect where the foreign 
national: 
(a)  entered the territory of the State without going through border 
control and has not been returned …; 
(b)  has remained on the territory of the State … without applying 
for a residence permit within the period imposed, except where 
that delay is due to force majeure, or despite the revocation or 
cancellation of the residence permit, or without applying for 
renewal of a residence permit which had expired over 60 days 
previously. ... 
… 
4. The expulsion shall always be carried out by the Questore with 
deportation by the law enforcement authorities, except as provided for 
in paragraph 5.’ 
17  Article 14 of Legislative Decree No 286/1998 is worded as follows: 
‘1. Where it is not possible to effect immediately the expulsion by 
deportation or return because it is necessary to provide assistance to 
the foreign national, conduct further checks on his identity or 
nationality, acquire travel documents, or because of the unavailability 
of the carrier or other suitable means of transport, the Questore shall 
order that the foreign national is to be detained, for the length of time 
which is strictly necessary, in the nearest detention centre among 
those identified or established by decree of the Minister for the Interior, 
in agreement with the Ministers for Social Solidarity and the Treasury, 
for the Budget and for Economic Planning. 
… 
5a. Where it is not possible to place the foreign national in a detention 
centre, or where the stay in such a centre has not allowed for the 
expulsion or return by deportation to be carried out, the Questore shall 
order the foreign national to leave the territory of the State within five 
days. The order shall be in writing and state the consequences of the 
illegal stay on the territory of the State in terms of penalties, including 
in the event of a repeat offence. The order of the Questore may include 
the presentation to the person concerned of the documents necessary 
to go to the diplomatic mission or consular post of his country in Italy, 
and also to return to the country to which he belongs or, if that is not 
possible, to the country from which he came. 
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5b. A foreign national who remains illegally and without valid grounds 
on the territory of the State, contrary to the order issued by the 
Questore in accordance with paragraph 5a, shall be liable to a term of 
imprisonment of one to four years if the expulsion or the return has 
been ordered following an illegal entry into the national territory …, or 
if application has not been made for a residence permit or the person 
concerned has not declared his presence on the territory of the State 
within the period imposed where there is no force majeure, or if his 
residence permit has been revoked or cancelled. A term of 
imprisonment of six months to one year shall apply if the expulsion 
was ordered because the residence permit expired more than 60 days 
previously and application for renewal has not been made, or if the 
application for a residence permit was rejected …. In any event, save 
where the foreign national is placed in detention, a new expulsion order 
with deportation by the law enforcement authorities shall be issued for 
the non-execution of the removal order issued by the Questore 
pursuant to paragraph 5a. Where deportation is not possible, the 
provisions of paragraphs 1 and 5a of the present Article shall apply … . 
5c. A foreign national who is the recipient of the expulsion order 
referred to in paragraph 5b and a new removal order as referred to in 
paragraph 5a and who remains illegally on the territory of the State 
shall be liable to a term of imprisonment of between one and five 
years. In any event, the provisions of the third and last sentences of 
paragraph 5b shall apply. 
5d. Where the offences referred to in the first sentence of paragraph 
5b and paragraph 5c are committed, the rito direttissimo [expedited 
procedure] shall be followed and the arrest of the perpetrator shall be 
mandatory.’ 
The dispute in the main proceedings and the question referred 
for a preliminary ruling 
18  Mr El Dridi is a third-country national who entered Italy illegally and 
does not hold a residence permit. A deportation decree was issued 
against him by the Prefect of Turin on 8 May 2004. 
19  An order requiring his removal from the national territory, issued on 21 
May 2010 by the Questore di Udine pursuant to that deportation 
decree, was notified to him on the same day. The reasons for that 
removal order were that no vehicle or other means of transport was 
available, that Mr El Dridi had no identification documents and that it 
was not possible for him to be accommodated at a detention facility as 
no places were available in the establishments intended for that 
purpose. 
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20  A check carried out on 29 September 2010 revealed that Mr El Dridi 
had not complied with that removal order. 
21  Mr El Dridi was sentenced at the conclusion of an expedited procedure 
by a single judge of the Tribunale di Trento (District Court, Trento) to 
one year’s imprisonment for the offence set out in Article 14(5b) of 
Legislative Decree No 286/1998. 
22  He appealed against that decision before the Corte d’appello di Trento 
(Appeal Court, Trento). 
23  That court is in doubt as to whether a criminal penalty may be imposed 
during administrative procedures concerning the return of a foreign 
national to his country of origin due to non-compliance with the stages 
of those procedures, since such a penalty seems contrary to the 
principle of sincere cooperation, to the need for attainment of the 
objectives of Directive 2008/115 and for ensuring the effectiveness 
thereof, and also to the principle that the penalty must be 
proportionate, appropriate and reasonable. 
24  It states in that regard that the criminal penalty provided for in Article 
14(5b) of Legislative Decree No 286/1998 comes into play subsequent 
to the finding of an infringement of an intermediate stage of the 
gradual procedure for implementing the return decision, provided for 
by Directive 2008/115, namely non-compliance simply with the 
removal order. A term of imprisonment of one to four years seems, 
moreover, to be extremely severe. 
25  In those circumstances, the Corte d’appello di Trento decided to stay 
the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of 
Justice for a preliminary ruling: 
‘In the light of the principle of sincere cooperation, the purpose of 
which is to ensure the attainment of the objectives of the directive, and 
the principle that the penalty must be proportionate, appropriate and 
reasonable, do Articles 15 and 16 of Directive 2008/115… preclude: 
—  the possibility that criminal penalties may be imposed in respect of 
a breach of an intermediate stage in the administrative return 
procedure, before that procedure is completed, by having recourse 
to the most severe administrative measure of constraint which 
remains available? 
—  the possibility of a sentence of up to four years’ imprisonment being 
imposed in respect of a simple failure to cooperate in the 
deportation procedure on the part of the person concerned, in 
particular where the first removal order issued by the administrative 
authorities has not been complied with?’ 
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The urgent procedure 
26  The Corte d’appello di Trento asked for the reference for a preliminary 
ruling to be dealt with under the urgent procedure pursuant to Article 
104b of the Court’s Rules of Procedure. 
27  The referring court justified its request by stating that Mr El Dridi is 
being detained in order to enforce the sentence imposed on him by the 
Tribunale di Trento. 
28  The First Chamber of the Court, after hearing the Advocate General, 
decided to grant the referring court’s request for the reference for a 
preliminary ruling to be dealt with under the urgent procedure. 
Consideration of the question referred  
29  By its question, the referring court asks, in essence, whether Directive 
2008/115, in particular Articles 15 and 16 thereof, must be interpreted 
as precluding a Member State’s legislation, such as that at issue in the 
main proceedings, which provides for a sentence of imprisonment to be 
imposed on an illegally staying third-country national on the sole 
ground that he remains, without valid grounds, on the territory of that 
State, contrary to an order to leave that territory within a given period. 
30  The national court refers in that regard to the principle of sincere 
cooperation laid down in Article 4(3) TEU, and to the objective of 
ensuring the effectiveness of European Union law. 
31  It must be borne in mind in that regard that recital 2 in the preamble 
to Directive 2008/115 states that it pursues the establishment of an 
effective removal and repatriation policy, based on common standards, 
for persons to be returned in a humane manner and with full respect 
for their fundamental rights and also their dignity. 
32  As is apparent from both its title and Article 1, Directive 2008/115 
establishes ‘common standards and procedures’ which must be applied 
by each Member State for returning illegally staying third-country 
nationals. It follows from that expression, but also from the general 
scheme of that directive, that the Member States may depart from 
those standards and procedures only as provided for therein, inter alia 
in Article 4. 
33  It follows that, although Article 4(3) allows Member States to adopt or 
maintain provisions that are more favourable than Directive 2008/115 
to  illegally staying third-country nationals provided that such 
provisions are compatible with it,  that directive does not however  
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allow those States to apply stricter standards in the area that it 
governs. 
34  It should also be observed that  Directive 2008/115 sets out 
specifically the procedure to be applied by each Member State for 
returning illegally staying third-country nationals and fixes the order in 
which the various, successive stages of that procedure should take 
place. 
35  Thus, Article 6(1) of the directive provides, first of all, principally, for 
an obligation for Member States to issue a return decision against any 
third-country national staying illegally on their territory. 
36  As part of that initial stage of the return procedure, priority is to be 
given, except where otherwise provided for, to voluntary compliance 
with the obligation resulting from that return decision, with Article 7(1) 
of Directive 2008/115 providing that the decision must provide for an 
appropriate period for voluntary departure of between seven and thirty 
days. 
37  It follows from Article 7(3) and (4) of that directive that it is only in 
particular circumstances, such as where there is a risk of absconding, 
that Member States may, first, require the addressee of a return 
decision to report regularly to the authorities, deposit an adequate 
financial guarantee, submit documents or stay at a certain place or, 
second, grant a period shorter than seven days for voluntary departure 
or even refrain from granting such a period. 
38  In the latter situation, but also where the obligation to return has not 
been complied with within the period for voluntary departure, Article 
8(1) and (4) of Directive 2008/115 provides that, in order to ensure 
effective return procedures, those provisions require the Member State 
which has issued a return decision against an illegally staying third-
country national to carry out the removal by taking all necessary 
measures including, where appropriate, coercive measures, in a pro-
portionate manner and with due respect for, inter alia, fundamental 
rights. 
39  In that regard, it follows from recital 16 in the preamble to that 
directive and from the wording of Article 15(1) that the Member States 
must carry out the removal using the least coercive measures possible. 
It is only where, in the light of an assessment of each specific situation, 
the enforcement of the return decision in the form of removal risks 
being compromised by the conduct of the person concerned that the 
Member States may deprive that person of his liberty and detain him. 
40  Under the second  subparagraph of  Article 15(1) of Directive 
2008/115, that deprivation of liberty must be for as short a period as  
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possible and only maintained as long as removal arrangements are in 
progress and executed with due diligence. Under Article 15(3) and 
(4), such deprivation of liberty is subject to review at reasonable 
intervals of time and is to be terminated when it appears that a 
reasonable prospect of removal no longer exists. Article 15(5) and (6) 
fixes the maximum duration of  detention at 18 months, a limit which 
is imposed on all  Member States.  Article 16(1) of that directive 
further requires that the persons concerned are to be placed in a 
specialised facility and, in any event, kept separated from ordinary 
prisoners. 
41  It follows from the foregoing that the order in which the stages of the 
return procedure established by Directive 2008/115 are to take place 
corresponds to a gradation of the measures to be taken in order to 
enforce the return decision, a gradation which goes from the measure 
which allows the  person concerned the most liberty,  namely granting 
a period for his voluntary departure, to measures which restrict that 
liberty the most,  namely detention in a specialised facility; the 
principle of  proportionality must be  observed throughout those 
stages. 
42  It is clear that even the use of the latter measure, which is the most 
serious constraining measure allowed under the directive under a 
forced removal procedure, is strictly regulated, pursuant to Articles 15 
and 16 of that directive, inter alia in order to ensure observance of the 
fundamental rights of the third-country nationals concerned. 
43  In particular, the maximum period laid down in  Article 15(5) and (6) 
of Directive 2008/115  serves the purpose of  limiting the deprivation 
of third-country  nationals’ liberty in a situation of forced removal 
(Case C-357/09 PPU Kadzoev [2009] ECR I-11189, paragraph 56). 
Directive 2008/115 is thus intended to take account both of the case-
law of the European Court of Human Rights, according to which the 
principle of proportionality requires that the detention of a person 
against whom a deportation or extradition procedure is under way 
should not continue for an unreasonable length of time, that is, its 
length should not exceed that required for the purpose pursued (see, 
inter alia, ECHR, Saadi v United Kingdom, 29 January 2008, not yet 
published in the Reports of Judgments and Decisions, § 72 and 74), 
and of the eighth of the ‘Twenty guidelines on forced return’ adopted 
on  4 May 2005 by the  Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe, referred to in recital 3 in the preamble to the directive. 
According to that guideline,  any detention pending removal  is to be 
for as short a period as possible. 
44  It is in the light of those considerations that it must be assessed 
whether the common rules introduced by Directive 2008/115 preclude 
national legislation such as that at issue in the main proceedings. 
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45  It should be observed in that regard first that, as is apparent from the 
information provided both by the referring court and by the Italian 
Government in its written observations, Directive 2008/115 has not 
been transposed into Italian law. 
46  According to  settled case-law, where a Member State fails to 
transpose a directive by the end of the period prescribed or fails to 
transpose the directive correctly, the provisions of that directive which 
appear,  so far as their subject-matter is concerned, to be 
unconditional and sufficiently precise may be relied on by individuals 
against the State (see, to that effect, inter alia, Case 152/84 Marshall 
[1986] ECR I-723, paragraph 46, and Case C-203/10 Auto Nikolovi 
[2011] ECR I-0000, paragraph 61). 
47  That is true of Articles 15 and 16 of Directive 2008/115, which, as is 
clear from paragraph 40 of this judgment, are unconditional and 
sufficiently precise, so that no other specific elements are required for 
them to be implemented by the Member States. 
48  Moreover,  a person in  Mr El Dridi’s situation comes within the 
personal scope of Directive 2008/115,  since, under Article 2(1) 
thereof, that directive applies to  third-country nationals staying 
illegally on the territory of a Member State. 
49  As observed by the Advocate General in points 22 to 28 of his View, 
that finding is not affected by Article 2(2)(b) of that directive, which 
allows Member States to decide not to apply the directive to third-
country nationals who are subject to return as a criminal law sanction 
or as a consequence of a criminal law sanction, according to national 
law, or who are the subject of extradition procedures. The order for 
reference indicates that the obligation to return results, in the main 
proceedings, from a decree of the Prefect of Turin of 8 May 2004. 
Moreover, the criminal penalties referred to in that provision do not 
relate to non-compliance with the period granted for voluntary depar-
ture. 
50  It must be observed, second, that even though the decree of the 
Prefect of Turin of 8 May 2004, in so far as it establishes an obligation 
for Mr El Dridi to leave the national territory, is a ‘return decision’ as 
defined in  Article 3(4) of Directive 2008/115 and referred to,  inter 
alia, in Articles 6(1) and 7(1) thereof, the removal procedure provided 
for by the Italian legislation at issue in the main proceedings is 
significantly different from that established by that directive. 
51  Thus, whilst that directive requires  that a period of  between seven 
and 30 days be granted for  voluntary departure,  Legislative Decree 
No 286/1998 does not provide for recourse to that measure. 
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52  Next, as regards the coercive measures  which the Member  States 
may implement under Article 8(4) of Directive 2008/115, such as,  
inter alia, deportation as provided for by Article 13(4) of Legislative 
Decree No 286/1998, it is clear that in a situation where such 
measures have not led to the expected result being attained, namely, 
the removal of the third-country national against whom they were 
issued, the Member States remain free to adopt measures, including 
criminal law measures, aimed inter alia at dissuading those nationals 
from remaining illegally on those States’ territory. 
53  It should be noted, however, that, although in principle criminal 
legislation and the rules of criminal procedure are matters for which 
the Member States are responsible, this branch of the law may 
nevertheless be affected by European Union law (see, to that effect, 
Case 203/80 Casati [1981] ECR 2595, paragraph 27; Case 186/87 
Cowan [1989] ECR 195, paragraph 19; and Case C-226/97 Lemmens 
[1998] ECR I-3711, paragraph 19). 
54  It follows that,  notwithstanding the fact that  neither point (3)(b) of 
the first paragraph of Article 63 EC, a provision which was reproduced 
in Article 79(2)(c) TFEU, nor Directive 2008/115, adopted inter alia on 
the basis of that provision of the EC Treaty, precludes the Member 
States from having competence in criminal matters in the area of 
illegal immigration and illegal stays, they must adjust their legislation 
in that area in order to ensure compliance with European Union law. 
55  In particular, those States may not apply rules, even  criminal law 
rules, which are liable to jeopardise the achievement of the objectives 
pursued by a directive and, therefore, deprive it of its effectiveness. 
56  According to the wording of the second and third subparagraphs 
respectively of Article 4(3) TEU,  the Member States inter alia ‘shall 
take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure 
fulfilment of the obligations  arising out of the Treaties or resulting 
from the acts of the institutions of the Union’ and ‘shall … refrain from 
any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s 
objectives’, including those pursued by directives. 
57  Regarding, more specifically, Directive 2008/115, it must be remem-
bered that, according to recital 13 in the preamble thereto, it makes 
the use of coercive measures expressly subject to the principles of 
proportionality and effectiveness with regard to the means used and 
objectives pursued. 
58  Consequently, the Member States may not, in order to remedy the 
failure of coercive measures adopted in order to carry out forced 
removal pursuant to Article 8(4) of that directive, provide for a 
custodial sentence, such as that provided for by Article 14(5b) of 
Legislative Decree No 286/1998, on the sole ground that a third-
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country national continues to stay illegally on the territory of a Member 
State after an order to leave the national territory was notified to him 
and the period granted in that order has expired; rather, they must 
pursue their efforts to enforce the return decision, which continues to 
produce its effects. 
59  Such a penalty, due inter alia to its conditions and methods of appli-
cation, risks jeopardising the attainment of the objective pursued by 
that directive, namely, the establishment of an effective policy of 
removal and repatriation of illegally staying third-country nationals. In 
particular, as observed by the Advocate General in point 42 of his 
View,  national legislation such as that  at issue in the main 
proceedings is liable to frustrate the application of the measures 
referred to in Article 8(1) of Directive 2008/115 and delay the 
enforcement of the return decision. 
60  That does not preclude the possibility for the Member States to adopt, 
with respect for the principles and objective of Directive 2008/115, 
provisions regulating the situation in which coercive measures have not 
resulted in  the removal of a  third-country national  staying  illegally 
on their territory. 
61  In the light of the foregoing, it will be for the national court, which is 
called upon, within the exercise of its jurisdiction, to apply and give full 
effect to provisions of European Union law, to refuse to apply any 
provision of Legislative Decree No 286/1998 which is contrary to the 
result of  Directive 2008/115,  including Article 14(5b) of that 
legislative decree  (see, to that effect,  Case 106/77 Simmenthal 
[1978] ECR 629, paragraph 24;  Case C-462/99 Connect Austria 
[2003] ECR I-5197,  paragraphs 38 and 40; and Joined Cases 
C-188/10 and C-189/10 Melki and Abdeli [2010] ECR I-0000, 
paragraph 43). In so doing, the referring court will have to take due 
account of the principle of the retroactive application of the more 
lenient penalty, which forms part of the constitutional traditions 
common to the Member States  (Joined Cases C-387/02,  C-391/02 
and C-403/02 Berlusconi and Others [2005] ECR I-3565, paragraphs 
67 to 69, and  Case C-420/06 Jager [2008] ECR I-1315, paragraph 
59). 
62  Consequently, the answer to the question referred is that Directive 
2008/115, in particular Articles 15 and 16 thereof, must be interpreted 
as precluding a Member State’s legislation, such as that at issue in the 
main proceedings, which provides for a sentence of imprisonment to be 
imposed on an illegally staying third-country national on the sole 
ground that he remains, without valid grounds, on the territory of that 
State, contrary to an order to leave that territory within a given period. 
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Costs 
63  Since these proceedings are,  for the parties to the main proceedings, 
a step in the action pending before the national court, the decision on 
costs is a matter for that court. Costs incurred in submitting 
observations to the Court, other than the costs of those parties, are 
not recoverable. 
 
On those grounds, the Court (First Chamber) hereby rules: 
Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 16 December 2008 on common standards and 
procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying 
third-country nationals, in particular Articles 15 and 16 thereof, 
must be interpreted as precluding a Member State’s legislation, 
such as that at issue in the main proceedings, which provides 
for a sentence of imprisonment to be imposed on an illegally 
staying third-country national on the sole ground that he 
remains, without valid grounds, on the territory of that State, 
contrary to an order to leave that territory within a given 
period. 
 
[Signatures] 
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JUDGMENT OF THE COURT (Grand Chamber) 
30 November 2009 (*) 
(Visas, asylum, immigration and other policies related to free 
movement of persons – Directive 2008/115/EC – Return of  
illegally staying third-country nationals – Article 15(4) to (6) – 
Period of detention – Taking into account the period during which 
the execution of a removal decision was suspended – Concept of 
‘reasonable prospect of removal’) 
In Case C-357/09 PPU, 
REFERENCE for a preliminary ruling under Articles 68 EC and 234 EC 
from the Administrativen sad Sofia-grad (Bulgaria), made by 
decision of 10 August 2009, received at the Court on 7 September 
2009, in the proceedings concerning 
Said Shamilovich Kadzoev (Huchbarov), 
THE COURT (Grand Chamber), 
composed of V. Skouris, President, A. Tizzano, J.N. Cunha 
Rodrigues, K. Lenaerts, J.-C. Bonichot, C. Toader, Presidents of 
Chambers, C.W.A. Timmermans, P. Kūris, E. Juhász, G. Arestis, L. 
Bay Larsen (Rapporteur), T. von Danwitz and A. Arabadjiev, Judges, 
Advocate General: J. Mazák, 
Registrar: N. Nanchev, Administrator, 
having regard to the request of the referring court of 10 August 
2009, received at the Court on 7 September 2009 and 
supplemented on 10 September 2009, that the reference for a 
preliminary ruling be dealt with under an urgent procedure pursuant 
to Article 104b of the Rules of Procedure, 
having regard to the decision of the Second Chamber of 22 
September 2009 granting that request, 
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having regard to  the written  procedure and  further to the   
hearing on 27 October 2009, 
after considering the observations submitted on behalf of: 
–        Mr Kadzoev, by D. Daskalova and V. Ilareva, advokati, 
–        the Bulgarian Government, by T. Ivanov and E. Petranova, 
acting as Agents, 
–        the Lithuanian Government, by R. Mackevičienė, acting as 
Agent, 
–        the Commission of the  European Communities, by S. 
Petrova and M. Condou-Durande, acting as Agents, 
after hearing the Advocate General, 
gives the following 
Judgment 
1       This  reference for  a  preliminary  ruling  concerns the 
interpretation of  Article 15(4) to (6) of Directive 2008/115/EC of 
the  European  Parliament  and of the  Council of  16 December 
2008  on  common  standards and  procedures in  Member States 
for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ 2008 
L 348, p. 98). 
2       The reference was made in the course of administrative pro-
ceedings brought on the initiative of the director of the Direktsia 
‘Migratsia’ pri Ministerstvo na vatreshnite raboti (Directorate for 
Migration at the Ministry of the Interior) requesting the 
Administrativen  sad  Sofia-grad  (Sofia City Administrative Court) 
to rule of its own motion on the continued detention of Mr  
Kadzoev (Huchbarov) at that directorate’s special detention  
facility for foreign nationals (‘the detention centre’) in Busmantsi  
in the district of Sofia. 
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Legal context 
Community legislation 
3       Directive 2008/115 was adopted on the basis in particular of  
Article 63(3)(b) EC. According to recital 9 in the preamble to the 
directive: 
‘In accordance with Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 December 
2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for 
granting and withdrawing refugee status [OJ 2005 L 326, p. 13],  
a third-country national who has applied for asylum in a Member 
State should not be regarded as staying illegally on the territory  
of that Member State until a negative decision on the application,  
or a decision ending his or her right of stay as asylum seeker has 
entered into force.’ 
4       Article 15 of Directive 2008/115, which forms part of the chapter  
on detention for the purpose of removal, reads as follows: 
‘1.      Unless other sufficient but less coercive measures can be 
applied effectively in a specific case, Member States may only  
keep in detention a third-country national who is the subject of 
return procedures in order to prepare the return and/or carry out 
the removal process, in particular when: 
(a)      there is a risk of absconding or 
(b)      the third-country national concerned avoids or hampers  
the preparation of return or the removal process. 
Any detention shall be for as short a period as possible and only 
maintained as long as removal arrangements are in progress and 
executed with due diligence. 
2.      Detention shall be ordered by administrative or judicial 
authorities. 
Detention shall be ordered in writing with reasons being given in 
fact and in law. 
When detention has been ordered by administrative authorities, 
Member States shall: 
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(a)      either provide for a speedy judicial review of the  
lawfulness of detention to be decided on as speedily as 
possible from the beginning of detention; 
(b)      or grant the third-country national concerned the right to 
take proceedings by means of which the lawfulness of 
detention shall be subject to a speedy judicial review to be 
decided on as speedily as possible after the launch of the 
relevant proceedings. In such a case Member States shall 
immediately inform the third-country national concerned 
about the possibility of taking such proceedings. 
The third-country national concerned shall be released  
immediately if the detention is not lawful. 
3.      In every case, detention shall be reviewed at reasonable 
intervals of time either on application by the third-country  
national concerned or ex officio. In the case of prolonged  
detention periods, reviews shall be subject to the supervision of  
a judicial authority. 
4.      When it appears that a reasonable prospect of removal no 
longer exists for legal or other considerations or the conditions  
laid down in paragraph 1 no longer exist, detention ceases to be 
justified and the person concerned shall be released immediately. 
5.      Detention shall be maintained for as long a period as the 
conditions laid down in paragraph 1 are fulfilled and it is  
necessary to ensure successful removal. Each Member State  
shall set a limited period of detention, which may not exceed six 
months. 
6.      Member States may not extend the period referred to in 
paragraph 5 except for a limited period not exceeding a further  
12 months in accordance with national law in cases where 
regardless of all their reasonable efforts the removal operation is 
likely to last longer owing to: 
(a)      a lack of cooperation by the third-country national 
concerned, or 
(b)      delays in obtaining the necessary documentation from third 
countries.’ 
5       Under Article 20 of Directive 2008/115, Member States are required 
to bring into force the laws, regulations and  
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administrative provisions necessary to comply with the directive, 
with the exception of Article 13(4), by 24 December 2010. 
6       In accordance with Article 22 of the directive, it entered into  
force on 13 January 2009. 
 National legislation 
7       Directive 2008/115 was transposed into Bulgarian law by the  
Law on foreign nationals in the Republic of Bulgaria (DV No 153  
of 1998), as amended on 15 May 2009 (DV No 36 of 2009) (‘the 
Law on foreign nationals’). 
8       According to the referring court, Article 15(4) of the directive  
has, however, not yet been transposed into Bulgarian law. 
9       Under Article 44(6) of the Law on foreign nationals, where a 
coercive administrative measure cannot be applied to a foreign 
national because his identity has not been established or  
because he is likely to go into hiding, the body which adopted  
the measure may order the foreign national to be placed in a 
detention centre for foreign nationals in order to enable his 
deportation from the Republic of Bulgaria or expulsion to be 
arranged. 
10     Before the transposition of Directive 2008/115, detention in such  
a centre was not subject to any time-limit. 
11     Now, under Article 44(8) of the Law on foreign nationals, ‘[t]he 
detention shall last as long as the circumstances set out in 
paragraph 6 above pertain but may not exceed six months. 
Exceptionally, where the person refuses to cooperate with the 
competent authorities, where there is a delay in obtaining the 
documents essential for deportation or expulsion, or where the 
person constitutes a threat to national security or public order,  
the period of detention may be extended to 12 months’. 
12     Article 46a(3) to (5) of the Law on foreign nationals provide: 
‘(3)      Every six months the head of the detention centre for 
foreign nationals shall present a list of the foreign nationals who 
have been detained for more than six months owing to  
impediments to their removal from Bulgarian territory. The list is  
to be sent to the administrative court of the place where the 
detention centre is situated. 
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(4)      At the end of each period of six months’ detention in a 
detention centre, the court deliberating in private shall of its own 
motion determine whether the period of detention is to be 
extended, replaced, or terminated. No appeal shall lie against  
the court’s decision. 
(5)      Where the court annuls the contested detention order or 
orders the foreign national to be released, the latter shall be 
immediately released from the detention centre.’ 
The main proceedings and the reference for a preliminary ruling 
13     On 21 October 2006 a person was arrested by Bulgarian law 
enforcement officials near the border with Turkey. He had no 
identity documents and said that his name was Said Shamilovich 
Huchbarov, born on 11 February 1979 in Grozny (Chechnya). He 
stated that he did not wish the Russian consulate to be informed of 
his arrest. 
14     By decree of 22 October 2006 of the competent police  
department, a coercive administrative measure of deportation  
was imposed on him. 
15     He was placed in the detention centre on 3 November 2006, to  
be detained until it was possible to execute the decree, that is,  
until documents were obtained enabling him to travel abroad and 
sufficient funds guaranteed to purchase a ticket to Chechnya.  
The decree became enforceable on 17 April 2008, following  
judicial review proceedings. 
16     On 14 December 2006 he declared to the authorities of the 
detention centre that his real name was not Huchbarov but 
Kadzoev. 
17     In the course of two administrative proceedings before the 
Administrativen sad Sofia-grad, a birth certificate was produced 
showing that Mr Kadzoev was born on 11 February 1979 in  
Moscow (former Soviet Union) of a Chechen father, Shamil 
Kadzoev, and a Georgian mother, Loli Elihvari. However, a 
temporary identity card for a national of the Chechen Republic of 
Ichkeria, valid until 3 February 2001, issued in the name of Said 
Shamilovich Kadzoev, born on 11 February 1979 in Grozny, was 
also produced. The person concerned nevertheless continued to 
present himself to the authorities under the names of either 
Kadzoev or Huchbarov. 
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18     In the period from January 2007 to April 2008, there was an 
exchange of correspondence between the Bulgarian and Russian 
authorities. Contrary to the view of the Bulgarian authorities, the 
Russian authorities claimed that the temporary identity card in  
the name of Said Shamilovich Kadzoev came from persons and  
an authority unknown to the Russian Federation, and could not 
therefore be regarded as a document proving the person’s  
Russian nationality. 
19     On 31 May 2007, while he was detained in the detention centre,  
Mr Kadzoev applied for refugee status. The action he brought 
against the refusal of the Bulgarian administrative authorities to 
grant that application was dismissed by judgment of the 
Administrativen sad Sofia-grad of 9 October 2007. On 21 March 
2008 he made a second application for asylum, but withdrew it  
on 2 April 2008. On 24 March 2009 he made a third application  
for asylum. By decision of 10 July 2009, the Administrativen sad 
Sofia-grad dismissed his action and refused him asylum. No  
appeal lies against that decision. 
20     On 20 June 2008 Mr Kadzoev’s lawyer applied for the detention  
to be replaced by a less severe measure, namely the obligation  
for Mr Kadzoev to sign periodically a register kept by the police 
authorities at his place of residence. As the competent  
authorities considered that he had no actual address in Bulgaria, 
they rejected the application on the ground that the necessary 
conditions were not satisfied. 
21     On 22 October 2008 a similar application was made, which was 
likewise rejected. 
22     Following an administrative procedure brought at the request of  
Mr Kadzoev before the Commission for Protection against 
Discrimination, which gave rise to proceedings in the Varhoven 
administrativen sad (Supreme Administrative Court), that court,  
in agreement with the commission, accepted in its judgment of  
12 March 2009 that it was not possible to establish with certainty 
the identity and nationality of Mr Kadzoev, so that it considered  
him to be a stateless person. 
23     According to the order for reference, the help centre for  
survivors of torture, the office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees and Amnesty International find it 
credible that Mr Kadzoev was the victim of torture and inhuman  
and degrading treatment in his country of origin. 
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24     Despite the efforts of the Bulgarian authorities, several non-
governmental organisations and Mr Kadzoev himself to find a  
safe third country which could receive him, no agreement was 
reached, and he has not as yet obtained any travel documents. 
Thus the Republic of Austria and Georgia, to which the Bulgarian 
authorities applied, refused to accept Mr Kadzoev. The Republic  
of Turkey, to which the Bulgarian authorities also applied, did not 
reply. 
25     The Administrativen sad Sofia-grad states that Mr Kadzoev is still 
detained in the detention centre. 
26     The main proceedings were commenced by an administrative 
document filed by the director of the Directorate for Migration at  
the Ministry of the Interior, asking the Administrativen sad Sofia-
grad to rule of its own motion, pursuant to Article 46a(3) of the  
Law on foreign nationals, on the continued detention of Mr  
Kadzoev. 
27     That court states that, before the Law on foreign nationals in the 
Republic of Bulgaria was amended for the purpose of transposing 
Directive 2008/115, the duration of detention in the detention 
centre was not limited to any period. It points out that there are  
no transitional provisions governing situations in which decisions 
were taken before that amendment. The applicability of the new 
rules deriving from the directive to periods and the grounds for 
extending them is therefore a matter on which interpretation  
should be sought, especially as, in the case at issue in the main 
proceedings, the maximum duration of detention laid down by  
the directive had already been exceeded before the directive was 
adopted. 
28     Moreover, there is no express provision stating whether in a case 
such as the present one the periods referred to in Article 15(5)  
and (6) of Directive 2008/115 are to be understood as including  
the period during which the foreign national was detained when 
there was a legal prohibition on executing an administrative 
measure of ‘deportation’ on the ground that a procedure for 
recognition of humanitarian and refugee status had been  
initiated by Mr Kadzoev. 
29     Finally, the referring court indicates that, if there is no  
‘reasonable prospect of removal’ within the meaning of Article  
15(4) of Directive 2008/115, the question arises whether the 
immediate release of Mr Kadzoev should be ordered in  
accordance with that provision. 
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30     In those circumstances, the Administrativen sad Sofia-grad  
decided to stay the proceedings and refer the following questions  
to the Court for a preliminary ruling: 
‘1.      Must Article 15(5) and (6) of Directive 2008/115 … be 
interpreted as meaning that: 
(a)      where the national law of the Member State did not 
provide for a maximum period of detention or  
grounds for extending such detention before the 
transposition of the requirements of that directive  
and, on transposition of the directive, no provision  
was made for conferring retroactive effect on the  
new provisions, the requirements of the directive  
only apply and cause the period to start to run from 
their transposition into the national law of the Member 
State? 
(b)      within the periods laid down for detention in a 
specialised facility with a view to removal within the 
meaning of the directive, no account is to be taken  
of the period during which the execution of a  
decision of removal from the Member State under an 
express provision was suspended owing to a pending 
request for asylum by a third-country national,  
where during that procedure he continued to remain  
in that specialised detention facility, if the national  
law of the Member State so permits? 
2.      Must Article 15(5) and (6) of Directive 2008/115 … be 
interpreted as meaning that within the periods laid down  
for detention in a specialised facility with a view to  
removal within the meaning of that directive no account is  
to be taken of the period during which execution of a  
decision of removal from the Member State was suspended 
under an express provision on the ground that an appeal 
against that decision is pending, even though during the 
period of that procedure the third-country national has 
continued to stay in that specialised detention facility,  
where he did not have valid identity documents and there  
is therefore some doubt as to his identity or where he does 
not have any means of supporting himself or where he has 
demonstrated aggressive conduct? 
3.      Must Article 15(4) of Directive 2008/115 … be interpreted  
as meaning that removal is not reasonably possible where: 
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(a)      at the time when a judicial review of the detention  
is conducted, the State of which the person is a 
national has refused to issue him with a travel 
document for his return and until then there was no 
agreement with a third country in order to secure  
the person’s entry there even though the  
administrative bodies of the Member State are 
continuing to make endeavours to that end? 
(b)      at the time when a judicial review of the detention  
is conducted there was an agreement for  
readmission between the European Union and the  
State of which the person is a national, but, owing  
to the existence of new evidence, namely the  
person’s birth certificate, the Member State did not 
refer to the provisions of that agreement, if the  
person concerned does not wish to return?  
(c)      the possibilities of extending the detention periods 
provided for in Article 15(6) of the directive have  
been exhausted in the situation where no agreement 
for readmission has been reached with the third  
country at the time when a judicial review of his 
detention is conducted, regard being had to Article 
15(6)(b) of the directive? 
4.      Must Article 15(4) and (6) of Directive 2008/115 … be 
interpreted as meaning that if at the time when the  
detention with a view to removal of the third-country  
national is reviewed there is found to be no reasonable 
ground for removing him and the grounds for extending  
his detention have been exhausted, in such a case: 
(a)      it is none the less not appropriate to order his 
immediate release if the following conditions are all 
met: the person concerned does not have valid  
identity documents, whatever the duration of their 
validity, with the result that there is a doubt as to  
his identity, he is aggressive in his conduct, he has  
no means of supporting himself and there is no third 
person who has undertaken to provide for his 
subsistence? 
(b)      with a view to the decision on release it must be 
assessed whether, under the provisions of the  
national law of the Member State, the third-country 
national has the resources necessary to stay in the  
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 Member State as well as an address at which he may 
reside?’ 
The urgent procedure 
31     The Administrativen sad Sofia-grad asked for the reference for a 
preliminary ruling to be dealt with under an urgent procedure 
pursuant to Article 104b of the Rules of Procedure. 
32     The referring court justified its request by stating that the case 
raises the question whether Mr Kadzoev should be kept in  
detention in the detention centre or released. In view of his 
situation, the court stated that the proceedings should not be 
suspended for a prolonged period. 
33     The Second Chamber of the Court, after hearing the Advocate 
General, decided to grant the referring court’s request for the 
reference for a preliminary ruling to be dealt with under an  
urgent procedure, and to remit the case to the Court for it to be 
assigned to the Grand Chamber. 
The questions referred for a preliminary ruling 
Question 1(a) 
34     By Question 1(a) the referring court essentially asks whether  
Article 15(5) and (6) of Directive 2008/115 must be interpreted  
as meaning that the maximum duration of detention laid down in 
those provisions must include also the period of detention 
completed before the rules in the directive become applicable. 
35     It must be observed that Article 15(5) and (6) of Directive 
2008/115 fix the maximum period of detention for the purpose  
of removal. 
36     If the period of detention for the purpose of removal completed 
before the rules in Directive 2008/115 become applicable were  
not taken into account for calculating the maximum period of 
detention, persons in a situation such as that of Mr Kadzoev  
could be detained for longer than the maximum periods  
mentioned in Article 15(5) and (6) of that directive. 
37     Such a situation would not be consistent with the objective of  
those provisions of Directive 2008/115, namely to guarantee in  
 
188 
any event that detention for the purpose of removal does not 
exceed 18 months. 
38     Moreover, Article 15(5) and (6) of Directive 2008/115 apply 
immediately to the future consequences of a situation that arose 
when the previous rules were in force. 
39     The answer to Question 1(a) is therefore that Article 15(5) and  
(6) of Directive 2008/115 must be interpreted as meaning that  
the maximum duration of detention laid down in those provisions 
must include a period of detention completed in connection with  
a removal procedure commenced before the rules in that directive 
become applicable. 
Question 1(b) 
40     By Question 1(b) the referring court seeks to know whether,  
when calculating the period of detention for the purpose of  
removal under Article 15(5) and (6) of Directive 2008/115, the 
period must be included during which the execution of the  
removal decision was suspended because of the examination of  
an application for asylum by a third-country national, where,  
during the procedure relating to that application, he has  
remained in the detention centre. 
41     It should be recalled that recital 9 in the preamble to Directive 
2008/115 states that ‘[i]n accordance with … Directive 2005/85  
… a third-country national who has applied for asylum in a  
Member State should not be regarded as staying illegally on the 
territory of that Member State until a negative decision on the 
application, or a decision ending his or her right of stay as  
asylum seeker has entered into force’. 
42     In accordance with Article 7(1) and (3) of Council Directive 
2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003 laying down minimum standards  
for the reception of asylum seekers (OJ 2003 L 31, p. 18),  
asylum seekers may move freely within the territory of the host 
Member State or within an area assigned to them by that  
Member State, but when it proves necessary, for example for  
legal reasons or reasons of public order, Member States may 
confine an applicant to a particular place in accordance with their 
national law. 
43     Article 21 of Directive 2003/9 provides that Member States are  
to ensure that negative decisions relating to the granting of  
benefits under that directive or decisions taken under Article 7 
which individually affect asylum seekers may be the subject of  
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an appeal within the procedures laid down in the national law. At 
least in the last instance, the possibility of an appeal or a review 
before a judicial body must be granted. 
44     Under Article 18(1) of Directive 2005/85, Member States must  
not hold a person in detention for the sole reason that he or she  
is an applicant for asylum and, under Article 18(2), where an 
applicant for asylum is held in detention, Member States shall 
ensure that there is a possibility of speedy judicial review. 
45     Detention for the purpose of removal governed by Directive 
2008/115 and detention of an asylum seeker in particular under 
Directives 2003/9 and 2005/85 and the applicable national 
provisions thus fall under different legal rules. 
46     It is for the national court to determine whether Mr Kadzoev’s  
stay in the detention centre during the period in which he was an 
asylum seeker complied with the conditions laid down by the 
provisions of Community and national law concerning asylum 
seekers. 
47     Should it prove to be the case that no decision was taken on Mr 
Kadzoev’s placement in the detention centre in the context of the 
procedures opened following his applications for asylum, referred  
to in paragraph 19 above, so that his detention remained based  
on the previous national rules on detention for the purpose of 
removal or on the provisions of Directive 2008/115, Mr  
Kadzoev’s period of detention corresponding to the period during 
which those asylum procedures were under way would have to  
be taken into account in calculating the period of detention for  
the purpose of removal mentioned in Article 15(5) and (6) of 
Directive 2008/115. 
48     Consequently, the answer to Question 1(b) is that a period  
during which a person has been held in a detention centre on the 
basis of a decision taken pursuant to the provisions of national  
and Community law concerning asylum seekers may not be 
regarded as detention for the purpose of removal within the 
meaning of Article 15 of Directive 2008/115. 
Question 2 
49     By this question the referring court asks essentially whether  
Article 15(5) and (6) of Directive 2008/115 must be interpreted  
as meaning that the period during which execution of the decree  
of deportation was suspended because of a judicial review 
procedure brought against that decree by the person concerned  
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is to be taken into account in calculating the period of detention  
for the purpose of removal, where the person concerned  
continued to be held in a detention facility during that procedure. 
50     It must be observed that Article 13(1) and (2) of Directive 
2008/115 provide in particular that the third-country national 
concerned is to be afforded an effective remedy to appeal  
against or seek review of decisions related to return before a 
competent judicial or administrative authority or a competent  
body composed of members who are impartial and who enjoy 
safeguards of independence. That authority or body must have  
the power to review decisions related to return, including the 
possibility of temporarily suspending their enforcement, unless a 
temporary suspension is already applicable under national 
legislation. 
51     Neither Article 15(5) and (6) of Directive 2008/115 nor any other 
provision of that directive permits the view that periods of  
detention for the purpose of removal should not be included in  
the maximum duration of detention defined in Article 15(5) and  
(6) because of the suspension of execution of the removal decision. 
52     In particular, the suspension of execution of the removal  
decision because of a procedure for judicial review of that  
decision is not one of the grounds for extending the period of 
detention laid down in Article 15(6) of Directive 2008/115. 
53     The period of detention completed by the person concerned  
during the procedure in which the lawfulness of the removal 
decision is the subject of judicial review must therefore be taken 
into account for calculating the maximum duration of detention  
laid down in Article 15(5) and (6) of Directive 2008/115. 
54     If it were otherwise, the duration of detention for the purpose of 
removal could vary, sometimes considerably, from case to case 
within a Member State or from one Member State to another 
because of the particular features and circumstances peculiar to 
national judicial procedures, which would run counter to the 
objective pursued by Article 15(5) and (6) of Directive 2008/115, 
namely to ensure a maximum duration of detention common to  
the Member States. 
55     This conclusion is not called into question by the judgment in  
Case C-19/08 Petrosian [2009] ECR I-0000 relied on by the 
Bulgarian Government. In that case, which concerned the 
interpretation of Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 of 18 
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February 2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an  
asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a  
third-country national (OJ 2003 L 50, p. 1), the Court held that 
where, in the context of the procedure for transfer of an asylum 
seeker, the legislation of the requesting Member State provides  
for suspensive effect of an appeal, the period for implementation  
of the transfer laid down in Article 20(1)(d) of that regulation  
begins to run, not as from the time of the provisional judicial 
decision suspending the implementation of the transfer  
procedure, but only as from the time of the judicial decision  
which rules on the merits of the procedure and which is no  
longer such as to prevent its implementation. 
56     That interpretation of Article 20(1)(d) of Regulation No 343/2003 
cannot be transposed to the context of the interpretation of  
Article 15(5) and (6) of Directive 2008/115. While the period at 
issue in the Petrosian case determines the time available to the 
requesting Member State for implementing the transfer of an 
asylum seeker to the Member State which is obliged to readmit  
him, the maximum periods laid down in Article 15(5) and (6) of 
Directive 2008/115 serve the purpose of limiting the deprivation  
of a person’s liberty. Moreover, the latter periods set a limit to  
the duration of detention for the purpose of removal, not to the 
implementation of the removal procedure as such. 
57     Consequently, the answer to Question 2 is that Article 15(5) and  
(6) of Directive 2008/115 must be interpreted as meaning that  
the period during which execution of the decree of deportation  
was suspended because of a judicial review procedure brought 
against that decree by the person concerned is to be taken into 
account in calculating the period of detention for the purpose of 
removal, where the person concerned continued to be held in a 
detention facility during that procedure. 
Question 3 
58     By this question the referring court seeks clarification, in the  
light of the facts of the case in the main proceedings, of the 
meaning of Article 15(4) of Directive 2008/115, in particular of  
the concept of a ‘reasonable prospect of removal’. 
Question 3(c) 
59     By Question 3(c) the referring court asks whether Article 15(4)  
of Directive 2008/115 is to be interpreted as meaning that there is 
no reasonable prospect of removal where the possibilities of 
 
192 
extending the periods of detention provided for in Article 15(6) have 
been exhausted, in the situation where no agreement for 
readmission has been reached with the third country at the time 
when a judicial review of the detention of the person concerned  
is conducted. 
60     It is clear that, where the maximum duration of detention  
provided for in Article 15(6) of Directive 2008/115 has been 
reached, the question whether there is no longer a ‘reasonable 
prospect of removal’ within the meaning of Article 15(4) does not 
arise. In such a case the person concerned must in any event be 
released immediately. 
61     Article 15(4) of Directive 2008/115 can thus only apply if the 
maximum periods of detention laid down in Article 15(5) and (6)  
of the directive have not expired. 
62     Consequently, the answer to Question 3(c) is that Article 15(4)  
of Directive 2008/115 must be interpreted as not being  
applicable where the possibilities of extending the periods of 
detention provided for in Article 15(6) of Directive 2008/115  
have been exhausted at the time when a judicial review of the 
detention of the person concerned is conducted. 
Questions 3(a) and (b) 
63     As regards Questions 3(a) and (b), it should be pointed out that, 
under Article 15(4) of Directive 2008/115, detention ceases to be 
justified and the person concerned must be released immediately 
when it appears that, for legal or other considerations, a  
reasonable prospect of removal no longer exists. 
64     As is apparent from Article 15(1) and (5) of Directive 2008/115,  
the detention of a person for the purpose of removal may only  
be maintained as long as the removal arrangements are in  
progress and must be executed with due diligence, provided that  
it is necessary to ensure successful removal. 
65     It must therefore be apparent, at the time of the national court’s 
review of the lawfulness of detention, that a real prospect exists 
that the removal can be carried out successfully, having regard  
to the periods laid down in Article 15(5) and (6) of Directive 
2008/115, for it to be possible to consider that there is a 
‘reasonable prospect of removal’ within the meaning of Article  
15(4) of that directive. 
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66     Thus a reasonable prospect of removal does not exist where it 
appears unlikely that the person concerned will be admitted to a 
third country, having regard to those periods. 
67     Consequently, the answer to Questions 3(a) and (b) is that  
Article 15(4) of Directive 2008/115 must be interpreted as  
meaning that only a real prospect that removal can be carried  
out successfully, having regard to the periods laid down in Article 
15(5) and (6), corresponds to a reasonable prospect of removal, 
and that that reasonable prospect does not exist where it  
appears unlikely that the person concerned will be admitted to a 
third country, having regard to those periods. 
Question 4 
68     By this question the referring court asks essentially whether  
Article 15(4) and (6) of Directive 2008/115 allow the person 
concerned not to be released immediately, even though the 
maximum period of detention provided for by that directive has 
expired, on the grounds that he is not in possession of valid 
documents, his conduct is aggressive, and he has no means of 
supporting himself and no accommodation or means supplied by  
the Member State for that purpose. 
69     It must be pointed out that, as is apparent in particular from 
paragraphs 37, 54 and 61 above, Article 15(6) of Directive 
2008/115 in no case authorises the maximum period defined in  
that provision to be exceeded. 
70     The possibility of detaining a person on grounds of public order  
and public safety cannot be based on Directive 2008/115. None  
of the circumstances mentioned by the referring court can  
therefore constitute in itself a ground for detention under the 
provisions of that directive. 
71     Consequently, the answer to Question 4 is that Article 15(4) and  
(6) of Directive 2008/115 must be interpreted as not allowing, 
where the maximum period of detention laid down by that  
directive has expired, the person concerned not to be released 
immediately on the grounds that he is not in possession of valid 
documents, his conduct is aggressive, and he has no means of 
supporting himself and no accommodation or means supplied by  
the Member State for that purpose. 
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Costs 
72     Since these proceedings are, for the parties to the main 
proceedings, a step in the action pending before the national  
court, the decision on costs is a matter for that court. Costs  
incurred in submitting observations to the Court, other than the 
costs of those parties, are not recoverable. 
On those grounds, the Court (Grand Chamber) hereby rules: 
1.      Article 15(5) and (6) of Directive 2008/115/EC of  
the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
December 2008 on common standards and  
procedures in Member States for returning illegally 
staying third-country nationals must be interpreted  
as meaning that the maximum duration of detention 
laid down in those provisions must include a period  
of detention completed in connection with a removal 
procedure commenced before the rules in that  
directive become applicable. 
2.      A period during which a person has been held in a 
detention centre on the basis of a decision taken 
pursuant to the provisions of national and  
Community law concerning asylum seekers may not  
be regarded as detention for the purpose of removal 
within the meaning of Article 15 of Directive  
2008/115. 
3.      Article 15(5) and (6) of Directive 2008/115 must be 
interpreted as meaning that the period during which 
execution of the decree of deportation was  
suspended because of a judicial review procedure 
brought against that decree by the person concerned  
is to be taken into account in calculating the period  
of detention for the purpose of removal, where the 
person concerned continued to be held in a  
detention facility during that procedure. 
4.      Article 15(4) of Directive 2008/115 must be 
interpreted as not being applicable where the 
possibilities of extending the periods of detention 
provided for in Article 15(6) of Directive 2008/115 
have been exhausted at the time when a judicial  
review of the detention of the person concerned is 
conducted. 
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5.      Article 15(4) of Directive 2008/115 must be 
interpreted as meaning that only a real prospect that 
removal can be carried out successfully, having  
regard to the periods laid down in Article 15(5) and 
(6), corresponds to a reasonable prospect of  
removal, and that that reasonable prospect does not 
exist where it appears unlikely that the person 
concerned will be admitted to a third country, having 
regard to those periods. 
6.      Article 15(4) and (6) of Directive 2008/115 must be 
interpreted as not allowing, where the maximum  
period of detention laid down by that directive has 
expired, the person concerned not to be released 
immediately on the grounds that he is not in 
possession of valid documents, his conduct is 
aggressive, and he has no means of supporting  
himself and no accommodation or means supplied by 
the Member State for that purpose. 
[Signatures] 
* Language of the case: Bulgarian. 
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Overview of preliminary references pending with regard to the Returns Directive  
-Tribunale di Ragusa, 9 February 2011, Mohamed Mrad, case C-60/11, OJ C 113, 
09.04.2011, p.8;  
Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Ragusa (Italy) lodged on 9 
February 2011 — Criminal proceedings against Mohamed Mrad 
(Case C-60/11) 
(2011/C 113/15) 
Language of the case: Italian 
Referring court 
Tribunale di Ragusa 
Party/parties to the main proceedings 
Mohamed Mrad 
Question referred 
1. Is Directive 2008/115/EC ( 1 ) to be regarded as directly applicable within the 
domestic law of the Italian State with effect from 25 December 2010? 
2. Is Article 14(5)(b) and (5)(c) of Legislative Decree No 286/98, as subsequently 
amended, incompatible with Articles 15 and 16 of the directive referred to above, 
with the effect that this court is obliged to disapply the domestic legislation in 
question? 
( 1 ) OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98. 
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- Tribunale di Ivrea, 4 February 2011, Lucky Emegor, case C-50/11, OJ C 113, 
09.04.2011, p.7;  
Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Ivrea (Italy) lodged on 4 
February 2011 — Criminal proceedings against Lucky Emegor 
(Case C-50/11) 
(2011/C 113/14) 
Language of the case: Italian 
Referring court 
Tribunale di Ivrea 
Party to the main proceedings 
Lucky EmegorEN 9.4.2011 Official Journal of the European Union C 113/7 
Question referred 
In the light of the principles of sincere cooperation and the effectiveness of 
directives, do Articles 15 and 16 of Directive 2008/115/EC ( 1 ) preclude a third-
country national staying unlawfully in national territory from being sentenced to a 
term of imprisonment of up to four years in the event of failure to comply with 
the initial order issued by the Questore for removal from national territory within 
five days of notification, and a term of between one and five years’ imprisonment 
for failure to comply with subsequent orders, with the police authorities under an 
obligation to arrest those engaged in the commission of this offence, solely on 
account of his failure to cooperate in the deportation procedure and in particular 
failure to comply with the removal order issued by the administrative authorities? 
( 1 ) OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98. 
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- Tribunale Ordinario Di Milano, 31 January 2011, Assane Samb, Case C-43/11, 
OJ C 113, 09.04.2011, p.7;  
Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale Ordinario Di Milano (Italy) 
lodged on 31 January 2011 — Criminal proceedings against Assane Samb 
(Case C-43/11) 
(2011/C 113/12) 
Language of the case: Italian 
Referring court 
Tribunale Ordinario Di Milano 
Defendant in the criminal proceedings 
Assane Samb 
Question referred 
In the light of the principles of sincere cooperation and of the effectiveness of 
directives, do Articles 15 and 16 of Directive 2008/115/EC ( 1 ) preclude the 
possibility that a third-country national illegally staying in a Member State may be 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment of up to four years where he fails to comply 
with the first order issued by the Questore and a term of imprisonment of up to 
five years for failure to comply with subsequent orders (with the corresponding 
obligation for the police authorities to arrest those engaged in the commission of 
this offence) simply on account of his lack of cooperation in the deportation 
procedure, in particular his simple failure to comply with a removal order issued 
by the administrative authorities? 
( 1 ) OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98. 
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- Tribunale di Bergamo, 28 February 2011, Survival Godwin, Case C-94/11 OJ C 
139, 7.5.2011, p. 4;  
Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Bergamo (Italy) lodged on 
28 February 2011 — Criminal proceedings against Survival Godwin 
(Case C-94/11) 
(2011/C 139/26) 
Language of the case: Italian 
Referring court 
Tribunale di Bergamo 
Party/parties to the main proceedings 
Survival Godwin 
Question(s) referred 
In the light of the principles of sincere cooperation and the effectiveness of 
directives, do Articles 15 and 16 of Directive 2008/115/EC ( 1 ) preclude the 
possibility that the conduct of a third-country national illegally staying in a 
Member State may be categorised as punishable under criminal law — simply on 
account of his lack of cooperation in the deportation procedure, in particular his 
mere failure to comply with a removal order issued by the administrative 
authorities — by a sentence of imprisonment of up to four years for failure to 
comply with the initial order issued by the Questore and a term of imprisonment 
of up to five years for failure to comply with subsequent orders? 
( 1 ) OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98. 
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- Tribunale di Rovereto, 11 February 2011, John Austine, Case C-63/11, OJ C 120, 
16.04.2011, p.5;  
Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Rovereto (Italy) lodged on 
11 February 2011 — Criminal proceedings against John Austine 
(Case C-63/11) 
(2011/C 120/09) 
Language of the case: italian 
Referring court 
Tribunale di Rovereto 
Party to the main proceedings 
John Austine 
Question referred 
In the light of the principles of sincere cooperation and the effectiveness of 
directives, are Articles 15 and 16 of Directive 2008/115/EC ( 1 ) to be interpreted 
as precluding a Member State from providing that an illegally staying third 
country national who fails to cooperate in the administrative return procedure 
isEN 16.4.2011 Official Journal of the European Union C 120/5 
to be subject to measures involving deprivation of liberty on the basis of 
measures, other than detention measures, as defined under national law, in the 
absence of the requirements and safeguards laid down in Articles 15 and 16, on 
grounds of failure to comply with a removal order issued by the competent 
administrative authorities in accordance with Article 8(3) of the directive? 
( 1 ) OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98. 
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- Tribunale di Santa Maria Capua Vetere, 7 March 2011, Yeboah Kwadwo, Case 
C-120/11, OJ C 145 14.5.2011, p. 17 
Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Tribunale di Santa Maria Capua Vetere 
(Italy) lodged on 7 March 2011 — Criminal proceedings against Yeboah Kwadwo 
(Case C-120/11) 
(2011/C 145/23) 
Language of the case: Italian 
Referring court 
Tribunale di Santa Maria Capua Vetere 
Party to the main proceedings 
Yeboah Kwadwo 
Question referred 
In the light of the principles of sincere cooperation, the effectiveness of directives 
and the proportionality and effectiveness of coercive measures for the return of 
illegally staying foreign nationals, do Articles 2, 15 and 16 of Directive 
2008/115/EC ( 1 ) preclude an illegally staying foreign national who has simply 
failed to comply with the deportation order and the removal order issued by the 
administrative authorities from incurring criminal liability and being sentenced to 
a term of imprisonment of up to four years if he fails to comply with the first 
removal order and up to five years if he fails to comply with subsequent orders 
issued by the Questore? 
( 1 ) OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98 
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- Corte Suprema di Cassazione, 21 March 2011, Demba Ngagne, Case C-140/11, 
OJ C 152, 21.5.2011, p. 16 
Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Italy) 
lodged on 21 March 2011 — Criminal proceedings against Demba Ngagne 
(Case C-140/11) 
(2011/C 152/28) 
Language of the case: Italian 
Referring court 
Corte Suprema di Cassazione 
Party to the main proceedings 
Demba Ngagne 
Questions referred 
1. Must Article 7(1) and (4), Article 8(1), (3) and (4), and Article 15(1) of Directive 
2008/115/EC ( 1 ) be construed as precluding a Member State from ordering a 
non-national who is unlawfully present on its territory to depart from that 
territory when it is not possible to proceed by means of deportation, whether 
immediate or following detention, thereby reversing the priorities and the order 
of procedure laid down in those provisions? 
2. Must Article 15(1), (4), (5) and (6) of Directive 2008/115/EC accordingly be 
construed as precluding a Member State from providing, as a consequence of 
unjustifiable non-cooperation on the part of a non-national in his own voluntary 
return, and on that ground alone, that that person is to be charged with an 
offence punishable by a custodial sentence (imprisonment) which is (up to 10 
times) longer than the period of pre-deportation detention, which is no longer 
possible, or objectively impossible, to apply? 
3. Can Article 2(2)(b) of Directive 2008/115/EC be construed, in the light of Article 
8 of that directive and the common policy areas identified, in particular, by Article  
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79 TFEU, as meaning that it is sufficient for the Member State to decide to 
categorise as a crime the non-national’s non-cooperation in his own voluntary 
return, because the directive does not apply? 
4. Must, on the contrary, Article 2(2)(b) and Article 15(4), (5) and (6) of Directive 
2008/115/EC be construed, in the light of Article 5 of the ECHR, as precluding a 
non-national who is unlawfully present on the national territory and in whose 
case pre-deportation detention is objectively impossible, or no longer possible, 
from being subjected to a spiral of voluntary departure orders and restrictions on 
his freedom, the legal basis for which is the fact that his disobedience of those 
orders is categorised as a punishable offence? 
5. In conclusion, is it possible to assert — in the light of recital 10 [in the preamble 
to Directive 2008/115/EC], the earlier version of Article 23 of the Convention 
implementing the Schengen Agreement, the recommendations and guidelines 
referred to in the preamble to Directive 2008/115/EC, and Article 5 of the ECHR — 
that Article 7(1) and (4), Article 8(1), (3) and (4), and Article 15(1), (4), (5) and (6) 
confer the status of a binding rule on the principles that the restriction of freedom 
for the purposes of repatriation falls to be regarded as an extreme measure 
(extrema ratio) and that no custodial measure is justified where it is linked to a 
deportation procedure in relation to which there is no reasonable prospect of 
return? 
( 1 ) OJ 2008 L 348, p. 98. 
 
 
